Ed25519 curves are currently being adopted for DKIM in RFC8463 [0]. I I wrote an article about this [1], where I concluded that Ed25519 is an improvement for DKIM over RSA (smaller keys, deprecation of SHA1). However, this finding may have big impact on the adoption rate of Ed25519 for DKIM. Specifically for DKIM validators (MTAs). MTAs are already amongst the worst offenders when it comes to not adhering to the stan…
If I understand the article correctly this isn't a problem for uses of Ed25519 in systems like DKIM or DNSSEC. These Ed25519 interop problems only arise with maliciously crafted keys and nonces. This is a problem for consensus systems (like Zcash in the article) because the signature is recorded and needs to be verified by many parties, and if a malicious signature it tickles an interop bug it can maybe ( handwave )…
Re: It’s 255:19AM. Do you know what your validation criteria are?
#31It's been a LONG time since I had to administer an SMTP server that handled mail for other people ... Is there a potential for, say, getting an intermediate gateway banned for sending invalid signatures by relaying them via it?