A Spectre proof-of-concept for a Spectre-proof web

Post by ddworken » Sat, Mar 13, 2021, 4:47 AM UTC

medlyyy wrote: post #30

toomim wrote: post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It means game over for users who run browsers like Safari, which don't isolate each site to their own OS process. If you load Javascript from one site, that JS can read the entire state of memory for another site, if it is within the same OS process. This means that any site can include some nefarious javascript that reads all the cookies and passwords for the user on other sites, and then log in as them.

Seems like Firefox doesn't have this feature yet either? https://wiki.mozilla.org/Project_Fission

Post by ddworken » Sat, Mar 13, 2021, 4:44 PM UTC

177tcca wrote: post #32

ddworken wrote: post #21

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As I understand it (though I don't work directly on Chrome), a key part of Chrome's threat model is that a compromised renderer process (where there is one renderer process per site) has limited security impact. So being safe against Spectre (which gives a read primitive in the renderer process) is just a subset of being safe against a compromised renderer process.

Per site isolation =] Which the (comparably) insecure likes of Firefox (unfortunately) does not have.