31–40 of 65 posts
I'd like so see police able to access any unencrypted data for any court sanctioned purpose, but within 6 weeks I'd like the owner of that data notified that the police have used their data and the reasons why.
Then people can vote with their feet and use only encrypted services for things...
>agents were not allowed to download or read any messages sent from AN0M accounts in the United States because of privacy laws. "Privacy laws" being the Fourth Amendment, which the article still makes it sound like they violated by downloading all the messages three times a week.
> By the end of 2019, this third country was sending data to the FBI every Monday, Wednesday and Friday, according to the court document. > "This data comprises the encrypted messages of all the users of AN0MS with a few exceptions," the document reads. > Those exceptions included approximately 15 AN0M users in the United States. Sounds like the FBI got the data of everyone except the US users.
> The affidavit noted that if any other AN0M handsets "landed in the US" the AFP agreed to monitor them "for any threats to life".
The FBI might not have been the one peeking in the window but they had friends willing to peek on their behalf. A mild inconvenience they can parallel construct around.
So how many people did they spy on to get those 251 prosecutions?
The app was a plant, preloaded on mobile phones you'd only buy for criminal acts, so probably not much more than 251. For the record, they almost certainly overreached elsewhere but imo, what was done with this app is pretty fair and balanced. It's much better than requiring backdoors in apps or services. It's almost like real police work.
Is this a thing? A specific type of prepaid phone or maybe a “laundered” sim card?
How was the app marketed? Is there any T and C? Doesn't this imply willful lying of government to its citizens. What's the guarantee that they aren't doing the same with contact tracing apps or other necessary apps?
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Do you have a link for that? Am curious to see.
From the analysis published a few months ago, believed to be the reason the operation was would up: https://web.archive.org/web/20210608102417/https://webcache.... All the data was sent to some sever in Bucharest.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Isn't this the classic Five Eyes loophole? I'll spy on you, you'll spy on me, and we'll exchange notes.
The US is explicitly not getting data on US citizens from foreign spying according to this article? And the article implies that no loophole was needed for Australia to get data on Australians, there was a legal warrant for that in Australia. So how is this the "classic Five Eyes loophole"?
Although the US ANOM data wasn't sent to the FBI, presumably a foreign agency could see that data and tell the FBI which US citizens might be involved in illegal activity so they can be monitored/investigated in other ways.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
So truth in advertising. Too bad the criminals on other side worked for government...
Or is it? I mean, it sounded like an app specifically marketed and used for serious organised crime, so as someone who is pro-encryption, pro-privacy, this seems like entirely reasonable police work.
More like no arrests that they could talk about, but it's not unheard of for governments to launder the evidence until it's more admissible in court ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction )
More like no arrests that they could talk about, but it's not unheard of for governments to launder the evidence until it's more admissible in court ( https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_construction )
Yeah I don't buy this for a second. US agencies are known to violate constitutional rights on a regular basis, usually without any repercussions. Yet in this scenario, where there doesn't even seem to be much innocent bycatch they're Doing It By The Books?
This wasn't someone not being read their miranda rights in the back of a police car - it was a huge international operation that got a lot of press and attention.