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Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

signal.org

31–40 of 135 posts

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#31
post #14

There are 20 bitcoin wallets worth more than a billion dollars each. I think it will be pretty obvious when someone gets a quantum computer working.

Bitcoin is already quantum attack resistant, unless you use un-hashed public keys or reuse Bitcoin addresses (as some do).

If Bitcoin would become vulnerable, its value would collapse to zero overnight once it's known. There is limited amount of money anyone could extract before the value collapses.

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#32

It is good that they kept the classical crypto along. However, the general tendency towards quantum-resistant cryptography leaves me puzzled. From my perspective as a physics PhD graduate, I firmly believe that a quantum computer capable of breaking public key crypto will never be built. This is because as you add more qubits, there's increased interference between them due to the additional connections required. It'…

People have already said here most of what I want to say in this comment, but just to make it as explicit as possible:

Essentially the only reason anyone thinks that useful quantum computation is possible is because of things called threshold theorems, which state that as long as the noise in each qubit is less than some small but non-zero error rate you can add more qubits and use quantum error correction to make your computation arbitrarily precise. In other words as long as you're below the threshold rate quantum computers scale well.

Of course those threshold rates are very very small, and creating significiant numbers of qubits which are below the threshold rates is incredibly difficult, but theoretically it works.

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

To a first approximation, the US government uses the same cryptography that US consumers do -- AES, SHA-2, the NIST P curves, ECDSA, etc. are all categorized for various levels of data integrity and confidentiality within the government. The same will be true of PQ signing schemes, meaning that a backdoor would be predicated on the USG believing that they have some truly remarkable NOBUS breakthrough in PQC. That fee…

> NSA interventions in cryptographic design have historically gone in the opposite direction[1]. I'm not sure I'd say that given that there are some other designs and things that have gone on[1][2]. Particularly the Dual EC debacle. They have a history of helping make suspect or down right compromised crypto if they think they can get away with it. That said it does look like they avoid doing it to anything that gets…

That’s fair. Maybe this is too fine of a hair to split, but I would categorize the Dual_EC fracas as less an intervention and more of a ham-fisted attempt to standardize something that mainstream cryptography was immediately suspicious of. But I suppose you could argue that there was similar suspicion around DES from the very beginning.

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#34
post #24

It is good that they kept the classical crypto along. However, the general tendency towards quantum-resistant cryptography leaves me puzzled. From my perspective as a physics PhD graduate, I firmly believe that a quantum computer capable of breaking public key crypto will never be built. This is because as you add more qubits, there's increased interference between them due to the additional connections required. It'…

I've heard physicists raise opinions like yours (i.e. QC will never be built for practical reasons), but I also hear ones that say the opposite. I'd err on the side of caution. As for your conspiracy: The conclusion of that would be to continue using hybrid constructions. Though, and I know crypto more than physics, I'd consider it as highly unlikely. Creating backdoors that others won't find is next to impossible. W…

The transparency of the process in an essential way depends on a number of people who can understand what is being proposed. It seems from the outside that the lattice-based cryptography is significantly more complex. The question is, would anyone notice and how far-reaching are the proofs made on their security? On what basis can one prove that a computer with a novel algorithm could not break it?

> As for your conspiracy: The conclusion of that would be to continue using hybrid constructions.

As long as ordinary crypto does not get deprecated.

Anyway, the number of responses made me curious about this new novel crystals-kyber. Do you have any recommendations on the best introductory text that explains it from the bird's view?

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#35

It is good that they kept the classical crypto along. However, the general tendency towards quantum-resistant cryptography leaves me puzzled. From my perspective as a physics PhD graduate, I firmly believe that a quantum computer capable of breaking public key crypto will never be built. This is because as you add more qubits, there's increased interference between them due to the additional connections required. It'…

Doesn't your argument apply to classical bits too? The more interconnected a classical bit is, the more parasitic coupling it will experience. That used to be an argument used against the feasibility of classical computers in the 40s (until von Neumann published work on fault tolerant classical computing). Both classical and quantum computers (1) can not "scale" without error correction because of analog noise (altho…

Yes. In fact the proofs that quantum error correction works as long as you're below a certain error rate (so-called "threshold theorems" are very, very similar to the same proofs that error correction works in classical computers.

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#36

It is good that they kept the classical crypto along. However, the general tendency towards quantum-resistant cryptography leaves me puzzled. From my perspective as a physics PhD graduate, I firmly believe that a quantum computer capable of breaking public key crypto will never be built. This is because as you add more qubits, there's increased interference between them due to the additional connections required. It'…

Doesn't your argument apply to classical bits too? The more interconnected a classical bit is, the more parasitic coupling it will experience. That used to be an argument used against the feasibility of classical computers in the 40s (until von Neumann published work on fault tolerant classical computing). Both classical and quantum computers (1) can not "scale" without error correction because of analog noise (altho…

It does not apply to classical bits in the same way. Quantum computers derive their computational power from the qubits being in a single quantum state across the qubits (an entangled one, to use physics jargon.)

This is distinct from classical computers, where you can describe a bit without needing to describe the other bits in the computer. You cannot describe a qubit (in a way that's computationally useful, at least) without describing all of them.

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#37
Whitepaper says:

>PQXDH provides post-quantum forward secrecy and a form of cryptographic deniability but still relies on the hardness of the discrete log problem for mutual authentication in this revision of the protocol.

So that's why active mitm with a contemporary quantum computer is a concern mentioned in the blog post. Of course it isn't of any concern currently (since no one has the hardware to exploit this), but I'm curious why they couldn't fit the crystals-kyber method for mutual auth in this hybridized implementation? performance concerns?

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#39
post #31
post #14

There are 20 bitcoin wallets worth more than a billion dollars each. I think it will be pretty obvious when someone gets a quantum computer working.

Bitcoin is already quantum attack resistant, unless you use un-hashed public keys or reuse Bitcoin addresses (as some do). If Bitcoin would become vulnerable, its value would collapse to zero overnight once it's known. There is limited amount of money anyone could extract before the value collapses.

Bitcoin wouldn't "become vulnerable". Someone would discover the vulnerability. If this person put it to use before making it widely known the could definitely extract a large amount of money before the bitcoin network before the public at large noticed (at which point the price would start to plummet)

Re: Quantum Resistance and the Signal Protocol

#40

It is good that they kept the classical crypto along. However, the general tendency towards quantum-resistant cryptography leaves me puzzled. From my perspective as a physics PhD graduate, I firmly believe that a quantum computer capable of breaking public key crypto will never be built. This is because as you add more qubits, there's increased interference between them due to the additional connections required. It'…

AFAIK no one is transitioning to PQC algorithms by abandoning classical ones. They concatenate classical and PQC - so-called hybrid.
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