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The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

edwardfeser.blogspot.com

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Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#31

Post by fsckboy »

chaboud wrote: post #28
fsckboy wrote: post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

my comment said that I don't believe "physical bits" exist, or at least not as physical bits, so you using the term physical bits is ignoring what I said. When you and I meet and shake hands, we don't actually touch, rather our electrons repel each other, quite firmly. I'm saying that they don't need to be physical to do that. I'm saying "we live in a simulation", except it's not (necessarily) a simulation, all we kn…

That becomes a bit of a silly argument, in that it ends up making no real assertion. Similar arguments were tried in the early days of the telescope in the 17th century, asserting that what was being observed could not be trusted due to the mediation of the lenses (early telescopes were generally refractive). While imperfections can limit and govern the information available via telescopes, there is no reason to beli…

my argument is only to get you to unassert that you know anything about the nature of the mind. (the other part, about the simulation, is how I find it more comfortable to think about the universe, but i have no proof, just like to point out that it's just as plausible)

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#32

Post by dragonwriter »

canjobear wrote: post #27
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

The nonphysicality of consciousness isn't taken as axiomatic, there are arguments for it. Consider the argument from knowledge, summarized in TFA: > A related argument known as the “knowledge argument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson. Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, never having experiences of colors. She has, nevertheles…

> In the thought experiment, when Mary sees red for the first time, it seems that she gains new knowledge that she did not have before even though she knew everything there is to know about the properties of matter involved. You have to either accept that she learned something nonphysical, or deny that she learned anything.

No, you don't. You just have to accept that the facts about physical phenomenon that can be learned through language are different than the physical experience of physical phenomena themselves, and that learning the latter is distinct from learning the former. The latter, however, is obviously physical.

And, even if it wasn't wrong in that way, that would be an argument for the nonphysicality of some subset of the subjects of knowledge, not an argument for the nonphysicality of consciousness.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#33

Post by chaboud »

andoando wrote: post #16
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

Is consciousness not special? It certainly isn't obvious to me my experience of the world isn't present in all matter. And how is it obvious that is a fundamental product of matter? It seems to me youre just taking the opposite as an axiom without any basis. My personal belief is the two viewpoints are not so contradictory. Consciousness can be a fundamental part of all matter (not simply an emergent phenomena or pro…

If your consciousness is a product of matter, it isn’t special, and, sure, consciousness as we label it could arise in forms of other matter. That doesn’t mean that it’s present in all matter, in the same way that we don’t ascribe consciousness to a virus.

Consciousness is a label. It’s a noun that is used (among many long winded arguments, apparently) to mean a range of things, but relaxation of that label doesn’t extend to universal consciousness of matter without rendering that concept pointless.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#34

Post by j_bum »

dragonwriter wrote: post #32
canjobear wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The nonphysicality of consciousness isn't taken as axiomatic, there are arguments for it. Consider the argument from knowledge, summarized in TFA: > A related argument known as the “knowledge argument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson. Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, never having experiences of colors. She has, nevertheles…

> In the thought experiment, when Mary sees red for the first time, it seems that she gains new knowledge that she did not have before even though she knew everything there is to know about the properties of matter involved. You have to either accept that she learned something nonphysical, or deny that she learned anything. No, you don't. You just have to accept that the facts about physical phenomenon that can be le…

Indeed, I think the parent comment presents a false dichotomy fallacy. Thanks for catching it

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#35

Post by chaboud »

fsckboy wrote: post #31
chaboud wrote: post #28

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That becomes a bit of a silly argument, in that it ends up making no real assertion. Similar arguments were tried in the early days of the telescope in the 17th century, asserting that what was being observed could not be trusted due to the mediation of the lenses (early telescopes were generally refractive). While imperfections can limit and govern the information available via telescopes, there is no reason to beli…

my argument is only to get you to unassert that you know anything about the nature of the mind. (the other part, about the simulation, is how I find it more comfortable to think about the universe, but i have no proof, just like to point out that it's just as plausible)

We actually (myself included, to an extent) know a great deal about the mind, perception, and cognition. There’s lots still to learn, but we’ve been poking, prodding, and experimenting for a long time.

I’ll give an example that is related to my current day job, where we make devices with displays (e.g., TV’s). I have commonly had people say that picture quality and color on televisions is subjective. However, until we’re into advanced features like content-adaptive processing, it isn’t. Instead, color is objectively and reproducibly measurable as a set of physical properties, and the mappings of those properties to the TV-buying public is very aligned with the science behind color theory.

Now, color theory as we apply it is a blend of physics (very, very reproducible) and perception. The perceptual part of color is largely reproducible over large populations, but there are certainly mutations, conditions, and variances that lead to some degree of varied perception, up to and including blindness (though TV’s these days throw off enough infrared that their brightness is generally detectable by non-sighted users). So, might we all be living in a simulation? Or a simulation of a simulation? Sure. But that has no practical impact because it is an unanswerable question.

