31–40 of 46 posts
> Unfortunately, this method did not allow us to intercept HTTPS traffic of Apple services (including iMessage), as iOS implements SSL pinning for this. Thus, we were not able to decrypt iMessage traffic that came through the VPN. When security helps attackers... that's a bit ironic. Anyway, this article is exactly why I don't want to work in computer security, you constantly have to look behind you, and government A…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
They mentioned that the suspicious traffic stopped after a restart.
I'm not seeing that mentioned in this blogpost, was it mentioned in one of the other ones?
They talk about it here, under "what we know so far"
I've always felt that security/exploit devs are just different. This kind of constant striving and failing until finally succeeding would be such an incredibly frustrating experience for me. Kudos to them though, it's serious perseverance.
It's a mindset/perspective difference.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Persistence on iOS is really, really hard.
I agree with you on that, but the USA (and probably China) is the nation state least likely to skimp on iOS persistence when targeting Russian AV analysts :D
> Unfortunately, this method did not allow us to intercept HTTPS traffic of Apple services (including iMessage), as iOS implements SSL pinning for this. Thus, we were not able to decrypt iMessage traffic that came through the VPN. When security helps attackers... that's a bit ironic. Anyway, this article is exactly why I don't want to work in computer security, you constantly have to look behind you, and government A…
Computer security person here! I have yet to be assassinated :)
> Despite many ups and downs, we eventually managed to obtain all the stages used in this attack, including four zero-day exploits reported to Apple, two validators, an implant and its modules. Looks like NSA still hasn't forgiven Kaspersky for exposing STUXNET [1]. It seems that this latest attack on Kaspersky was expensive. Losing 4 zerodays must have been painful. It's also possible that Israel and Unit 8200 [2] w…
> but my money's on the NSA Why is your money on the NSA?