Earlier quoted context omitted.
No they wouldn't, because this is trivially easy to MITM. The whole reason CAs exist is to verify the identity of the domain owner, because any random MITMer can claim to be yourbank.com and you can't prove it either way. Very technically this would be slightly better because it stops passive observers, but in reality I suspect it would be worse because tons of websites would use this broken by design solution and th…
There are two aspects that are currently adressed by https: identity and privacy. What I’m proposing does indeed only solve the privacy aspect. And for some use-cases, that’s fine. Not all use-cases (e.g. your bank), and we would still have CAs for that.
TLS does try to provide confidentiality and part of that is authenticating who you are talking to. Without this your communication is not at all confidential, as anyone could impersonate your intended target. A passive adversary can't read your traffic, true, but an active attacker (of for example the coffee shop dwelling variety) is not a major step up and would undermine the confidentiality aspect entirely.