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The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

media.defense.gov

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Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#31

Post by [deleted] »

VLM wrote: post #26
icegreentea2 wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

Wikipedia disagrees and claims the last BVR missile engagement at BVR range was 30 years ago and BVR missiles are usually combat ineffective. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond-visual-range_missile BVR is kind of a cold war tech; "its WW3 shoot down all the soviet bombers" it doesn't have another mission at this time. To risky to use.

[deleted]

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#32

Post by geenew »

ajmurmann wrote: post #27
icegreentea2 wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…

There's an HBO movie about development of the Bradley called 'Pentagon Wars'. It's a rare bureaucratic comedy movie.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#33

Post by mlyle »

VLM wrote: post #26
icegreentea2 wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

Wikipedia disagrees and claims the last BVR missile engagement at BVR range was 30 years ago and BVR missiles are usually combat ineffective. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Beyond-visual-range_missile BVR is kind of a cold war tech; "its WW3 shoot down all the soviet bombers" it doesn't have another mission at this time. To risky to use.

Russia has been nibbling at and slowly attriting the Ukrainian air force with R-37's.

BVR is a tricky technology. If your rules of engagement let you indiscriminately kill something without being sure of its identity, it's capable. But you need to not have normal air traffic in the area or not give a shit about the consequences or both.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#34

Post by SonicScrub »

ajmurmann wrote: post #27
icegreentea2 wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…

The story about the Bradley procurement as written by John Boyd, and made popular by the Pentagon Wars is misleading at best, and entirely wrong in many regards.

The movie's most famous scene ( the Bradley design montage) is entire fictional. The Bradley was designed intentionally from the ground up as an Infantry Fighting Vehicle NOT, as the movie states, an APC whose design was fiddled by meddling generals. While this may seem pendantic, this completely invalidates the critiques leveled against the vehicle by the movie characters during the design montage. The design characteristics that would be silly for a vehicle operating in an APC role are perfectly reasonable given the role of an IFV. Also worth noting that the program also came in under budget, contrary to movie's portrayal of ridiculous cost overruns. The program was expensive. Much more expensive than a program for a slightly more modern APC should be. But completely reasonable for what was then a completely new class of vehicle.

The supposed meddling with the live fire testing was John Boyd failing to understand what the purpose of a live fire test was for. The Bradley cannot take an RPG round. It was not designed to. John Boyd's insistence that the Pentagon was covering up a flaw in the Bradley's design by not shooting a Bradley with an RPG is just wrong. The Pentagon didn't want to do this test because they already knew what would happen and would learn nothing from doing so. A similar thing occured with the supposed "scandal" of replacing the fuel with water for the small arms fire testing. The objective of the test was not to hit the Bradley until it broke under realistic combat situations, but instead to learn about specific locations where the amour is vulnerable. If the Bradley catches fire and is destroyed, you lose the information you tried to gain. By placing water in the fuel tanks, you can identify where the bullets penetrated, while also ensuring the bullet pass through a fluid (important for a realistic sense of the bullet dynamics after penetration. John Boyd did not understand the objective of the tests, and cried conspiracy.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#35

Post by belter »

jmvoodoo wrote: post #14
belter wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We can revisit it after it is proven in combat, something that still has to happen.

F-35s have flown over 1,000 combat sorties. When would you consider it "proven"?

Bombing ISIS does not count. Here is an example of something that could really hurt.

"...The F-35 can only tolerate supersonic speeds at high altitudes for short bursts before it sustains lasting structural damage and the loss of stealth capabilities..." - https://nationalpost.com/news/canada/five-problems-with-amer....

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#36

Post by SonicScrub »

geenew wrote: post #32
ajmurmann wrote: post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…

There's an HBO movie about development of the Bradley called 'Pentagon Wars'. It's a rare bureaucratic comedy movie.

While entertaining for sure, the details of the movie are almost entirely fictional.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#37

Post by belter »

FridayoLeary wrote: post #28
chiph wrote: post #15

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Israelis have released footage of shooting down two drones, so they have the first kills with the F-35. Obviously this was not against a maneuvering human pilot, but still important. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=AdSFEpqwA6Q

They also have multiple (unproven but everyone knows who did it) strikes against iranian positions in syria and even in iran itself, it is rumoured. The ability to be invisible to radar is an absolute gamechanger.

That just make it difficult to lock on with weapons. They are not invisible and any radar operator would tell you that if they would be allowed...

"...Stealth designs minimize an aircraft's radar signature, delaying and sometimes even preventing detection, but because of the physical requirements for tactical jets, stealth fighters can be easily spotted by certain low-frequency radar bands.

In fact, it's not even uncommon for air traffic control radar to be able to spot stealth fighters on their scopes. And we're not just talking about when these aircraft are carrying external munitions or fuel tanks, rather, even in full-on "stealth mode," F-22s and F-35s aren't as sneaky as you might think."

