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LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

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Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>I think the test is better than many other commenters are giving credit. The test is fine. The conclusion drawn from it, not so much. If humans fail your test for x and you're certain humans have x then you're not really testing for x. x may be important to your test for sure but you're testing for something else too. Or maybe humans don't have x after all. Either conclusion is logically consistent at least. It's th…

> The conclusion drawn from it, not so much. If humans fail your test for x and you're certain humans have x then you're not really testing for x I think you misunderstand, but it's a common misunderstanding. Humans have the * ability* to reason. This is not equivalent to saying that humans reason at all times (this was also started in my previous comment) So it's none of: "humans have x", "humans don't have x", nor…

>I think you misunderstand, but it's a common misunderstanding. Humans have the ability to reason. This is not equivalent to saying that humans reason at all times (this was also started in my previous comment)

>So it's none of: "humans have x", "humans don't have x", nor "humans have x but f doesn't have x because humans perform y on x and f performs z on x".

This is all rather irrelevant here. You can sit a human for some arbitrarily long time on this test and he/she will be unable to solve it even if the human has theory of mind (the property we're looking for) the entire duration of the test, ergo the test is not properly testing for the property of theory of mind.

>So I don't know why you're talking about trickery. The models are explicitly trained to solve problems like these.

Models are trained to predict text. Solving problems is just what is often the natural consequence of this objective.

It's trickery the same way it can be considered trickery when professors would do it to human testers. Humans and Machines that memorize things take shortcuts in prediction when they encounter what they've memorized "in the wild". That's the entire point of memorization really.

The human or model might fail not because it lacks the reasoning abilities to solve your problem, but because its attention is diverted by misleading cues or subtle twists in phrasing.

And if you care about the latter, fine!, that's not a bad thing to care about but then don't pretend you are only testing raw problem solving ability.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#32

Deducing things from the inability of an LLM to answer a specific question seemed doomed by the "it will be able to on the next itteration" principle. It seems like the only way you could systematic chart the weaknesses of an LLM is by having a class of problems that get harder for LLMs at a steep rate, so a small increase in problem complexity requires a significant increase in LLM power.

> It seems like the only way you could systematic chart the weaknesses of an LLM is by having a class of problems that get harder for LLMs at a steep rate

That would be any problem more complicated than O(n) complexity, even with chain-of-thought prompting[1].

Note that the O(n) thing can bite you in all sorts of unintuitive ways: if the LLM+CoT can perform an O(n) Task A and O(m) Task B, then it can't do the O(nm) task "for every step of A, perform B on the result" unless you come up with a task-specific prompt outlining the solution. The alternative is to play RLHF Whack-A-Mole, separately training the LLM on the combined task. (I think this weakness might be why LLMs are hitting a wall in enterprise deployment, and also explains why LLM agents don't actually work.) The only way this will get fixed is with a fundamentally more sophisticated architecture.

[1] https://www.quantamagazine.org/how-chain-of-thought-reasonin...

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#33
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Deducing things from the inability of an LLM to answer a specific question seemed doomed by the "it will be able to on the next itteration" principle. That's orthogonal. If we are pointing in the right direction(s) then yes, next iteration could resolve all problems. If we are not pointing in the right direction(s) then no, next iteration will not resolve these problems. Given LLMs rapid improvement in regurgitatin…

GP is referring to the fact that if it becomes well known that LLM version X can’t solve problem Q, then the model’s trainers will make sure to include problem Q prominently in the training set, running it through over and over to ensure that version X+1 is able to solve the problem whether the model’s “reasoning” abilities have improved or not. Thus observers of the LLM space like us need to keep finding novel “Bell…

Oh, thanks for the correction. I did misinterpret.

Though I will say that LLMs don't appear to be doing any better at the river crossing puzzles. They tend to "patch" the ones I and others actively tweet about but they still aren't becoming better at generalizing. I've taken this as fairly strong evidence as we're going in the wrong direction of reasoning (as opposed to similar direction). But the strongest evidence to me is that they're entropy minimizers.

What's extra interesting, is transformers CRAVE augmentations. I work in vision and this is a necessary thing to get them to do well. You can actually get much smaller models to do what bigger models can if you get this right.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#34
LLMs and NLP are to verbal reasoning what the calculator is to quantitative reasoning.

Language and by extension verbal reasoning is full of ambiguity and semantic slipperiness. For example, what degree of semantic similarity distinguishes synonymous from synonym-ish concepts? When do we partition concepts into homonyms?

I think part of the problem with how people evaluate LLMs is that the expectations that people have. Natural language != ontology. The expectation should be more Chomsky and less Boole. Asking it to solve math problems written in paragraph form is a waste of time. Use a calculator for that! Solving riddles? Code it up in prolog!

Instead you should be thinking of what operations you can do on concepts, meaning, and abstract ideas! That is what these things do.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#35

LLMs and NLP are to verbal reasoning what the calculator is to quantitative reasoning. Language and by extension verbal reasoning is full of ambiguity and semantic slipperiness. For example, what degree of semantic similarity distinguishes synonymous from synonym-ish concepts? When do we partition concepts into homonyms? I think part of the problem with how people evaluate LLMs is that the expectations that people ha…

Is this really verbal reasoning? It's just a logic problem.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#36
Not really about Theory of Mind, but in the same line, I remember the other day someone argued with me that LLMs model the world, rather than just modelling language (that may represent the world).

