>scale of the conflict right
Would not go that far, but I agree that more PRC narrows military gap with US, the more TW becomes a stretch goal to the greater strategic aim of eroding/pushing out US presence in Asia and more broadly US primacy in general. At end of the day cross strait drama is one sustained by US power post WW2, which sufficiently deterred or destroyed would open up many options for reuninfication.
Ultimately the prospect for war is real, but timing is differs.
On paper, US wants war sooner (before 2030) to take out pacing competitor as force balance is shifting towards PRC favour every year while PRC's nuclear deterrence still not sufficient. It explains much of recent US behaviours, which is not to say admin is actively engineering war, but actors are not actively constraining policies that could lead to one.
For PRC even taking TW doesn't dramatically improve PRC geostrategic posture - Yonaguni is basically where TW is and can be militarized with US hardware, as well as other regional fence sitters that want to hedge against PRC containment but only after TW damocles is off the table. But not if PRC substantially dismantles US military presence in Asia and make examples of US partners that participate in broader campaign which will also include destorying military infra in the region (i.e. Pinegap). The worst thing US can do is try to defend (non security guarantee) TW and fail, the next worst is succeeds pyrrhicly but lose so much hardware that honoring other defense commitments becomes impossible to hide. For PRC, this is like a 2030+ effort. Which is not to say PRC would not prefer a relatively isolated TW campaign with minimal US intervention, but they're war planning assumes US intervention and if that comes to pass, IMO PRC won't be content with just stopping immediate US intervention goals, but their abliity to intervene in Asia going forward.