Live data from Hacker News

State of Linux Desktop Security

bjornpagen.com

31–40 of 89 posts

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#33

> Windows and MacOS enforce signature checking on all binaries. This is not a meaningful security feature. If the signature has to be from the manufacturer then you can't so much as write your own shell script, which is useless. That is a cage, not a security measure. But if the user can sign their own binaries then the signature is the equivalent of the execute bit -- you have to tell the system something is executa…

You're going to make ipsec heads explode comparing signing a binary to setting a file's execute bit.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#34
post #18

I'm dubious of some of these -- the code signing thing strikes me as not that compelling for reasons other comments have already pointed out. Others are very valid. But more than "how are we doing vs Apple and Microsoft?" I'd kinda prefer to set the bar a bit higher. Desktop operating systems (all of them, at least with actual users) are just completely architecturally backwards for the reality of our modern security…

[deleted]

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#35
Perhaps what is broken is not our operating systems, but the notion that a computer program running on one's own computer can be an untrusted agent of a third party. I don't the tools in my collection to be isolated from each other, dangerous creatures in a computerized zoo. I want them to be composable elements of a cohesive whole. I want them to share data so promiscuously that is difficult to tell where one program stops and another begins. Today, this vision of computing is best realized in the free software world, and I don't believe that is a coincidence. To make it work, your tools must be trustable, and the problem of trustable computing is fundamentally intertwined with the issue of free software. Can it be reconciled with a commercial model of software? I don't know, but if it's a choice, then I've made mine.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#38
post #24

Well. The principle of Linux was and still is to give tools and have users use them. It gets out of the users way to use them. One can always use firejail or other sandboxing solutions to do that. Chrome itself is a security nightmare, always with the mic on and listening. Microsoft and Apple also have CVEs unattended. Binary checks before starting a program? Why I have a package-manager that does the checks. Untrust…

Which is why 98% of the desktop and mobile users don't care about Linux. That is the price to pay when only technical minded users are the target group.

And that's ok, there's nothing wrong with tools being specialised for certain small markets. It makes them significantly better for those people than being forced to use a ill fitting tool for someone else.

Consolidation and lack of competition makes for a worse experience.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#39
People rarely run untrusted software on FOSS systems. If you can't trust your package manager and your distrobution you have all kinds of problems the least of which is sandboxing applications.

The only untrusted programs I run are Steam games and FPGA tools, and for those I created a separate user account.

The notion that every application must be 100% sandboxed is mostly security theater and will make your life with daily work in the real non-theater world a living nightmare.

Re: State of Linux Desktop Security

#40
post #36

>Any app running under Xorg can see the contents of any other app runing under Xorg. It's one of the problems addressed by Wayland

Wayland remains very immature, and it still has significant shortcomings in hardware support. It's a beta-level technology at best, while Xorg has 20 years of stability behind it. It isn't responsible to suggest it as an alternative.
Post reply on HN