Earlier quoted context omitted.
Say I walk into a machine, and then I walk out, and also an exact duplicate walks out of a nearby chamber. My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. One of us would have the experience of walking into the machine and walking out again, and the other would have the experience of walking into the machine and being teleported into the other chamber. Im probably lacking in imagination, or the relevant background, b…
> My assumption is that we’d both feel like “me”. You assume that both would feel like you, but there is no way you can prove it. The other can be a philosophical zombie [1] for all you know. Would the "current you" feel any different after the duplication? Most people, including me, would find this counterintuitive. What happens if the other you travels to the other end of the world? What would you see? The question…
Both of the replicas would refer to themselves as "I", but neither would refer to the other as "I".