Earlier quoted context omitted.
It would also be pretty ironic if so, given that the idea was basically lifted from Google internal infra.
I mean, TinyURL launched in 2002.
Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
31–40 of 84 posts
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#32This is great. I love go links ever since knorton turned me on to them. I will give this a spin first thing in the morning.
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#33The name is going to be quickly problematic if the trademark holder for golinks.io decides to get litigious: https://trademarks.justia.com/owners/zamora-jorge-3828689/
I was going to say the terminology comes from inside Google, where afaik go links were invented. However, yeah, that's straight up a trademark. You'd need a lawyer to know whether the trademark would survive litigation, and whether the s on those trademarks makes a material difference. (OP isn't plural, those trademarks are)
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#34More "Go"ogle culture out in the wild. I've seen these at a few companies now. I'm a little surprised they're still called "go"-links, though I suppose the name works everywhere.
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#35caveat emptor
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#36I started reading bout tailnet and still have no clue what it is
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#37A few weeks back, I installed Tailscale on a Friday and the following Sunday my machine (ubuntu 22.10) was hacked and running mining/tracking software and rsyslog. I only noticed because my fans were spinning harder than usual. caveat emptor
CVE-2022-41924 Severe 9.6
A vulnerability identified in the Tailscale Windows client allows a malicious website to reconfigure the Tailscale daemon `tailscaled`, which can then be used to remotely execute code. In the Tailscale Windows client, the local API was bound to a local TCP socket, and communicated with the Windows client GUI in cleartext with no Host header verification. This allowed an attacker-controlled website visited by the node to rebind DNS to an attacker-controlled DNS server, and then make local API requests in the client, including changing the coordination server to an attacker-controlled coordination server. An attacker-controlled coordination server can send malicious URL responses to the client, including pushing executables or installing an SMB share. These allow the attacker to remotely execute code on the node. All Windows clients prior to version v.1.32.3 are affected. If you are running Tailscale on Windows, upgrade to v1.32.3 or later to remediate the issue.
Published November 23, 2022.
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#38A few weeks back, I installed Tailscale on a Friday and the following Sunday my machine (ubuntu 22.10) was hacked and running mining/tracking software and rsyslog. I only noticed because my fans were spinning harder than usual. caveat emptor
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#39A few weeks back, I installed Tailscale on a Friday and the following Sunday my machine (ubuntu 22.10) was hacked and running mining/tracking software and rsyslog. I only noticed because my fans were spinning harder than usual. caveat emptor
Ouch. CVE-2022-41924 Severe 9.6 A vulnerability identified in the Tailscale Windows client allows a malicious website to reconfigure the Tailscale daemon `tailscaled`, which can then be used to remotely execute code. In the Tailscale Windows client, the local API was bound to a local TCP socket, and communicated with the Windows client GUI in cleartext with no Host header verification. This allowed an attacker-contro…
Re: Golink: A private shortlink service for tailnets
#40A few weeks back, I installed Tailscale on a Friday and the following Sunday my machine (ubuntu 22.10) was hacked and running mining/tracking software and rsyslog. I only noticed because my fans were spinning harder than usual. caveat emptor
Ouch. CVE-2022-41924 Severe 9.6 A vulnerability identified in the Tailscale Windows client allows a malicious website to reconfigure the Tailscale daemon `tailscaled`, which can then be used to remotely execute code. In the Tailscale Windows client, the local API was bound to a local TCP socket, and communicated with the Windows client GUI in cleartext with no Host header verification. This allowed an attacker-contro…