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How I learned about corporate firewalls

valcanbuild.tech

31–40 of 204 posts

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#31

We once had to fight for stackoverflow access. Security responds: you devs should only require the manual provided by the vendor(in this case: Oracle javadocs)?

Little experience with javadocs, so how do they fall?

JavaDocs are like the owner's manual included in a car: useful for many things, but if you need to figure out what route to take to get from point A to point B it probably won't help you.

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Can you expand on this a bit? I googled "ntlm proxy" and "sonatype nexus" and still have no idea what it is you've done but I'd like to understand.

Nexus Repository (commonly referred to as just "Nexus", which is confusing because Sonatype has several products called "Nexus $name") is a local artifact repository. Running it locally allows you to cache artifacts from external repositories like pypi.org or repo.maven.org, which is beneficial because it cuts down on the amount of outbound traffic required to install dependencies.

The biggest win is not the bandwidth, it's that you have exactly what was used before in case you need it (audit/postmortem), or origin goes away.

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#34

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Oh god this is horrible! Yeah, I can't believe how stupidly locked down some of these networks are. I once had an employer said they needed a "whitelist" of websites we wanted to visit instead of a "blacklist" of ones we shouldn't. That was an interesting day...

I had exactly this. We run a Saas and someone wrote an email saying that our server was down, and when we'd expect it to be up. Not having had a notification, I double checked from a couple of geographic locations that our application was indeed up and responding. After a bit of investigation, it turns out that they have to whitelist every unique address with their corporate IT. And had only whitelisted our primary c…

> We run a Saas and someone wrote an email saying that our server was down, and when we'd expect it to be up. Not having had a notification, I double checked from a couple of geographic locations that our application was indeed up and responding.

A tale as old as time: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uRGljemfwUE

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#35
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Nexus Repository (commonly referred to as just "Nexus", which is confusing because Sonatype has several products called "Nexus $name") is a local artifact repository. Running it locally allows you to cache artifacts from external repositories like pypi.org or repo.maven.org, which is beneficial because it cuts down on the amount of outbound traffic required to install dependencies.

The biggest win is not the bandwidth, it's that you have exactly what was used before in case you need it (audit/postmortem), or origin goes away.

In the context of GP's comment bandwidth + proxies seems to have been their motivation. Not to mention that external package registries HATE how many large organizations hammer them with the exact same traffic every time a build is running, due to the lack of the local cache.

But you are correct as well; that is an uncommon yet hugely beneficial reason to have an internal artifact repository.

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a security guy, we are taught the CIA triad early and it's easy to forget. The A stands for availability and if you don't make things available, you're failing at your own job.

CI = ??

I didn't know either, so I looked it up: The three initials stand for the three most important IT protection goals, often referred to as the "pillars of data security":

Confidentiality,

Integrity,

Availability.

There are other IT protection goals, including authenticity, privacy, reliability, and (non)repudiation.

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#37
I wonder what _showHtmlPage_ does? Did he just write something, something that allows 3rd party (corporate firewalls) inject HTML under his domain within TLS protected connection?

Cannot judge by not knowing how he displays errors. But a question to HN public: Is opening unknown HTML under my domain within another window safe? Or is there any possibility to strip down any "permissions" to cookies, requests, resources etc for that dedicated page?

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

CI = ??

I didn't know either, so I looked it up: The three initials stand for the three most important IT protection goals, often referred to as the "pillars of data security": Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability. There are other IT protection goals, including authenticity, privacy, reliability, and (non)repudiation.

>authenticity, privacy, reliability, and (non)repudiation.

These fall under integrity, confidentiality, availability, and integrity respectively! The CIA triad is pretty comprehensive!

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#39

If I want to push to GitHub when I am in the office, I have to VPN out of the office connection because Port 22 is blocked. And they wonder why I prefer to work from home?

For anybody running into a similar problem: most git hosting services set up a subdomain that will allow SSH traffic over port 443, e.g. ssh.github.com, altssh.bitbucket.org, altssh.gitlab.com, etc.

Re: How I learned about corporate firewalls

#40
post #37

I wonder what _showHtmlPage_ does? Did he just write something, something that allows 3rd party (corporate firewalls) inject HTML under his domain within TLS protected connection? Cannot judge by not knowing how he displays errors. But a question to HN public: Is opening unknown HTML under my domain within another window safe? Or is there any possibility to strip down any "permissions" to cookies, requests, resources…

Came here to point this out. For non-trivial implementations of showHtmlPage, this is a vulnerability. A malicious user could set up a 403 response with a fake “please re-enter your card to verify” form that sends to the attacker, or possibly even script to scrape the card number. Probably low risk of this actually happening in this scenario, but I’m pretty sure this fix is a bad idea. Better to show a generic error and log.
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