Conversely, operating with the assumption that the physical-world sensing and reasoning apparatus available to me isn’t some complex prank is working out pretty well for the trillions+ creatures out there (insects could be an interesting discussion) that appear to be going about their daily lives. Why ask people to prove a negative?

In the meantime, we’ll continue to try to better understand how minds work.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#36

Post by rini17 »

fsckboy wrote: post #25
rini17 wrote: post #11

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Even if it's all computation, it might be worth it to distinguish sentient and not sentient computations. I think trying to arrive to it by examining particles is a detour at best.

if sentient computation exists as a subset of a computational structure (our universe) it must be said that the computational structure is sentient.

That's like saying all movement must have originated from some Prime Mover. Why is there need for such forced assumptions.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#37

Post by plorkyeran »

canjobear wrote: post #27
chaboud wrote: post #3

Having not gone deep into this problem, I’m a bit confused. It appears that the initial assertion is that consciousness is somehow special and also somehow not a product of fundamental properties of matter. Both of those appear to be taken as axiomatic. Might the whole debate be summed up as “we decided to go looking for magic and decided that it’s magic and thus can’t be found”? Is it not possible that our experienc…

The nonphysicality of consciousness isn't taken as axiomatic, there are arguments for it. Consider the argument from knowledge, summarized in TFA: > A related argument known as the “knowledge argument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson. Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, never having experiences of colors. She has, nevertheles…

The hypothetical scenario of knowing all of the physical facts about what it is like to see the color red does not seem particularly possible to me even without the constraint that it happen without having seen colors before. Since we are assuming that Mary understands the color red to a dramatically deeper degree than any human actually has, I don’t see how you can conclusively state that her reaction to finally seeing it would be something other than “yep that’s exactly what I expected”, with the only new information gained being that her knowledge actually does correspond to reality (or at least to her perception of such).

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#38

Post by plorkyeran »

epiccoleman wrote: post #13
aklein wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

TBH, I don’t really understand why this is a problem. An explanation is not an experience; it cannot provide to the human brain the same information. Suppose you neurologically induced an experience of seeing that new color without “really” seeing it - surely this would be sufficient to communicate qualia? (And if not, surely it’s just a matter of adjusting the inducement to some degree).

Isn't "an explanation is not an experience" basically the problem? Like, if you could perfectly describe all the physical conditions to induce the experience of a color, there would still be something missing from that description which you can't get without consciousness in the loop. You can't communicate or describe it without the actual experience part. Most (all?) of our "science" doesn't require any sort of noti…

Would there still be something missing if you could “perfectly describe all the physical conditions to induce the experience of a color”? I don’t see any reason to assume that’s self-evidently true, and it’s not something that we have the ability to test. Obviously if you start from the assumption that qualia exists then you will conclude that it must exist.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#39

Post by fsckboy »

chaboud wrote: post #35
fsckboy wrote: post #31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

my argument is only to get you to unassert that you know anything about the nature of the mind. (the other part, about the simulation, is how I find it more comfortable to think about the universe, but i have no proof, just like to point out that it's just as plausible)

We actually (myself included, to an extent) know a great deal about the mind, perception, and cognition. There’s lots still to learn, but we’ve been poking, prodding, and experimenting for a long time. I’ll give an example that is related to my current day job, where we make devices with displays (e.g., TV’s). I have commonly had people say that picture quality and color on televisions is subjective. However, until w…

when people talk about the hard problem of consciousness or the mind-body problem, they're not talking about the brain aspect (which might sum up what you're referring to) but "what does this feel like" aspect. Why would electro-chemical-chromodynamic processes in brain feel like anything at all? what is that mechanism? will we be able to recreate it, either in a dish, or in a brain we construct? how will we know, since I can't even be sure you feel the same things I feel.

I'm not trying to create a big woo-woo mystery, i'm just saying rationalists should not be quick to assume they know what is going on or where the answer lies.

Re: The Problem with the "Hard Problem"

#40

Post by canjobear »

dragonwriter wrote: post #32
canjobear wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The nonphysicality of consciousness isn't taken as axiomatic, there are arguments for it. Consider the argument from knowledge, summarized in TFA: > A related argument known as the “knowledge argument” was famously put forward by Frank Jackson. Imagine Mary, a scientist of the future who, for whatever reason, has spent her entire life in a black and white room, never having experiences of colors. She has, nevertheles…

> In the thought experiment, when Mary sees red for the first time, it seems that she gains new knowledge that she did not have before even though she knew everything there is to know about the properties of matter involved. You have to either accept that she learned something nonphysical, or deny that she learned anything. No, you don't. You just have to accept that the facts about physical phenomenon that can be le…

> the facts about physical phenomenon that can be learned through language are different than the physical experience of physical phenomena themselves

Whether she learned through language is irrelevant. Before seeing red, she might have learned about it by consulting extensive charts of the brain, or (black-and-white) videos of timecourses of brain activation. Maybe she even got to run computer simulations of her own brain response.

By construction Mary already knew everything physical about the color red, so the new knowledge she gained through consciously experiencing it is not knowledge about anything physical.

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