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Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

blog.mozilla.org

31–40 of 121 posts

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#32
Not sure why it took so long for Mozilla to expose the setting on Android, it's been a 'secret' setting for a long time. In fact, sometimes they let features ride the rails for a little bit too long IMO.

For Waterfox for Android I exposed the setting by default and also added an addition DNS over Oblivious HTTP setting (DoOH) which uses Fastly as the relay (they host and control it, for privacy sanitisation) and Cloudflare as the resolver.

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#33
>DNS query [...] in the clear. [...] (DoH) plugs this privacy leak [...] no one on the network, not your internet service provider [...] can eavesdrop on your browsing

Whoever could see DNS traffic can still see the target you're connecting to...

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#35
post #33

>DNS query [...] in the clear. [...] (DoH) plugs this privacy leak [...] no one on the network, not your internet service provider [...] can eavesdrop on your browsing Whoever could see DNS traffic can still see the target you're connecting to...

But if that request is going to a large provider (GCP, AWS, CloudFlare), without the hostname, the request is going to be close to meaningless for the snoop.

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#36

This doesn't address why this needs to be built in to the browser when Android already does DoH by itself. I assume there's a reason, does anyone know what it is?

I thought Android only supported DNS over TLS, so at least this opens up options for people.

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#37

This doesn't address why this needs to be built in to the browser when Android already does DoH by itself. I assume there's a reason, does anyone know what it is?

Android privacy tools are leaky (which is bad given it's privacy tooling, you don't want that to leak!) Their VPN tools on OS level are pretty notorious for not properly respecting kill switch settings[0]. That alone makes a native browser implementation a better solution than the OS version. [0]: https://mullvad.net/en/blog/dns-traffic-can-leak-outside-the... is just one example I found on Google (in this case, usin…

What does your post have to do with DoH though?

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#39
Firefox for Android is some of the worst software I've ever used. A lot of extensions won't work in it, and even Edge Canary is far better with them. It is extremely slow, and the UI is horrible.

I'm running it on a device with a Qualcomm SM8635 Snapdragon 8s Gen 3 chipset, and it just crawls. The UI is very unresponsive, and page load times are terrible. It also has to reload the page if it was running in the background and you switch back to it.

Re: Firefox 143 for Android to introduce DoH

#40

This doesn't address why this needs to be built in to the browser when Android already does DoH by itself. I assume there's a reason, does anyone know what it is?

First not all Android versions do that, and not all vendors implement that. Not everyone is running the latest version and has a Google Pixel. Second passing from the OS is less secure since there are a multitude of actors, Google, the device vendor, eventual VPN app, etc. that could get access to that queries (in fact apps to block ADS such as ADAway if you don't have root use VPN functionality to intercept DNS queries). In the end if you want to be safe better not pass from the OS in the first place.
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