"On Libbitcoin Explorer 3.x versions, bx seed uses the Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) initialized with 32 bits of system time." That's a hell of an amateur mistake to make. 50/50 odds whether it was incompetence or deliberate fraud. Maybe 80/20; that flaw is so simple anyone can attack it. Which apparently is happening right now. It's much better if your crypto library generates keys only you c…
Milk Sad Disclosure
31–40 of 133 posts
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#32Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#33Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#34I wonder whether they modified brainflayer for brute forcing this, or if they wrote something from scratch.
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#35"On Libbitcoin Explorer 3.x versions, bx seed uses the Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) initialized with 32 bits of system time." That's a hell of an amateur mistake to make. 50/50 odds whether it was incompetence or deliberate fraud. Maybe 80/20; that flaw is so simple anyone can attack it. Which apparently is happening right now. It's much better if your crypto library generates keys only you c…
Would a CSPRNG be at all an improvement with only a 32 bit seed? Couldn't you still brute force it?
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#36Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#37Reminds me of attacks people were running on 'brainwallets' a while back - i.e. wallets whose initial key material was just a passphrase you'd remember. The idea was that you could keep the passphrase stored nowhere and not have to worry about it being stolen by... well, any of the 10,000 things out there looking for cryptocurrency keys. Of course, there is no way in hell you can actually make the human brain store e…
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#38"On Libbitcoin Explorer 3.x versions, bx seed uses the Mersenne Twister pseudorandom number generator (PRNG) initialized with 32 bits of system time." That's a hell of an amateur mistake to make. 50/50 odds whether it was incompetence or deliberate fraud. Maybe 80/20; that flaw is so simple anyone can attack it. Which apparently is happening right now. It's much better if your crypto library generates keys only you c…
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#39Reminds me of attacks people were running on 'brainwallets' a while back - i.e. wallets whose initial key material was just a passphrase you'd remember. The idea was that you could keep the passphrase stored nowhere and not have to worry about it being stolen by... well, any of the 10,000 things out there looking for cryptocurrency keys. Of course, there is no way in hell you can actually make the human brain store e…
> Of course, there is no way in hell you can actually make the human brain store enough entropy perfectly Sure there is. Have horse batteries taught us nothing? https://xkcd.com/936/ Don't confuse key length with entropy. A properly-scaled PBKDF remains secure with as little as 48 bits or so. Needless to say, though, a 32 bit time value is hardly a properly designed key derivation input.
I wrote a command-line utility a couple of years ago that I use myself regularly to generate secure and memorable passwords
With this tool you can also see how many bits of entropy the passphrase generation settings you are using will result in.
For example, generating a 5 word passphrase using the long wordlist
pgen -l -n 5
will yield a passphrase like: joyous embolism outsider evasion mashed
And when we ask the tool for the entropy with these settings pgen -l -n 5 -e
it will tell us: Current settings will create passphrases with 64.62 bits of entropy.
And hey, if you have reason to not trust the randomness capabilities of the program or your computer guess what :)My program supports the use of physical dice to generate your password.
Have a look, try it out yourselves :D
Re: Milk Sad Disclosure
#40In that it's not used by bitcoind or any wallets I know of: it's mainly of interest here because the book Mastering Bitcoin used it for examples.