Not directly related to the topic but how is it that Threema is the only popular secure messenger where you have a random ID to give to people to communicate with and not a phone number (Signal) or have your name show up across all your contacts / groups (Telegram)?
Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
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Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#32Threema messages of Marian Kočner, a contorversial Slovak businessman who allegedly ordered a murder of a local journalist, were somehow obtained with the help of Europol. [0] The part of his trial where a security expert explained how the police got the messages was purposely not made public. [0] https://spectator.sme.sk/c/22216551/threema-saga-kocner-repo...
Is there some reason that's interesting? What they do here is just hack the phones, so get access to all the texting apps from the client side... Was there some implication they did otherwise in that case?
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#33Not directly related to the topic but how is it that Threema is the only popular secure messenger where you have a random ID to give to people to communicate with and not a phone number (Signal) or have your name show up across all your contacts / groups (Telegram)?
Wickr was decently popular but unfortunately is now owned by Amazon
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're right; this isn't directly related to the topic. It's a recapitulation of every thread we have ever had about Signal, on a story that has very little to do with Signal and that unveils new cryptography research. Unfortunately, this is a big dynamic on HN, not just on cryptography threads, but especially on threads rooted in stories with intense technical details. It's time consuming to bring yourself up to spe…
It makes sense to talk about Signal in these types of threads, despite not being about Signal, because Signal is still the de facto private messenger. The userbase is much larger than that of Threema so it is worthwhile to compare how these platforms are doing things differently. Especially in the context of if users should switch. Just like how in threads about Signal it is similarly appropriate to discuss WhatsApp…
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
Is there some reason that's interesting? What they do here is just hack the phones, so get access to all the texting apps from the client side... Was there some implication they did otherwise in that case?
There is always some trust with private communication apps. No way one can get a completely trustless system. Signal tries to build trust by being open source and by publishing the same documents it sends in subpoenas[0] (i.e. transparency in how they respond to government requests). The lack of understanding how the information was obtained is worthy of increased suspicion albeit not abandonment. There is added susp…
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#36Not directly related to the topic but how is it that Threema is the only popular secure messenger where you have a random ID to give to people to communicate with and not a phone number (Signal) or have your name show up across all your contacts / groups (Telegram)?
I do like this feature a lot. I think converting to passphrases (random words) as well could be a good idea (to make it easier to share) -- I think it's a good simple way to make decentralized/secure systems.
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#37The attacks in this paper are much less damaging than the attacks in the Nebuchadnezzar paper were against Matrix. But somehow, Threema comes out looking even worse: * Threema's end-to-end inner protocol, the one used to exchange messages between actual humans, is based on a single X25519 key, used bidirectionally. It has no forward secrecy. Worse, to prevent otherwise-trivial replay attacks made possible by the simp…
A lot of those issues fall into the category of warning signs that foretell impending doom beyond the immediate problem being identified. Like looking at a house you're thinking of buying and seeing a giant hole in the wall and looking at a different house with a damp mildew smell in every room. The hole in the wall is a more immediate and obvious problem, but the smell suggests the more significant concern.
Cryptographic systems in particular seem good at generating these kind of warning signs, since there is a significant overlap between "I can't immediately catastrophically break this" and "WTF are you doing?". Arguably, making these kinds of terrible cryptographic choices suggests something fundamentally broken in your design process that isn't fixed by just addressing specific weaknesses. This seems especially true in the secure messaging arena, where if you can't articulate an extremely good reason you can't use an existing protocol, the default position should be to avoid your product.
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#38Not directly related to the topic but how is it that Threema is the only popular secure messenger where you have a random ID to give to people to communicate with and not a phone number (Signal) or have your name show up across all your contacts / groups (Telegram)?
I think Signal takes its community temperature from their forums rather than other places that people normally talk on the internet like HN, Reddit, or Twitter. It is rather odd and those forums are pretty trash if I'm to be honest. There are a lot of people that fight tooth an nail on there to make Signal as static as possible, meaning no new features or anything else. A particularly interesting one I saw was a user…
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
You're right; this isn't directly related to the topic. It's a recapitulation of every thread we have ever had about Signal, on a story that has very little to do with Signal and that unveils new cryptography research. Unfortunately, this is a big dynamic on HN, not just on cryptography threads, but especially on threads rooted in stories with intense technical details. It's time consuming to bring yourself up to spe…
I get your point but this is not a thread about Signal. Threema is a lot less common of a topic on HN than Signal and the only reason I’m using it and am familiar with it is this feature so I don’t think it’s such an off topic question to ask.
Re: Three lessons from Threema: Analysis of a secure messenger
#40Earlier quoted context omitted.
To be fair, they also mentioned telegram and the subject of the comment was a really good feature of threema.
The thread is about new cryptographic research. Or it was, and should be.