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The Dark Side of Expertise

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Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#31

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Hm. You're saying that inexpert decision-makers were misled by experts? That is true, but I'd argue that the article is making a different claim: the article is claiming that experts are misled by their own expertise.

It seems like one difficulty is in knowing what expertise is important? Assumedly the contractors thought they had expertise, but were lacking. The firefighters assumedly thought they had expertise, but we're lacking. What expertise do I think I have, but am actually lacking?

Yeah, that's difficult. The only answer I've found is experience. Gaining experience for yourself is painful because it's slow, and part of the experience is consequences of your mistakes: in fields like fire-fighting (or rock climbing, which I love) your mistakes can literally kill you. So hopefully you learn form other people's experience and mistakes as much as possible.

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#32
post #29

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This is the same annoying problem I found with Malcolm Gladwell's Blink . He draws this conclusion that we can trust our first impressions, but it's really unclear how he comes to that conclusion: some of his evidence comes to no conclusion, and some of it directly contradicts that conclusion.

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Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#33

This was pretty ramble-y and pulled in some pretty unrelated examples. * We never get a clear answer for why the Civic Center Engineers got the inputs wrong, so we can't conclude that it was because of their expertise. * With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading them: panic. If anything, the solution to the problem shows that expertise was the sol…

> With the firefighters, there's a pretty easy proximal explanation, which again is not their expertise misleading them: panic.

Exactly, plus while his idea was fascinating, its understandable that the others didnt follow suit; he essentially invented the idea:

> Similar types of escape fires had been used by the plains Indians to escape the fast-moving, brief duration grass fires of the plains, and the method had been written about by James Fenimore Cooper (1827) in The Prairie, but in this case Foreman Dodge appears to have invented it on the spot, as the only means available to him to save his crew.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mann_Gulch_fire

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#34
Just another study about expertise and how it can maybe not be beneficial:

https://www.bmj.com/content/357/bmj.j1797

From "Physician age and outcomes in elderly patients in hospital in the US: observational study":

> Physicians’ skills, however, can also become outdated as scientific knowledge, technology, and clinical guidelines change. Incorporating these changes into clinical practice is time consuming and can at times be overwhelming. Interest in how quality of care evolves over a physician’s career has revived in recent years, with debates over how best to structure programs for continuing medical education, including recent controversy in the US regarding maintenance of certification programs.

> Within the same hospital, patients treated by older physicians had higher mortality than patients cared for by younger physicians, except those physicians treating high volumes of patients.

Basically, expertise can change, and if you don't keep up, you may be following outdated advice (which might not useful or even possibly harmful). I feel like the "dropping your equipment" is a part of this. You need to know the right tool for the right job, and sometimes doing the same thing for years might lead you down the wrong path.

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They ignored the actual fact that it was sagging more than predicted and insisted the calculations were right. That might be ok, but someone allowed the project to proceed without explaining the contradiction. Real observations were dismissed in favor of believing in the expertise.

>They ignored the actual fact that it was sagging more than predicted and insisted the calculations were right. Seems like they lack the expertise needed to properly evaluate their model.

or experience can create a bias where you know you are right even when the evidence says otherwise.

Age usually humbles people by them experiencing this often enough they tend to check things... if they mature properly

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#36
This illogical talk is because of "Thinking, Fast and Slow", Chapter 4, which Daniel Kahneman has since questioned.

http://www.decisionsciencenews.com/2012/10/05/kahneman-on-th...

USCSB has great work place accident round ups (CGI, no gore). Of course Expertise is what makes the workplace safer, it has no dark side.

Here's Murphy's law (If it's possible for it to happen, given enough time it will, so don't allow it to physically happen wherever possible over processes)

https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Tflm9mttAAI

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#37
post #34

Just another study about expertise and how it can maybe not be beneficial: https://www.bmj.com/content/357/bmj.j1797 From "Physician age and outcomes in elderly patients in hospital in the US: observational study": > Physicians’ skills, however, can also become outdated as scientific knowledge, technology, and clinical guidelines change. Incorporating these changes into clinical practice is time consuming and can at…

>I feel like the "dropping your equipment" is a part of this. You need to know the right tool for the right job, and sometimes doing the same thing for years might lead you down the wrong path.

This happened at my last job. The company I worked for hadn't really changed their methods for about 7 years. Jobs went slow, we worked ridiculous amounts of overtime and mistakes were a regular part of the job. Over the years I worked there, I went through everything, replaced a few processes, convinced the owner to get newer more efficent tools and in the end, cut down the amount of overtime we worked to almost nothing, reduced actual human operater times on our machines from about 2-3 hours per run to 20 minutes, and reduced mistakes and error from once a week or so to once in a blue moon.

The thing is, I didn't do anything amazing or groundbreaking, they could have been operating that way for longer, they'd just found something that had worked and never bothered to try and improve their system. I was left alone for a few years and given free reign to do pretty much whatever I wanted, I got sick of being overworked, so I started figuring out and changing whatever I could to make things quicker, easier and better and it really didn't take much in the end to make a drastic improvement.

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#39
The civic center arena roof collapse is similar to the FIU pedestrian bridge collapse in that the engineers trusted their calculations over physical evidence of imminent failure:

> At 9 a.m. on March 15, a university employee heard a loud "whip cracking" sound while under the bridge span, waiting for a red traffic light. At the same time, the design-build team met for about two hours at the construction site to discuss the cracks discovered on March 13. Representatives from both FIU and FDOT were present. The FIGG lead engineer's conclusions were that the structural integrity of the bridge was not compromised and that there were no safety concerns raised by the presence of the crack.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Florida_International_Universi...

Fortunately for NYC, when William LeMessurier received a phone call about Citicorp Center from a student, he went back and re-ran some calculations and realized that quartering winds would put his building under more stress than he originally realized. But no harm, that would be handled by the extra safety factor built into his calculations. Unless it turned out other changes had been made during construction he wasn't originally aware of. Well, I won't give away the whole story:

http://people.duke.edu/~hpgavin/cee421/citicorp1.htm

http://www.engineersjournal.ie/2015/12/08/citicorp-centre-to...

Re: The Dark Side of Expertise

#40
post #15

Priming with respect to the Florida effect is a famously not replicable result. It's not a real effect. I'm more sympathetic to the word game example, yet it's not obvious how that translates to anything beyond. With respect to the Hartford Civic Center, as always, it's a little more complicated than that. Yes the architects stood by their calculations, but this was more of a process issue than hubris. Despite the ne…

> Weaker struts were actually used than called for in the design, and that's on the construction manager rather than the architect.

I was wondering if something like that was the case. It's common practice among structural engineers that they will not inspect the building because then they are liable if they don't catch deviations in construction from what they made calculations for.

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