As an AWS-focused practitioner, I started doing Google Cloud training and it blew my mind when I found out that the multiple account sub-account mess that AWS continues to use just doesn’t exist there. GCP sensibly uses a folder and project system that provides a lot of flexibility and IAM control. It also blew my mind that Google Cloud VPCs and autoscaling groups are global, so that you don’t have to jump through ho…
AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
31–40 of 85 posts
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think Google scares a lot of people away with their approach of not being able to talk to any human whatsoever unless you spend a lot of money on a monthly basis. I read a lot of horror stories of people getting in troubles with GCP and not being able to talk to a human person, whereas you would get access to some human presence with AWS. Things might have been changed, but I guess a lot of people have still this i…
I’m scared of Google realising that maintaining a given cloud product just isn’t fun anymore and sending it to the Google graveyard.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#33In this case, I was looking for a threat model within which this is a vulnerability but unable to find so.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
I disagree with your opinion here: The contents of security policies can easily be sensitive information. I think what you mean to say is, "Amazon has decided not to treat the contents of security policies as sensitive information, and told its customers to act accordingly" , which is a totally orthogonal claim. It's extremely unlikely that every decision Amazon makes is the best one for security. This is an example…
It’s not orthogonal. The foundation of good security is using your tools correctly. AWS explicitly tells users to not store sensitive information in policies. If you’re doing so, it’s not AWS making the mistake.
Just because Amazon tells people not to put sensitive information in a security policy, doesn't mean a security policy can't or shouldn't contain sensitive information. It more likely means Amazon failed to properly implement security policies (since they CAN contain sensitive information), and gives their guidance as an excuse/workaround. The proper move would be to properly implement security policies such that the access is as limited as expected, because again, security policies can contain sensitive information.
An analogy would be a car manufacturer that tells owners to not put anything in the car they don't want exploded. "But they said don't do it!" -- Obviously this is still unreasonable: A reasonable person would expect their car to not explode things inside it, just like a reasonable person would expect their cloud provider to treat customer security policies as sensitive data. Don't believe me here? Call up a sample of randomly-selected companies and ask for a copy of their security policies.
This is key to understand here: What Amazon says is best security given their existing decisions is not the best security for a cloud provider to provide customers. We're discussing the latter: Not security given a tool, but security of the tool itself, and the decisions that went into designing the tool. It's certainly not the case that the tool is perfect and can't be improved, and it's not a given that the tool is even good.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#35More over, the issue wasn’t that AWS recommended or automatically setup the environment insecurely. Their documentation simply left the commonly known best practice of disallowing trusts from lower to prod environments implicit, rather than explicitly recommending users follow that best practice in using the solution.
I don’t think over-hyping smaller issues, handled appropriately, helps anyone.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
I don't know GCP but my experiences with Azure were also way smoother than AWS. It's like the Amazon folks are not even trying to work on less friction...
Which parts of Azure have you used that have less friction than AWS?
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
Hey, author of the blog here :) Just wanted to point out that it is not just names of objects in sensitive accounts exposed here - as I wrote, the spoke roles also have iam:ListRoles and iam:ListPolicies, which is IMO much more sensitive than just object names . These contain a whole lot of information about who is allowed to do what, and can point at serious misconfigurations that can then be exploited onwards (e.g.…
ListPolicies does not show the contents of policies, so the information you mentioned isn’t possible to obtain from there. Things like GetKeyPolicy do, but as I mentioned in my comments already, the contents of policies are not sensitive information, and your security model should assume they are already known by would-be attackers. “My trust policy has a vulnerability in it but I’m safe because the attacker can’t re…
The goal in preventing enumeration isn't to hide defects in the security policy. The goal is to make it more difficult for attackers to determine what and how they need to attack to move closer to their target. Less information about what privileges a given user/role have = more noise from the attacker, and more dwell time, all other things being equal. Both of which increase the likelihood of detection prior to full compromise.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#38As an AWS-focused practitioner, I started doing Google Cloud training and it blew my mind when I found out that the multiple account sub-account mess that AWS continues to use just doesn’t exist there. GCP sensibly uses a folder and project system that provides a lot of flexibility and IAM control. It also blew my mind that Google Cloud VPCs and autoscaling groups are global, so that you don’t have to jump through ho…
I think Google scares a lot of people away with their approach of not being able to talk to any human whatsoever unless you spend a lot of money on a monthly basis. I read a lot of horror stories of people getting in troubles with GCP and not being able to talk to a human person, whereas you would get access to some human presence with AWS. Things might have been changed, but I guess a lot of people have still this i…
Google’s poor support reputation is deserved, but I’m not sure I’d want to architect extra stuff over that issue. After I found out those facts about GCP I was pretty sure I could have gotten 6 months of my professional life back because of the architecture of GCP being superior.
Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#39Re: AWS Built a Security Tool. It Introduced a Security Risk
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
Google's resource management + AWS's IAM + Azure's... nah == best of everything.
AWS IAM terrible, GCP's is much better
How is GCP much better? FWIW I use/evangelize GCP everyday. Their IAM setup is just very naive and seems like it has had things bolted on as an afterthought. AWS is much more well designed and future proof.