- https://www.businessinsider.com/radars-can-see-best-stealth-...

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#38

Post by SonicScrub »

tomohawk wrote: post #16
u320 wrote: post #8

Earlier quoted context omitted.

"F-35 is bad" is just an internet meme with little to support it.

It's more like the F35 over promises and under delivers compared to what it is expected to replace. The F15 comes with a 20,000 hour airframe, while the F35 comes with a 8000 hour airframe. The F15 can get to target much faster, much farther, and still have fuel to do something when it gets there. The F15 can carry 12 AIM-120s (or 24 depending), while the F35 can carry 4. The F15's a great interceptor. The F35 is a g…

This is why both platforms exist. There seems to be this strange idea that the F35 must be compared against the abilities of fighter in a direct 1v1 dogfight scenario, despite that this situation would almost never happen. Modern air-to-air engagements are not squads of fighters dueling one another, but instead entire fleets of aircraft with differing roles and responsibilities working together in a coordinated fashion. AWACs, electronic warfare planes, missile trucks (like the F15EX), and fighters that can get in close all working together. This is environment the F35 was designed for. The fleet level data-link and sensor fusion capabilities of the F-35 are it's main feature, as they augment the capabilities of the entire fleet. Then fact that F15EX can act as a better standalone interceptor is not really relevant, since it would almost never perform this role unsupported. An F35 and F15EX operating in tandem would be much more effective than either operating alone, since the F35 could enter areas covered by opposing fighters / ground fire, and feed sensor information to the F15EX to take out threats outside of its own sensors range.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#39

Post by yetanotherloss »

jghn wrote: post #19
tomohawk wrote: post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's more like the F35 over promises and under delivers compared to what it is expected to replace. The F15 comes with a 20,000 hour airframe, while the F35 comes with a 8000 hour airframe. The F15 can get to target much faster, much farther, and still have fuel to do something when it gets there. The F15 can carry 12 AIM-120s (or 24 depending), while the F35 can carry 4. The F15's a great interceptor. The F35 is a g…

Isn’t the F22 the successor to the F15, being air superiority fighters?

It was but production was scaled back so much, and the peer enemy aircraft it was needed to defeat still largely don't exist yet. As a result the production lines were shut down and equipment moved to permanent storage and other multirole fighters that are usually less expensive end up doing the F22's job.

In the horrifying event of a US-China war or similar they'd be front line units along with F-35s and other modern fighters, but as is they'll probably end up on service life extension and retired without ever being used much in combat.

The F-15 was sold to other nations and IIRC the majority of its air superiority engagements were with the Israeli air force.

Re: The F-15 Eagle: Origins and Development, 1964-1972 [pdf]

#40

Post by mastax »

ajmurmann wrote: post #27
icegreentea2 wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That tends to happen because military procurement is always a set of compromises, so there lies a tremendous amount of room for basically arguing about how to weigh the different requirements/criteria/mission sets. Also while the article vindicates Sprey's want of having a lightweight fighter, the reality is that while lightweight fighters did come, they quickly became exactly what Sprey would not have wanted (once t…

The Boyd biography by Robert Coram tells the story of the battle between the Fighter Mafia and the Bomber Generals. It also talks about, what I'd at best call regulatory capture. There was an outrageous series of events around procurement of the Bradley fighting vehicle. An excerpt from the craziness that ensued: "The Bradley was a tragedy waiting to happen. It was packed with ammunition, fuel, and people. The thinne…

I had some hope that this biographer wouldn't take Burton's claims at face value, but alas.

The Bradley was designed to survive 14.5mm HMG fire. This is in line with IFV doctrine. The three most important layers of the survivability onion come before "don't get penetrated" and Bradley has proven to be very good at those.

The army did not plan to perform live fire testing with an RPG designed to destroy tanks weighing twice as much as the Bradley because it would be a waste of a vehicle. The outcome was already known, the vehicle would be catastrophically destroyed. When Burton asked, they agreed to do it anyway. The army Ballistic Research Laboratory (BRL) wanted to modify the test so that they might actually learn something they didn't already know. Burton interpreted (Ed: or portrayed) this as a conspiracy against him to hide a fact that was a matter of public record before the first vehicle was built.

In that test, the fuel tanks were filled with water so that vehicle damage assessment could be performed after the test. It's much easier to look at the spalling pattern of a projectile, or see what internal systems got damaged, when you're not trying to look at a burned out husk.

I could go on but I'm on my phone.

I'm not sure if Burton was a Luddite who didn't believe in statistics or the scientific method, or if he didn't care about learning from his tests and just wanted to blow up as many Bradleys as possible in order to create a hoopla to get the program cancelled.

Source: The Bradley and how it got that way, Howarth.

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