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A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

disagreeableme.blogspot.com

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Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#31
post #9

I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…

Yes I pretty much stopped reading the article properly there. It starts by first redefining intentionality to be something LLMs can do, and then effectively has 18 paragraphs of flowery language recapitulating the definition they started with.

What LLMs do may happen to fit some technical definition of intentionality that has been previously explored but that definition doesn't align with the actual debate that is going on about LLMs abilities.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#32
post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The token model of LLMs doesn't map well into how human experience the world of informational glyphs. Left and right is a intrinsic quality of our vision system. An LLM has to map the idea of left and right into symbols via text and line breaks. I do think it will be interesting as visual input and internal graphical output is integrated with text based LLMs as that should help correct their internal experience to be…

" An LLM has to map the idea of left and right into symbols via text and line breaks." Oh yeah that's i suggested it :) I do wonder though if we give the LLMs enough examples of texts with people describing their relative spatial position to each other and things will it eventually "learn" to work things these out a bit better

Probably. But what seems much more interesting is to have a spatial model pre-seeded in the LLM, so that it "attaches" language to that as part of its training. Ditto for other models of the world we want the language module to be able to draw on and reason with.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#33
post #31
post #9

I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…

Yes I pretty much stopped reading the article properly there. It starts by first redefining intentionality to be something LLMs can do, and then effectively has 18 paragraphs of flowery language recapitulating the definition they started with. What LLMs do may happen to fit some technical definition of intentionality that has been previously explored but that definition doesn't align with the actual debate that is go…

but that definition doesn't align with the actual debate that is going on about LLMs abilities

Yes because the debate is nonsense.

Seeing output from GPT that demonstrates intelligence, reasoning, or whatever, and saying it is not real reasoning/Intelligence etc, is like looking at a plane soar and saying that the plane is fake flying. And this isn't, for anyone who thinks it is, a nature versus artificial thing either. The origin point is entirely arbitrary.

You could just as easily move the origin to Bees and say, "oh, birds aren't really flying". You could move it to planes and say, "oh, helicopters aren't really flying." It's a very meaningless statement.

The point most people seem to miss is that internal processes are entirely irrelevant. If you have a property you are interested in and a way to test for it, then the results of that test is what is important, not whether how it works at the arbitrary origin is exactly the same as how it works at point 2. In this case, it's even worse because since we do not know the internal processes of either LLMs or humans, the argument is really " oh, how I think the origin works is different from how I think point 2 works, so it isn't really flying".

When you say upsetting things to bing chat, you'll find the conversation prematurely end.

Someone can cry all they want about how bing isn't really upset. How it doesn't really have intention to end the chat but those are evidently useless definitions because the chat did end.

A definition that treats Bing as an intentful system is more accurate to reality and real consequences. It has the predictive power that the alternative does not.

Someday someone may find themselves stabbed and killed by an LLM piloted robot because of something they said or did. Something that would predictably get someone killed by a system with "real" intent. So what, Are you going to be raised from the dead because the LLM "wasn't really upset" or "didn't really have intent" ? It obviously doesn't count right.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#34
post #11
post #9

I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…

> Primarily, they are pure functions that accept a sequence of tokens and return the next token. The model itself is stateless, and it doesn't seem right to me to ascribe "intent" to a stateless function. Even if the function is capable of modeling certain aspects of chess. I have two arguments against. One, you could argue that state is transferred between the layers. It may be inelegant for each chain of state tran…

That's a great way of looking at it. Comparing model weights to our brains and how we process input, you could imagine model weights as a brain frozen at time t=0. The prompt tokens are the sensory input, and the generation parameters are like twists to how the neurons pass information to each other. The token context window is like the capacity of one's working memory. At the conclusion of the last layer of processing, the output tokens are like one's subjective experience.

