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When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

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Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#31
post #16

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> if an attacker has unencumbered access to one’s device, all security goes flying out the window This is rapidly starting to become less true - full disk encryption is everywhere, backed by hardware TPMs; the Lockdown LSM prevents root from owing the boot chain; devices with soldered RAM are functionally immune to cold boot attacks. There are still things an attacker can do - put a hardware keylogger on the keyboard…

This is rapidly starting to become less true Unfortunately, both for right-to-repair and actually owning the hardware you bought.

This kind of stuff shouldn't really theoretically have to affect repairability, but Apple seems to go out of their way to make sure that as much as possible gets bricked when you replace things.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#32
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. Physical security matters, a lot. That being said, malicious hardware is a problem. A hacked phone charging terminal at the airport could certainly be a serious problem if there are enough vulnerabilities in the USB stack.

> As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. People frequently say this, but never really explain it. As far as I can tell, it translates to "Nobody cares about physical security" - except it's clear that people /do/. Things like Boot Guard are only really relevant to physical attacks. DMA protection in firmware is only really relevant to physical attacks. It's extremely obvious t…

There are huge swaths of people who don’t think about physical security at all.

But many do and it’s a difficult problem that impacts the efficiency of the business. I’ve had to deal with it often and end of the day, you need to keep important data off of mobile or other client devices, and have controlled workarounds for exceptions.

Some of the tougher compliance standards recognize this and essentially prohibit many types of remote access without the entity owning the remote computer.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#33
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. Physical security matters, a lot. That being said, malicious hardware is a problem. A hacked phone charging terminal at the airport could certainly be a serious problem if there are enough vulnerabilities in the USB stack.

> As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. People frequently say this, but never really explain it. As far as I can tell, it translates to "Nobody cares about physical security" - except it's clear that people /do/. Things like Boot Guard are only really relevant to physical attacks. DMA protection in firmware is only really relevant to physical attacks. It's extremely obvious t…

The point of the saying is that, try as we might to secure the devices, they can be compromised by someone with physical access (and the right knowledge and tools) in essentially all cases. It is not meant to discourage you from using the best security measures available ON the device, but rather to point out that the only way to truly have physical security is to maintain control OF the device.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#34
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. Physical security matters, a lot. That being said, malicious hardware is a problem. A hacked phone charging terminal at the airport could certainly be a serious problem if there are enough vulnerabilities in the USB stack.

> As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. People frequently say this, but never really explain it. As far as I can tell, it translates to "Nobody cares about physical security" - except it's clear that people /do/. Things like Boot Guard are only really relevant to physical attacks. DMA protection in firmware is only really relevant to physical attacks. It's extremely obvious t…

These are mitigations, they’re designed to slow down an attack by someone who has physical access to the machine. In many ways they’re a bit like a finely designed padlock; none are ever going to stop a skilled lock pick, but they can slow them down enough to make an attach impractical.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#35
post #25

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Please tell this to the Intel SGX folks. They don’t seem to have gotten that memo yet...

There are always people who “need” physically tamper proof software, and in a free state you’re free to express such demands. Intel isn’t the first nor the last. Like so: https://youtu.be/BKorP55Aqvg

Tamper resistant.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#36

What would it take to have a Thunderbolt/USB C condom? You know, like those standard USB adapter that just drops the data leads on a usb charger to make attacks like this impossible. Maybe we would have to implement a hardware switch on the device itself? I'm not going to feel safe charging with a public use charger until I find some way to insure only power and not data is making it to my device. Even POE feels like…

USB power delivery does not use the data lines at all. It negotiates the permissible voltage and current using Vbus pin only. There's no reason why your USB data port needs to be enabled while charging. Just disable it. I actually have a charge-only thunderbolt cable in my desk ... it's incredibly irritating because the only way to tell the difference between it and a real thunderbolt cable is that it doesn't work.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#37

What would it take to have a Thunderbolt/USB C condom? You know, like those standard USB adapter that just drops the data leads on a usb charger to make attacks like this impossible. Maybe we would have to implement a hardware switch on the device itself? I'm not going to feel safe charging with a public use charger until I find some way to insure only power and not data is making it to my device. Even POE feels like…

I just bring my own brick for such circumstances. It takes no effort for me to evaluate the security, and it’s more flexible than counting on built in USB ports.

