> But Boeing counters that it has both "additional protection mechanisms" in the CIS/MS that would prevent its bugs from being exploited from the ODN, and another hardware device between the semi-sensitive IDN—where the CIS/MS is located—and the highly sensitive CDN. That second barrier, the company argues, allows only data to pass from one part of the network to the other, rather than the executable commands that wo…
A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
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Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#32Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?
Used to be done with a literal diode.
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#33Who thought that having any communication path from the passenger entertainment system to flight control was a good idea?
Connecting entertainment systems to flight control sounds very wrong. Connecting entertainment systems to flight management would be common; it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers.
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#34It seems insane that all this code isn't just open source by default. No one's going to be able to rip off airlines by stealing it, you still need to have a company that, you know, sells planes. Keeping it closed seems like a full admission that "there are probably a bunch of bugs in here and we don't want people to see them"
There is more than 1 company that sells planes and writes plane software.
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#35It seems insane that all this code isn't just open source by default. No one's going to be able to rip off airlines by stealing it, you still need to have a company that, you know, sells planes. Keeping it closed seems like a full admission that "there are probably a bunch of bugs in here and we don't want people to see them"
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#36Is that even legal? Will he ever be allowed to cross the US border after admitting this?
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#37> But Boeing counters that it has both "additional protection mechanisms" in the CIS/MS that would prevent its bugs from being exploited from the ODN, and another hardware device between the semi-sensitive IDN—where the CIS/MS is located—and the highly sensitive CDN. That second barrier, the company argues, allows only data to pass from one part of the network to the other, rather than the executable commands that wo…
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#38Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#39Earlier quoted context omitted.
> it should be one-way communication (entertainment can only read FMS data, not send any), for the purpose of driving the moving map displays for passengers. Would you agree that this logical boundary should be physically enforced? Such as an opto-isolator?
There should actually be three distinct "air-gaped" networks (or at least classifications of network). Secure: The network that connects and controls the airplane. Absolutely only essential things allowed on, and if possible isolated using mathematically proven secure vlan/isolation techniques. "Employee": pilots, crew, etc. This is more just a distinct network for corporate operations security. "Customer": Still try…
Re: A Boeing Code Leak Exposes Security Flaws Deep in a 787's Guts
#40Who thought that having any communication path from the passenger entertainment system to flight control was a good idea?
Also industries have cultures, and dunning-kruger often applies outside their core domains.
For example: I did some work with Mercedes (no insult to them -- I've happily owned several of their cars). They were "real" engineers; the "schnook" of the door when it shut. The brake-by-wire folks modeled everything in Matlab, developed multiple implementations, But the entertainment system? It's not "real" engineering, so is typically subbed out to a canonical or cheapest bidder based on a powerpoint bullet list. The result: really really safe vehicle, but the user's actual experience (outside the driving) is not encouraging.
Same issue with a BMW I had: ECU always kept the pollution within spec; the car always started instantly when I turned the key no matter the temperature or environment, but the seats and windows would move randomly.
And we all suffer from this: when I worked on power plants I was (and remain) horrified by the shitshow that is SCADA and the HMI infrastructure many of the other "absurd" things I saw, well, some patient people would show me what an idiot I was and that there were very good reasons for doing things that looked to an outsider like headstands.