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Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

berkshirehathaway.com

31–40 of 80 posts

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#31
post #4

After having seen so much nonsense accounting in the books of so many startups (especially recently, it feels like a growing trend) it's refreshing to see GAAP. The difference in standards between the startup universe and the 'real world' is actually scary. There have been far too many instances of people getting taken for a ride based on EBITDA when the company's financials were far from healthy. Am I alone in think…

I agree.

Although for anyone unfamiliar, GAAP isn't and never was perfect. Like any target it is gamed. Hence the origins of the meme "cash flow is a better indicator than net income."

In comparison, startup accounting has engaged in such fuckery that it makes GAAP look wholesome.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#32

Any book recommendations for someone who would like to learn more about GAAP, accounting, operational earnings, and/or how to evaluate stocks?

I think the recommendations you're getting here to read Buffett's letters, The Intelligent Investor, etc. are good, but if you're completely new to accounting, I think starting with more basic texts would be a better idea.

Two that I liked and still refer to from time to time are How to Read a Financial Report by John A Tracy and Financial Statements: A Step-By-Step Guide to Understanding and Creating Financial Reports by Thomas R Ittelson.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#33
post #19

Any book recommendations for someone who would like to learn more about GAAP, accounting, operational earnings, and/or how to evaluate stocks?

Read the last twenty years of Buffet's letters. No snark intended. His letters intended for investors are the best use of your time rather than a book someone wrote for vanity.

thank you.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#34

Any book recommendations for someone who would like to learn more about GAAP, accounting, operational earnings, and/or how to evaluate stocks?

* Best introduction: Financial Intelligence, Revised Edition: A Manager's Guide to Knowing What the Numbers Really Mean (Berman, Karen, Knight, Joe, Case, John, imusti) * Then read this, all of it, except perhaps most of the exhibits: Most recent Costco annual report (10-k). * Berkshire Hathaway annual letters, Transcripts from Berkshire annual meetings * Great follow-up: Financial Shenanigans, Fourth Edition: How to…

this is very helpful. Thank you stranger

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#35
After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#36

After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?

I would say don’t try to interpret a single article to understand the whole of Berkshire Hathaway. It’s a complex organization with 300K employees in dozens of businesses who operate in a totally decentralized way (aside from capital allocation).

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#37
post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I'm missing your point here. Do you not like marriage analogies? Or you don't think his analogy and very well known life experience doesn't apply (he has an interesting personal experience with marriage)? Or do you think most of the people who read his letter have no background in marriage? I find the analogy very appropriate and well stated. Much like a marriage he can't just give back a portion of an entity he's in…

I guess what’s strange to me is not the idea that, as you become more committed to a person you discover their flaws and the relationship gets worse. That seems self evident to me and seems to be a common theme both in theory and in practice. But how many marriages resolve with discovering the person is way better than you imagined? I’m not familiar with this, either through the idealism of poetry or romantic movies,…

A happy marriage over time becomes something that's hard to describe completely and I don't think it's ever what people imagine - it can be what is imagined, but it's also something else. His point isn't that the person is "better" than you imagined (though they are different from the time you marry them, that growth is part of the beauty), it's that the marriage is blissful in ways you never foresaw.

His analogy is good, imo.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#38

After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?

There’s two main points in article:

1) berskhire owns clayton homes which takes advantage of poor people with high fees. Therefore it is hypocritical for Charlie to accuse a pharma company of taking advantage of people. 2) some of berskhire deals associated with 3G capital cost cut at sake of revenue growth

For number 1, it’s a fair question. I’ve heard of Clayton homes before and seems to be a head scratcher for Warren and Charlie who are quick to throw moral judgements around. However one key difference I’ll point out between Clayton and Charlie’s criticism of the pharma company is that jacking prices in pharmaceuticals can be literally a life or death matter. Clayton homes on the other hand people have choices - they can continue to rent a usual apartment vs trying to “buy” a home. Not saying it’s not sketchy but the degree of harm is different.