At the least it's made me think for a moment about `stateless` and its meaning

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#35
post #13
post #9

I'm not sure the definition of "intention" the article suggests is a useful one. He tries to make it sound like he's being conservative: > That is, we should ascribe intentions to a system if and only if it helps to predict and explain the behaviour of the system. Whether it really has intentions beyond this is not a question I am attempting to answer (and I think that it is probably not determinate in any case). And…

Ascribing human properties to computers and software has always seemed very bizarre to me. I always assume people are confused when they do that. There is no meaningful intersection between biology, intelligence, and computers but people constantly keep trying to imbue electromagnetic signal processors with human/biological qualities very much like how children attribute souls to teddy bears. Computers are mechanical…

A shame you can't find any meaningful parallels like many of us. Why the pissy tone? Here's some good reading for you

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voltage-gated_ion_channel

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#36
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ascribing human properties to computers and software has always seemed very bizarre to me. I always assume people are confused when they do that. There is no meaningful intersection between biology, intelligence, and computers but people constantly keep trying to imbue electromagnetic signal processors with human/biological qualities very much like how children attribute souls to teddy bears. Computers are mechanical…

He was inspired by lesswrong which from my scan more mysticism and philosophy (with a handful of self importance) than anything about how computers work. Advanced technology is magic to laypeople. It's like how some people believe in homeopathy. If you don't understand how medicine works, it's just a different kind of magic.

Lesswrong is basically a new online religion where you worship by acting like you're a STEM expert, which is part of why they have so many strong assumptions about how AI must work all based on untrue ideas about how it actually works.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

" An LLM has to map the idea of left and right into symbols via text and line breaks." Oh yeah that's i suggested it :) I do wonder though if we give the LLMs enough examples of texts with people describing their relative spatial position to each other and things will it eventually "learn" to work things these out a bit better

>I do wonder though if we give the LLMs enough examples of texts with people describing their relative spatial position to each other and things will it eventually "learn" to work things these out a bit better GPT-4's spatial position understanding is actually really good all things considered. By the end, 4 was able to construct an accurate maze just from feedback about the current position and possible next moves a…

A funny thing GPT-4 is unusually good at is giving driving directions. This shouldn't work, and of course isn't 100% right, but… it's kind of right.

Bard can answer questions like this, but I think it actually uses the Maps API. (It certainly says that's what it's doing.)

On the other hand, every chatbot including GPT-4 is both unable to do ASCII art and unable to tell it can't do it. (Bard always shows you `cowsay` and tells you it's what you asked for, no matter what it was supposed to be.)

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#38
post #35
post #13

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Ascribing human properties to computers and software has always seemed very bizarre to me. I always assume people are confused when they do that. There is no meaningful intersection between biology, intelligence, and computers but people constantly keep trying to imbue electromagnetic signal processors with human/biological qualities very much like how children attribute souls to teddy bears. Computers are mechanical…

A shame you can't find any meaningful parallels like many of us. Why the pissy tone? Here's some good reading for you https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Voltage-gated_ion_channel

I am aware of the mechanical models of cognition. They're unconvincing.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The article provides a very clear reason for using the idea of "intention": that framing helps us understand and predict the behavior. In contrast framing a mathematical function as having "intention" doesn't help. The underlying mechanism isn't relevant to this criterion. Clearly the system we're understanding as "intentional" has state; we can engage in multi-round interactions. It doesn't matter that we can separa…

A mathematical function isn't a mechanism. It has no causal power.

Not sure I understand. Software (which is a mathematical function) runs on a processor and that is arguably a mechanism, or allows them to emerge, such as a button or input field.

Re: A Multi-Level View of LLM Intentionality

#40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

A mathematical function isn't a mechanism. It has no causal power.

Not sure I understand. Software (which is a mathematical function) runs on a processor and that is arguably a mechanism, or allows them to emerge, such as a button or input field.

> Software (which is a mathematical function)

Software isn't a mathematical function. Software may be an embodiment of a mathematical function, but isn't a mathematical function itself.

Mathematical functions are much more abstract than software–although exactly how much more abstract depends on which position you take in the philosophy of mathematics. For a mathematical Platonist, a mathematical function is an eternal object which would still exist even if this planet never did. It never comes into existence, it never ceases to exist, it has no physical location. By contrast, software is something which has a physical location (on this hard disk), it was created at a certain point, and will likely one day cease to exist (when the last copy is destroyed).

If you adopt a non-Platonist philosophy of mathematics, the picture will be a bit different, but still I think software will be more concrete than mathematical functions are. For example, if one takes a conceptualist viewpoint (mathematical objects only exist in the mind, as ideas or concepts)–you can think of a mathematical function in your mind, and never write it down anywhere (nor verbally communicate it to anyone), it only exists in your mind, but it really is a mathematical function. Whereas, software which only exists in your mind and has never been written down anywhere isn't actually software, it is only an idea for software.

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