I kept thinking about that problem and plausible experiments to show my point that LLMs are dumb about the physical world, even if they know perfectly how it works in terms of language/representation. So I thought, what happens if I give an LLM an image and I ask a representation of said image in ASCII art (obviously without relying in Python and the trivial pixel intensity to character transform it usually proposes). Remember:

- LLMs should've been trained with a lot of RGB image training data with associated captions => So it should understand images very well.

- LLMs should've been trained with a lot of ASCII training data with associated captions => So it should draw/write ASCII like an expert. Plus, it understands vision apparently (managed as tokens), so it should do well.

But it can't do a decent translation that captures the most interesting features of an image into ASCII art (I'm pretty sure a human with an hour of time should be able to do it, even if its awful ASCII art). For example, I uploaded an image macro meme with text and two pictures of different persons kind of looking at each other. The ASCII art representation just showed two faces, that didn't look at each other but rather away from each other. It just does not "understand" the concept of crossing sights (even if it "understands" the language and even image patches when you ask about where are they looking at, it will not draw that humanly important stuff by itself).

These things just work with tokens, and that is useful and seems like magic in a lot of domains. But there is no way in hell we are going to get into AGI without a fully integrated sensor platform that can model the world in its totality including interacting with it (i.e. like humans in training, but not necessarily in substrate nor training time hopefully). And I really don't know how something that has a very partial model of the world can have a Theory of Mind.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#37

LLMs and NLP are to verbal reasoning what the calculator is to quantitative reasoning. Language and by extension verbal reasoning is full of ambiguity and semantic slipperiness. For example, what degree of semantic similarity distinguishes synonymous from synonym-ish concepts? When do we partition concepts into homonyms? I think part of the problem with how people evaluate LLMs is that the expectations that people ha…

Is this really verbal reasoning? It's just a logic problem.

How can one / should one combine the concepts of a dinosaur and monetary policy of the Ottoman Empire? What differentiates verbal reasoning from logic?

I don’t know that either of those can be solved well with formal languages or logic.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>I think the test is better than many other commenters are giving credit. The test is fine. The conclusion drawn from it, not so much. If humans fail your test for x and you're certain humans have x then you're not really testing for x. x may be important to your test for sure but you're testing for something else too. Or maybe humans don't have x after all. Either conclusion is logically consistent at least. It's th…

> The conclusion drawn from it, not so much. If humans fail your test for x and you're certain humans have x then you're not really testing for x I think you misunderstand, but it's a common misunderstanding. Humans have the * ability* to reason. This is not equivalent to saying that humans reason at all times (this was also started in my previous comment) So it's none of: "humans have x", "humans don't have x", nor…

This test does not require theory of mind or test for "theory of mind" because there are many people who have a well formed theory of mind who cannot solve this problem, and well formulated, it can be solved by a simple logic program, which again, would not have any kind of theory of mind. It'd produce a large number of false positives _and_ false negatives.

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#39
post #21

The problem with evaluating LLMs is that there's a random component, and the specific wording of prompts is so important. I asked Claude to explain the problem, then write python to solve it. When it ran there was an exception, so I pasted that back in and got the correct answer. I'm not sure what this says about theory of mind (the first script it wrote was organized into steps based on who knew what when, so it see…

Yes, that helps. But if you iterate on this a few times (as I did last year with Code Interpreter), it reveals how much LLM's "like" to imitate patterns. Sure, often it will pattern-match on a useful fix and that's pretty neat. But after I told it "that fix didn't work" a couple times (with details about the error), it started assuming the fix wouldn't work and immediately trying again without my input. It learned the pattern! So, I learned to instead edit the question and resubmit.

LLM's are pattern-imitating machines with a random number generator added to try to keep them from repeating the same pattern, which is what they really "want" to do. It's a brilliant hack because repeating the same pattern when it's not appropriate is a dead giveaway of machine-like behavior. (And adding a random number generator also makes it that much harder to evaluate LLM's since you need to repeat your queries and do statistics.)

Although zero-shot question-answering often works, a more reliable way to get useful results out of an LLM is to "lean into it" by giving it a pattern and asking it to repeat it. (Or if you don't want it to follow a pattern, make sure you don't give it one that will confuse it.)

Re: LLMs, Theory of Mind, and Cheryl's Birthday

#40

Not really about Theory of Mind, but in the same line, I remember the other day someone argued with me that LLMs model the world, rather than just modelling language (that may represent the world). I kept thinking about that problem and plausible experiments to show my point that LLMs are dumb about the physical world, even if they know perfectly how it works in terms of language/representation. So I thought, what ha…

  it should draw/write ASCII like an expert.
Not a lot of conversations incrementally totaling ASCII conversations in the training data - you are essentially asking a gold fish to climb a tree.

  It should have a lot of RGB image training data with associated captions => So it should understand images very well.
you seem to have conflated the architectures. ChatGPT was trained on text, and text-image embedding - it can recognize, but cannot project. Thats the DALL-E portion - it leverages a similar transformer arch but they are not the same model nor architecture.

However, ask a Generative Adversarial Network for ASCII, you'll get what you expect. Absent the infra-word character cohesion that LLM's token-ization provides, it will give realistic, if sometimes "uncanny" images - ones that "make sense" sequentially, or in the short term, but not the longer, or larger context.

The language portion of your brain, that works faster than you do - else you would be at a loss of words constantly - is not nearly as equipped to deal with spatial problems that your posterior parietal cortex is.

Ultimately we are converging towards a Mixture-of-Experts model that we will one day realize is just....us, but better.

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