For number 2, the author leave out many specific details but I’m inclined to not give much weight. If you’ve read any of Warren’s letters their entire philosophy is to buy and hold, generating a healthy return on net tangible equity year after year. It makes no sense they would cut costs at expense of revenue growth. It does make sense they would cut costs, but not in the slash and burn manner this article is implying.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#39

After reading all the positive comments about BRK in this thread I came across this article: https://www.nasdaq.com/articles/hypocrisy-berkshire-hathaway... For somebody with little knowledge of financial services (i.e., me), how would you recommend that I interpret this?

The BRK official position on Valeant is that they take advantage of sick individual's life-or-death need for drugs to price gouge them since purchasing decisions are not made on price (medication is "price inelastic").

Clayton homes is criticized for having bad or misleading loan terms. BRK (and many financial services individuals I know personally) often see just about any loan term as fair as long as no-one was forced into the loan at gunpoint. Is it the responsibility of the lessor or lessee to make sure the lessee is signing to something in their best interest? Loans are not life-or-death and purchasing decisions are frequently made on price (loans are "price elastic").

The article you've linked presents these two cases and makes the argument that they are equivalently immoral, making Munger a hypocrite. Personally, I think they're both fair criticisms, but they definitely come from different places. I don't see necessary cognitive dissonance in having the opinion that only one of these is immoral.

With regard to cutting costs: I see no indication that BRK criticized Valeant for firing people, so I suspect this is a personal issue for the author of the article, so I haven't addressed it here.

Re: Annual Letter to Berkshire Shareholders (2019) [pdf]

#40
"The result was significant property damage and a major disruption in Lubrizol’s business. Even so, both the company’s property loss and business-interruption loss will be mitigated by substantial insurance recoveries that Lubrizol will receive. But, as the late Paul Harvey was given to saying in his famed radio broadcasts, “Here’s the rest of the story.” One of the largest insurers of Lubrizol was a company owned by...uh,Berkshire."

Whoops. I wonder if they're going to introduce a policy against such self-insurance?

"Mistakes in assessing insurance risks can be huge and can take many years – even decades – to surface and ripen. (Think asbestos.) A major catastrophe that will dwarf hurricanes Katrina and Michael will occur – perhaps tomorrow, perhaps many decades from now. “The Big One” may come from a traditional source, such as wind or earthquake, or it may be a total surprise involving, say, a cyber attack having disastrous consequences beyond anything insurers now contemplate. When such a mega-catastrophe strikes, Berkshire will get its share of the losses and they will be big –very big. Unlike many other insurers, however, handling the loss will not come close to straining our resources, and we will be eager to add to our business the next day."

This is somewhat concerning. Property/casualty has been a relatively stable insurance market, as Buffett notes. (Major hurricanes not withstanding. I seem to recall reading that, if life insurance had been more common among gay men when the AIDS epidemic occurred, the life insurance industry would have been bankrupt.)

But, there are large-scale new things trundling down the pike. Global climate change, for one. I don't know if BH is involved with flood insurance damages, but large regions of the world are likely to be exposed to them that had not been before. There aren't any statistics to cover those changes. It's gonna be interesting.

"Over the years, many new rules and guidelines pertaining to board composition and duties have come into being. The bedrock challenge for directors, nevertheless, remains constant: Find and retain a talented CEO –possessing integrity, for sure – who will be devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime."

"Devoted to the company for his/her business lifetime?!" A CEO's business lifetime is much more than 18 months! This is clearly an outdated and obsolete (if not completely archaic) idea. How ridiculous!

(A significant chunk of my assets are in BH stock. No baby seals were harmed in the production of this comment.)

"Frequently,the possession of one such directorship bestows on its holder three to four times the annual median income of U.S.households. (I missed much of this gravy train: As a director of Portland Gas Light in the early 1960s, I received $100annuallyfor my service. To earn this princely sum, I commuted to Maine four times a year.)"

Uh, oh. Warning! Warning! Socialism incoming!

"In past reports, we’ve discussed both the sense and nonsense of stock repurchases. Our thinking, boiled down: Berkshire will buy back its stock only if a) Charlie and I believe that it is selling for less than it is worth and b) the company, upon completing the repurchase, is left with ample cash."

I just thought I'd copy that one.

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