Interesting. I'm still struggling to see how this is better than just using a yubi/solo-key
Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
31–40 of 264 posts
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#32Nah. For all the talk of "one app to rule them all" (which is an awful idea) this is a step closer to that. For all it's faults, crypto has one thing right -- not your keys, not your stuff. I get that doing keys/passwords is hard, but the best thing in the long run is for them to stay in the hands of the user. And if not, the holder of the keys needs to be someone you can easily hold accountable, i.e. either fire, or…
it is your key, it lives on your device (and is synced across devices using your cloud account if you so choose)
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#33Earlier quoted context omitted.
In the United States the US Postal Service would be a great fit for a job like this. They already have good infrastructure for identity verification and physical distribution. I wouldn't want escrow of private keys, however. I'd rather the USPS just act as a certification authority that provides strong guarantees of identity verification.
Yes, definitely. USPS + Login.gov could act as trust anchors, with cryptographic keys reprovisioned upon proofing, versus storing them. I am open to whatever is the optimal balance between security and practicality. https://www.uspsoig.gov/document/role-postal-service-identit... > The Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 has recently expanded the Postal Service’s ability to provide identity verification to all levels of…
[1] just one, recent example... https://www.al.com/news/2022/10/alabama-gop-chairman-made-th...
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#34Earlier quoted context omitted.
Final step is key escrow authority that will store your private key and produce it to you if you can proof your identity with government ID. It is not enough to store in cloud storage (which Google, Apple, or someone else could deny you access to), or your own device you could lose or destroy (which is why backup hardware tokens are always recommended for U2F MFA); you need the ability (but not a requirement) to bind…
In the United States the US Postal Service would be a great fit for a job like this. They already have good infrastructure for identity verification and physical distribution. I wouldn't want escrow of private keys, however. I'd rather the USPS just act as a certification authority that provides strong guarantees of identity verification.
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
Yes, definitely. USPS + Login.gov could act as trust anchors, with cryptographic keys reprovisioned upon proofing, versus storing them. I am open to whatever is the optimal balance between security and practicality. https://www.uspsoig.gov/document/role-postal-service-identit... > The Postal Service Reform Act of 2022 has recently expanded the Postal Service’s ability to provide identity verification to all levels of…
Except that here in the US a non-trivial number of politicians of a particular persuasion[1] actually believe that government issued ID, of any kind, is the "mark of the beast". There's a reason that Real ID had a lot of push back. Having USPS, already a political bogey-man for that same crowd, become a holder of "identity" is probably going to face a lot of pushback. [1] just one, recent example... https://www.al.co…
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#36At no time am I even likely to rely on Google for anything this important; every other week there's a thread about Google killing off accounts for no reason. No way would any sane person allow Google access to this with their track record. And this isn't even considering my suspicion that Google only wants to "help" with this so you're locked into their services and they are better able to track your activity.
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
This is all part of the FIDO Alliance, so, a standards based solution that anyone with the wherewithal to implement it can do so. Many password managers have already said they'll be supporting it, as well as major vendors (Google and Apple for instance). I'm struggling to see your complaint being a valid one. This is basically webauthn, so use a Yubikey or similar device if you wish.
Remember how gmail was just imap/smtp? etc...
The various incarnations of their chat services is a better example. Gtalk used to have great XMPP support, even federation for a while. All remnants of that are gone now so I had to stop using it.
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
"Passkeys on users’ phones and computers are backed up and synced through the cloud to prevent lockouts in the case of device loss." "Only on the user's device", right.
They way keys are managed means that the passkey material is never available to Google, Apple, etc
Does the decryption only occur on the user's device?
Is this master password not reused for the account or has account authentication been changed to use a cryptographic proof produced on-device?
If the key is ever decrypted on vendor's servers, everything else is theater.
And this is all of course also excluding auto-updating vendor-supplied authentication code from the threat model because the industry is not ready for that conversation yet.
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#39Passkeys sound like another way for companies like Google and Apple to lock you into their walled garden. Having each walled garden randomly generating a key for every single domain instead of using the actual domain name as part of the key is a great way to lock regular people into their respective ecosystems.
Re: Bringing passkeys to Android and Chrome
#40Passkeys sound like another way for companies like Google and Apple to lock you into their walled garden. Having each walled garden randomly generating a key for every single domain instead of using the actual domain name as part of the key is a great way to lock regular people into their respective ecosystems.
What drives me nuts is how little discussion of this I've seen. People don't even seem aware of the implications of it. It's being pushed hard as a boon to security, which it is in some cases, but at a cost that nobody is even considering or talking about.
The implications are pretty profound: large companies having the power to lock you out of everything on a whim (even your own systems and unaffiliated third party services), levy taxes on the use of everything (e.g. Google starts charging you or sites to log in with Google), surveil literally everything (including logging into everything you have as you and sucking down data), and if a big identity provider gets seriously hacked it'll be an epic security apocalypse. Imagine someone stealing the master keys for a provider and pushing ransomware to millions of companies at once.
... and don't forget the obvious: "Oops I got locked out of Google and now I'm locked out of 50 SaaS services, my company's bank, my VPN, and my remote servers."
It just totally blows me away that these systems have no privacy protection at all, no portability provision for me to select or change my provider built into the protocol, no built-in support for third factor auth that I can control (e.g. FIDO2), no built in provision for recovery codes, and so on. These kinds of things didn't even seem like they were considered in the design of things like OpenID/OIDC. It's just a big "oh hey lets give god level access with no recourse to third parties and implement it so there's total lock-in... what could go wrong?"
Edit: yes some well-implemented systems offer their own built-in support for some of those things (recovery codes, changing your auth provider, reverting to password, etc.) but in my experience it's a minority and there is obviously nothing in the standard to encourage it or provide any guidance on how to do those things securely.