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F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

wonderfall.dev

31–40 of 69 posts

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#31

> 3. Low target API level (SDK) for client & apps Yeah well Google fucked up and removed a lot of important API stuff that supported tools. So I'll continue to use termux from F-Droid. Otherwise I might as well not have a phone.

Yup. Raising the target SDK means that more phones become ewaste, not because of their hardware becoming outdated, but because their software will never receive an update.

Raising the minimum SDK level might do this. This is separate from the target SDK level.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#32
post #15

Yes, you have to trust F-Droid to sign apps. But that doesn't weaken the security model — since August2021, (new) Android devs can't sign their own apps anymore, Google holds the keys instead. The security model already assumes a third party is signing the apps.

What surprises me about this article is that not one word is spoken of other appstores.

A lot of bragging takes place about Play, but is silent on Amazon's appstore or any of the Chinese alternatives.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#33
post #23

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Yes, last I checked, Google signs the app with your private key, which they force you to give them. In other words, they have the ability to make any changes to your app and re-sign it at their whim. Anyone concerned about the security of their shit should only install apps directly signed directly by the developer, using a private key only the developer possesses. It's a shame these platforms go to such great length…

Playing devil's advocate, given the choice between trusting a random developer to keep their keys private or Google to keep their keys private, I'd probably side with Google. Yeah that doesn't help with coercion or government letters, but neither would being a solo dev, both parties will comply.

What Google does with their keys is known only to Google. Google also have various commercial pressures which can compromise their behaviour (on that note, have we even managed to stop Certificate Authorities selling carte-blanche certificates to middleware-box vendors yet?)

A team-maintained package repository on the other hand operates through transparency.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#34
post #14

F-Droid demands more trust but it is also infinitely more trustworthy than the Play store. It looks like things can be improved (a lot) and I hope it does. F-Droid provides an invaluable service to those who value privacy and open source with very few volunteers.

As others have pointed out, this isn't even true anymore. Google's Play Store model lines up with what F-Droid is doing (effectively), so it doesn't really demand more trust, just different trust.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#35
post #7

Not to discredit the article, but it would be nice to know from the get-go that it's written by a contributor to GrapheneOS and gives a plug to their upcoming App Repository at the end.

This person isn't a grapheneOS developer. I'm unsure why people keep saying that.

In the GOS chatrooms this article has come up a few times but I've seen them say they don't know why people keep saying this person is a GOS dev. I mean look at the author's github. They sponsor the lead dev but have no commits or forks in the project to show for.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#36
post #18

> [in] a third-party Play Store client called Aurora Store [...] I’d recommend against using the shared “anonymous” accounts feature: you should make your own throwaway account with minimal information. Why is that? I've been using the anonymous accounts because I figured sharing an account gives a lot less info to google, and we're downloading the apks directly from Google servers in the end. Is there something I sh…

The anonymous account is picked from a pool of real accounts. The username/passwords are hardcoded into the app I'm pretty sure? So basically the aurora devs can login to this account and see the crap everyone's been downlidng (Id assume?)

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#37
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm not saying that the author has never contributed a PR (there'd be a lot of repos for me to look through), but AFAICT the author is just a user/fan of GrapheneOS, not a contributor to GrapheneOS itself or to the GraphenOS App Repository.

After reading the article, I clicked the link to their Github and saw a @GrapheneOS tab in their contribution graph. But taking a second look, I see that they haven't contributed to any of their repos in quite some time.

Note that just filing an issue shows up on the contribution graph.

Looking a little closer, AFAICT, they have only filed 2 GrapheneOS PRs ever: https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_Setting... and https://github.com/GrapheneOS/platform_packages_apps_SetupWi...

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#38
post #32
post #15

Yes, you have to trust F-Droid to sign apps. But that doesn't weaken the security model — since August2021, (new) Android devs can't sign their own apps anymore, Google holds the keys instead. The security model already assumes a third party is signing the apps.

What surprises me about this article is that not one word is spoken of other appstores. A lot of bragging takes place about Play, but is silent on Amazon's appstore or any of the Chinese alternatives.

Author here. You're wrong, as I spent several paragraphs explaining how Play App Signing works and how it's being enforced for new app bundles. The Huawei app repository has a similar approach to Play Store, and to my knowledge Amazon app repository has always been doing this (and even more nasty stuff: https://developer.amazon.com/docs/app-submission/understandi...).

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#39
post #7

Not to discredit the article, but it would be nice to know from the get-go that it's written by a contributor to GrapheneOS and gives a plug to their upcoming App Repository at the end.

Author here. I'm neither a GrapheneOS project member or an Accrescent developer. I'm trying to push these solutions because I think they actually do things right. It's really frustrating that the first reaction for some would be to think that my motivation is to push alternative solutions for my own benefit. Let's try to move past this and other irrelevant personal judgments.

Re: F-Droid: how it weakens Android's security model

#40

> 3. Low target API level (SDK) for client & apps Yeah well Google fucked up and removed a lot of important API stuff that supported tools. So I'll continue to use termux from F-Droid. Otherwise I might as well not have a phone.

That's not a sustainable approach as these old APIs will be obsoleted by a future version of Android. The correct approach is to follow modern practices that will guarantee security & privacy. In the case of Termux, they're well aware of the issue: https://github.com/termux/termux-app/issues/2155

This is a similar situation to iOS which has a saner app ecosystem for this reason (in my opinion). That doesn't prevent apps with the same purpose to exist. iSH and a-Shell are examples of that on iOS. UserLAnd on Android takes the proot approach: https://userland.tech/

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