Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nope, it's much more insidious than that. The user is already on your website, which could be a legitimate website with a malicious owner. If you look at the screenshot, it's a perfectly valid interpretation for a non tech-savvy user to interpret that as "realhealthysnacks is asking me to install a legitimate Microsoft application". Now change the simplified example for a real one from a SaaS product login page with…
> legitimate website with a malicious owner. What... does that mean? A website with a malicious owner is illegitimate by definition. :) But more to the point, this logic is circular. You're saying PWAs are subject to attack by malicious actors because their users can be attacked by websites controlled by malicious owners. Which is... true. But specious, and true of regular web pages and apps and every other kind of s…
Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
31–40 of 44 posts
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
No it doesn't. You need to fool the user into installing an app that loads from your own domain. Now that obviously isn't impossible, but it requires getting the user to ignore or be mislead by the clearly-displayed URL in the web page and/or installer UI. As the commenter upthread conjectured, this is indeed perfectly isomorphic to fooling a user into loading and interacting with a faked web page. That's a real thre…
I'm not a security pro, but the claim about "spun clickbait" doesn't hold for me. I thought it was new to me, and an attack possibility that I hadn't considered before reading. I do think I "validate" sites pretty well before doing any serious things there (logins, transactions, etc).
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because this one makes it look like there’s a url bar with a Microsoft domain
No it doesn't. You need to fool the user into installing an app that loads from your own domain. Now that obviously isn't impossible, but it requires getting the user to ignore or be mislead by the clearly-displayed URL in the web page and/or installer UI. As the commenter upthread conjectured, this is indeed perfectly isomorphic to fooling a user into loading and interacting with a faked web page. That's a real thre…
This isn't "clickbait". This author is a known security researcher. The word "new" or "novel" doesn't occur in the writeup. They are simply documenting how something works.
They've been writing about this type of thing for years now.
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
Nope, it's much more insidious than that. The user is already on your website, which could be a legitimate website with a malicious owner. If you look at the screenshot, it's a perfectly valid interpretation for a non tech-savvy user to interpret that as "realhealthysnacks is asking me to install a legitimate Microsoft application". Now change the simplified example for a real one from a SaaS product login page with…
> legitimate website with a malicious owner. What... does that mean? A website with a malicious owner is illegitimate by definition. :) But more to the point, this logic is circular. You're saying PWAs are subject to attack by malicious actors because their users can be attacked by websites controlled by malicious owners. Which is... true. But specious, and true of regular web pages and apps and every other kind of s…
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#35I think you could do the same in native apps? So yeah, not much you can do about uncareful users. I suppose you could use something like an App store to provide some checks and a little more security. But then you're likely to run into monopolies again..
I guess the argument would be that a screened app store would block such a malicious app. But since the trick requires the user to go to a malicious website to install this app, it seems to me that the user might similarly be tricked into entering credentials on that website.
You would enter your credentials on something that (according to a url bar) is Facebook.com
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#36Earlier quoted context omitted.
Being a PWA lets you hide the real URL bar.
How could this be stopped? Blocking images or rendering that mimics a real URL bar would be challenging. Perhaps the PWA forces an overlay of the real apex domain at the top or in a top corner?
You could try the manifest data, (the data for the PWA app) tied more to the html and dns. Making it harder to impersonate other sites.
You could also go a more extreme route and have something like PWA app signing like other kinds of apps.
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#37What makes this PWA specific rather than just “installable software”?
However, as with every phishing attack, the user must ignore small (security related) hints.
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
Being a PWA lets you hide the real URL bar.
How could this be stopped? Blocking images or rendering that mimics a real URL bar would be challenging. Perhaps the PWA forces an overlay of the real apex domain at the top or in a top corner?
For most PWAs, the title is simply the apex domain without the TLD with some kind of capitalization. There are a few slightly more complex cases, such as Google Maps (google.com/maps) and YouTube Music (music.youtube.com). Even in these cases, there is an obvious relationship between URL and title.
Re: Progressive Web Apps (PWAs) Phishing
#39Also the thing about the URL won’t have much practical difference for the user. The reason is that a lot of the flows can redirect through different domains. For example, when I sign in with Google into a third party site, I often see a redirect through the YouTube domain.
So users are not expecting full fidelity to the domain.