Live data from Hacker News

A Message to Our Customers (2016)

apple.com

31–40 of 57 posts

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

That’s all great and all but Google hasn’t been touting privacy features as a selling point. With Apples decision to move forward with this I’m not beholden to any company for my phone. At least with android I can side load and do what I want.

Not having any data on a single false positives ever leave your device is MUCH more private than having that data exist on Google's servers. Also, I have huge doubts that Google is reviewing the data to be sure it isn't a false positive before handing it over to the authorities. They very famously refuse to hire expensive human beings when flawed machine learning algorithms are cheaper.

I never used iCloud photo. I never hosted my photos on Google photos. But when Apple talks about using their CSAM technology for 3rd party apps, even if I'm sending my photos to my private synology? Well that's when I see the writing on the wall and head out. There is no perfect candidate, but selling me on privacy, and doing what they are doing now is the line in the sand for me.

https://www.macrumors.com/2021/08/09/apple-child-safety-feat...

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#32
post #22

It is remarkable that Tim so clearly understood the problem in 2016. With that one post, Apple and Tim earned trust from a group of people that trust very few. And in an instance, both Apple and Tim have now burned all of it.

This whole this is complicated. Trying to do right for people on privacy while also doing right by endangered children. I like what Alex Stamos had to say about it... https://mobile.twitter.com/alexstamos/status/142405454287900...

I dunno man.

I think I can see the issue pretty clearly here.

- Real harm is enabled with encryption. I get it.

- Back doors break encryption for everyone and don't stop encryption for bad guys.

Am I missing something?

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#33
post #8

What is the functional difference between the government demanding Apple add code to break device encryption, and the government demanding Apple add signatures that extend their on-device scanning beyond its intended scope of CSAM? Apple seems to get a lot of credit for opposing the former, but gets mocked when they say they would oppose the latter. But as far as I can tell, the legal argument is exactly the same for…

> Apple’s plans seem creepy to me, but I have been less than impressed with the specificity of arguments against it. Most seem to stop at “what if the government forces them to expand it” without addressing exactly how, under current federal law, the government would do that. It's not "the government". There are many governments around the world. What happens when China, Russia, or another country legislates using th…

> Will Apple back out of them or give in?

They will give in, at least in China. They currently host all of their iCloud content in China on Chinese servers (and turn over encryption keys), they have banned all VPN apps from the Chinese app store, and they removed the Hong Kong protest app at the behest of the CCP. They will do whatever China tells them to, because, at least from their perspective, they have to. All their manufacturing is in China.

I can't even imagine an outcome where Apple doesn't start looking for pictures of tank man or anti-government images on Chinese citizen's phones. The Chinese government will hand them a list of hashes and say "these photos are illegal here, tell us whenever you find one". Maybe Apple will hold the line of "only photos uploaded to iCloud", but even then they just built the capability to scan everything on someone's phone, and the iCloud part is simply a switch that we have to hope they don't flip.

I'm trying not to be too hopelessly negative here but I can't believe Apple decided that encrypting iCloud backups is worth trading for a file scanner on your phone. What the fuck.

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#34
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the concern is scanning and uploading images. This could be justified in some cases. But once you open this door, it can easily expand to scan for other things. And people don't always read the notices for every update.

We already know that Apple will publicly fight Government demands to break device encryption. They have already proven that.

They previously said they couldn't comply. Now they will have to say they won't comply.

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#35
post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I don't think the concern is scanning and uploading images. This could be justified in some cases. But once you open this door, it can easily expand to scan for other things. And people don't always read the notices for every update.

We already know that Apple will publicly fight Government demands to break device encryption. They have already proven that.

The key word is publicly... Or I missed tags?

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#36

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is a good point. I do believe we should be skeptical of these companies stated positions unless we can see a profit motive. The previous stance that Apple said they had was "we value your privacy and you should pay us for that". They also demonstrated in the case in 2016 with terrorists and the FBI that they meant it. In this case, they have flipped entirely, and are now adding features without being compelled t…

So what’s the profit motive?

I don't see it. Clearly our motivations are misaligned. I'm not confident you can sell me on the idea that this will get people to trust them more, and therefore buy more apple stuff.

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We already know that Apple will publicly fight Government demands to break device encryption. They have already proven that.

They previously said they couldn't comply. Now they will have to say they won't comply.

They can't comply now.

Unlike Google, they set up a system where no data hits Apple's server unless multiple images match known examples of kiddie porn.

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#38

Earlier quoted context omitted.

We already know that Apple will publicly fight Government demands to break device encryption. They have already proven that.

The key word is publicly ... Or I missed tags?

Did I miss the sarcasm tag when it is implied that Google is immune to government demands in a manner that Apple is not?

Re: A Message to Our Customers (2016)

#39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Not having any data on a single false positives ever leave your device is MUCH more private than having that data exist on Google's servers. Also, I have huge doubts that Google is reviewing the data to be sure it isn't a false positive before handing it over to the authorities. They very famously refuse to hire expensive human beings when flawed machine learning algorithms are cheaper.

I never used iCloud photo. I never hosted my photos on Google photos. But when Apple talks about using their CSAM technology for 3rd party apps, even if I'm sending my photos to my private synology? Well that's when I see the writing on the wall and head out. There is no perfect candidate, but selling me on privacy, and doing what they are doing now is the line in the sand for me. https://www.macrumors.com/2021/08/09…

>when Apple talks about using their CSAM technology for 3rd party apps

Citation needed.

Apple has made no such claim and has made it clear that if you turn iCloud photos off, nothing is scanned.

>If users are not using iCloud Photos, NeuralHash will not run

https://techcrunch.com/2021/08/10/interview-apples-head-of-p...

Post reply on HN