Earlier quoted context omitted.
I dunno, I think it's pretty easy to judge the value of not easily testable wacky conjectures. I don't think much of Penrose's idea that brains are quantum gravitic computers either, and that is vastly more close to being testable, and Penrose's achievements and track record in actual science are also vastly more impressive. Putting that aside; computer guys seem to think "computability" is important in physics. I do…
The conjecture that our universe is isomorphic to a CA is absolutely testable. When we find a CA that behaves just like the universe, we'll know it's true. If we find a completely different way of computing it that doesn't map to a CA, we'll know it's false. Computable physics would be extremely useful. Even with coarse approximations you can only integrate the Schrödinger equation among hundreds of particles. So you…
Yeah, undoubtedly, but that has nothing to do with it being true.
Wolfram doesn't make the case, at all, that it might be true, nor does he suggest any reason a CA might be a better model than the Schroedinger equation, or a way of searching for CA oriented models. The fact that modeling physical equations is difficult on a Turing machine is probably telling you something interesting about nature, rather than telling you to dispose of equations as models of reality.
The whole thing is about as useful as Tipler's idea that God is a supercomputer at the end of the universe. Maybe thought provoking for certain kinds of people, but not helpful at all in the business of figuring out how the universe works, or useful things to do on a computer. It's basically an exotic form of science fiction with a higher than average cognitive load.