Earlier quoted context omitted.
Erlang actors are not privately addressable, so they cannot be used for capability security. The actors described here are.
Joe Armstrong goes to lengths to describe the benefits of "privately addressable" actors in his thesis (though he uses different terminology). As far as I'm aware, Erlang actors are also privately addressable. cf: > System security is intimately connected with the idea of knowing the name of a process. If we do not know the name of a process we cannot interact with it in any way, thus the system is secure. Once the n…
And beyond that, there is no sandboxing in Erlang that allows you to do anything like spawn a process that can't access the disk or network or anything like that. So in practice that doesn't even hardly buy you anything on a real system because if you were somehow running unauthenticated Erlang code you've already got access corresponding to the OS permissions of the running Erlang process. (Though for those not familiar with Erlang, "somehow running unauthenticated Erlang code" is very unlikely, to the point that it's not a realistic threat. I'm just speaking hypothetically here.)
The thesis may cover how such systems could be turned to a more secure context but it does not correspond to current Erlang.