But buses, trains, planes — they all offer a USB socket, not a power socket.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#38
post #26

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. Physical security matters, a lot. That being said, malicious hardware is a problem. A hacked phone charging terminal at the airport could certainly be a serious problem if there are enough vulnerabilities in the USB stack.

> As a general rule, anyone with physical access to your machine already owns it. People frequently say this, but never really explain it. As far as I can tell, it translates to "Nobody cares about physical security" - except it's clear that people /do/. Things like Boot Guard are only really relevant to physical attacks. DMA protection in firmware is only really relevant to physical attacks. It's extremely obvious t…

Physical access is just such a rich attack surface that keeping your computer away from malicious actors is the right and proper solution.

An extreme example a pentester imparted to me once was, if someone could spend sufficient time alone with my laptop, they could remove my hard drive and insert it into an identical laptop with a hardware or firmware backdoor preinstalled. We were discussing nation-state adversaries, but the general principle applies.

Another example is attacks on encrypted drives (so-called "evil maid" attacks). If a computer is booted and the drive is decrypted, an attacker with physical access could open the computer, remove the RAM, and download it's contents, thereby stealing the encryption key. If the computer is powered down, it's still vulnerable to other attacks; enrypted drives necessarily have cleartext code for accepting the password & decrypting the drive. You could modify this code to log the decryption key, or broadcast it over your device's radios.

There's also the classic Windows "sticky key" exploit, where you replace the sticky key binary with a program that gives you administrator access, reboot the computer, and then activate sticky keys.

You could install a keystroke logger. You could install a device to record monitor output. You could log network traffic.

I've yet to find a kiosk environment that I couldn't break out of. Once I was able to break out of a scanning kiosk environment, and into a Windows desktop, by turning the quality settings all the way up and crashing the kiosk. That was one of the more difficult examples; most of the time all you need is to find a way to right-click. (I had the proper authority to investigate these kiosks.)

The point is that the list goes on.

It is true, as you say, that there has been progress in implementing mitigations, and that there are people who care deeply about these issues. A counterexample might be SIM cards, TPMs, and other HSMs. These systems are able to provide better guarantees by encapsulating their peripherals and being willing to self destruct. But that could describe a cell phone, tablet a laptop, too.

Maybe in the future this "law" won't be so hard and fast.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#39
post #37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I just bring my own brick for such circumstances. It takes no effort for me to evaluate the security, and it’s more flexible than counting on built in USB ports.

But buses, trains, planes — they all offer a USB socket, not a power socket.

I've long since taken to carrying a USB battery that can charge and provide power at the same time. It's more reliable for me than USB condoms, and, well, it's a battery, which is useful too.

Re: When Lightning Strikes Thrice: Breaking Thunderbolt 3 Security

#40
post #28

What would it take to have a Thunderbolt/USB C condom? You know, like those standard USB adapter that just drops the data leads on a usb charger to make attacks like this impossible. Maybe we would have to implement a hardware switch on the device itself? I'm not going to feel safe charging with a public use charger until I find some way to insure only power and not data is making it to my device. Even POE feels like…

How about a SSH-like “trust on first use” prompt for all data connections? Each USB/TB device has its own pub/private keypair. If you ever plug in a charging cable and get the prompt, you know something is wrong.

I think Thunderbolt already does something like this? At least on Windows, I'm prompted to trust or not trust a new Thunderbolt device before it can do anything except draw power. (I didn't know that was a feature and kept wondering why my external GPU wasn't showing up...)
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