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Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

sre.google

31–40 of 128 posts

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#31
post #18

If you're using AWS resources, give LocalStack a try for integration testing

Wife used localstack at previous job and it was miserable experience. Especially their emulation of queues.

Maybe things have improved since couple years ago, though

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#32

Recently, I've heard of several companies folding up SRE and moving individuals to their SWE teams. Rumors are that LinkedIn, Adobe, and Robinhood have done this. This made me think: is SRE a byproduct of a bubble economy of easy money? Why not operate without the significant added expense of SRE teams? I wonder if SRE will be around 10 years from now, much like Sys Admins and QA testers have mostly disappeared. Inst…

>s SRE a byproduct of a bubble economy of easy money? Why not operate without the significant added expense of SRE teams?

I'm a SWE SRE. I think in some cases it is better to be folded into a team. In other cases, less so.

One SRE team can support many different dev teams, and often the dev teams are not at all focusing time on the very complicated infra/distributed systems aspect of their job, it's just not something that they worry about day to day.

So it makes sense to have an 'infra' that operates at a different granularity than specialized dev teams.

That may or may not need to be called SRE, or maybe it's an SRE SWE team, or maybe you just call it 'infrastructure' but at a certain scale you have more cross cutting concerns across teams where it's cheaper to split things out that way.

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#33
If you are interested in a similar list but with a bent towards being a SRE for 15 years in FinTech/Banks/Hedge Funds/Crypto, let me humbly suggest you check out:

https://x.com/alexpotato/status/1432302823383998471?s=20

Teaser: "25. If you have a rules engine where it's easier to make a new rule than to find an existing rule based on filter criteria: you will end up with lots of duplicate rules."

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#35

Something I hope to eventually hear is the solution to the full cold start problem. Most giant custom-stack companies have circular dependencies on core infrastructure. Software-defined networking needs some software running to start routing packets again, diskless machines need some storage to boot from, authentication services need access to storage to start handing out service credentials to bootstrap secure authz…

Azure has procedures in place to prevent circular dependencies, and regularly exercises them when bringing new regions online.

IIRC some of the information about their approach is considered sensitive so I won't elaborate further.

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#36
post #7

This is a great writeup, and very broadly applicable. I don't see any "this would only apply at Google" in here. > COMMUNICATION CHANNELS! AND BACKUP CHANNELS!! AND BACKUPS FOR THOSE BACKUP CHANNELS!!! Yes! At Netflix, when we picked vendors for systems that we used during an outage, we always had to make sure they were not on AWS. At reddit we had a server in the office with a backup IRC server in case the main one…

Afair Google just ran irc on their corp network which was completely separate from prod so I wouldn’t be surprised if it was in a small server room in the office somewhere. > very broadly applicable. I don't see any "this would only apply at Google" in here. One thing I haven’t even heard of anyone else doing was production panic rooms - a secure room with backup vpn to prod

> Afair Google just ran irc on their corp network which was completely separate from prod

I thought Google didn't have a "corp" network because of their embrace of zero-trust in BeyondCorp?

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#37

Recently, I've heard of several companies folding up SRE and moving individuals to their SWE teams. Rumors are that LinkedIn, Adobe, and Robinhood have done this. This made me think: is SRE a byproduct of a bubble economy of easy money? Why not operate without the significant added expense of SRE teams? I wonder if SRE will be around 10 years from now, much like Sys Admins and QA testers have mostly disappeared. Inst…

Sys admins changed name to SREs which changed named to devops engineers or cloud engineers or whatever the title is now.

Still the same competency. Someone needs to know how those protocols work, tell you latency characteristics of storage, and read those core dumps.

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#39

I'm curious how people approach big red buttons and intentional graceful degradation in practice, and especially how to ensure that these work when the system is experiencing problems. E.g. do you use db-based "feature flags"? What do you do then if the DB itself is overloaded, or the API through which you access the DB? Or do you use static startup flags (e.g. env variables)? How do you ensure these get rolled out q…

Versioning, feature toggle and rollback - automated and implemented at different level based on the system. It could be an env configuration, or db field or down migration scripts or deploying last working version.

Re: Lessons Learned from Twenty Years of Site Reliability Engineering

#40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Afair Google just ran irc on their corp network which was completely separate from prod so I wouldn’t be surprised if it was in a small server room in the office somewhere. > very broadly applicable. I don't see any "this would only apply at Google" in here. One thing I haven’t even heard of anyone else doing was production panic rooms - a secure room with backup vpn to prod

> Afair Google just ran irc on their corp network which was completely separate from prod I thought Google didn't have a "corp" network because of their embrace of zero-trust in BeyondCorp?

I don't think zero-trust prohibits network segmentation for redundancy or due to geographical constraints etc. It's mainly about how you gain access.
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