31–40 of 433 posts
Some DNS providers suck and only let you set 1024 bit long keys. For example wordpress.com.
You aren't in danger.
[1]: https://sympa.inria.fr/sympa/arc/cado-nfs/2020-02/msg00001.h...
Could someone help me understand why we're not dramatically ramping up key sizes across the board on all encryption? Not as a solution, but as a buy-some-time measure. Compute is rapidly increasing, there is continuous chatter about quantum and yet everyone seems to be just staring at their belly buttons. Obviously bigger keys are more expensive in compute, but we've got more too...why only use it on the cracking sid…
We are doing that, just not everyone is as concerned by safety and make different tradeoffs against things like ease of use or accessibility. Different applications have different tolerances and that’s fine. If and when anything quantum is able to yield results (I wouldn’t worry much about this), increasing key size is pretty much meaningless, you need to move to other encryption schemes (there’s lots of options alre…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Those 1,700 are easy to find though, just need to dig a bunch of domain names and you'll find plenty vulnerable ones that you can spoof. Yahoo Mail has a market share on the order of 3%. So a black hat could then target a decent chunk of users with @yahoo addresses specifically. Has anyone heard of this being exploited in the wild? Would be interesting to find out whether there are some reputable domains among the 1.…
Your claim that yahoo uses a 512bit key are counterfactual. Please adhere to honesty and good faith arguments.
The article clearly states that Yahoo is one of the 3 clients that didn't reject 512bit keys the way they should per RFC.
Yahoo Mail inbox users are vulnerable _receivers_ of spoofed emails.
Could someone help me understand why we're not dramatically ramping up key sizes across the board on all encryption? Not as a solution, but as a buy-some-time measure. Compute is rapidly increasing, there is continuous chatter about quantum and yet everyone seems to be just staring at their belly buttons. Obviously bigger keys are more expensive in compute, but we've got more too...why only use it on the cracking sid…
Probably because RSA 2048 is not yet broken, and once there we still have RSA 4096 to lean back on which is since quite some time the most common key size for most things using RSA (DKIM being one of the exceptions). In the context of DKIM we're waiting for Ed25519 to reach major adoption, which will solve a lot of annoyances for everyone.
3072 has been recommended by various parties for a few years now:
Could someone help me understand why we're not dramatically ramping up key sizes across the board on all encryption? Not as a solution, but as a buy-some-time measure. Compute is rapidly increasing, there is continuous chatter about quantum and yet everyone seems to be just staring at their belly buttons. Obviously bigger keys are more expensive in compute, but we've got more too...why only use it on the cracking sid…
Probably because RSA 2048 is not yet broken, and once there we still have RSA 4096 to lean back on which is since quite some time the most common key size for most things using RSA (DKIM being one of the exceptions). In the context of DKIM we're waiting for Ed25519 to reach major adoption, which will solve a lot of annoyances for everyone.
(This isn’t intended as a leading question.)
Me writing over 14 years ago: https://blog.jgc.org/2010/06/facebooks-dkim-rsa-key-should-b... This was doable 14 years ago for 512-bit keys.
So we went to a few weeks to 8h in 14 years give or take
Me writing over 14 years ago: https://blog.jgc.org/2010/06/facebooks-dkim-rsa-key-should-b... This was doable 14 years ago for 512-bit keys.
DKIM deniability is a particular hobbyhorse of mine [1]. These short keys are obviously not the way to achieve it, but I view this kind of thing as a result of the muddled thinking that’s been associated with DKIM and the community’s lack of desire to commit to the implications of an all-email signing mechanism.
[1] https://blog.cryptographyengineering.com/2020/11/16/ok-googl...
Me writing over 14 years ago: https://blog.jgc.org/2010/06/facebooks-dkim-rsa-key-should-b... This was doable 14 years ago for 512-bit keys.
For a number of years it was (non-officially) thought to be a feature to use weak DKIM keys. Some folks argued that short keys allowed you to preserve deniability, since DKIM signatures would only be short-lived and nobody would be able to use DKIM signatures to prove that any email was authentic. (I’m not saying that this is why most companies used short keys, just that there was a general view that short keys were…