My design uses paper and pen. Deployment requires mailing ballots out and having places where people can come in to fill them out. 10 million dollars please.
How is that better than whatever we have now?
/wooosh
DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
31–40 of 303 posts
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#32[deleted]
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#33> Kiniy said Galois will design two basic voting machine types. The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. Galois will bring this system to Def Con…
The paper trail is not so wonderful.
What we saw in 2016 was that even if a candidate were to contest a result, none of the election committees were willing to commit to a full hand recount; instead, the only options were to retabulate through the very same tabulation processes and machines that had produced the questionable results in the first place.
Without low barrier to recount by hand, the electronic systems production of paper trails is worthless. Arguably worse than worthless, because it leaves everyone thinking there is a usable backup, when there isn't.
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#34Open source, open hardware? What a joke. Neither are resistant to chip/compiler level attacks such as https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2018/03/adding_backdo... and https://www.win.tue.nl/~aeb/linux/hh/thompson/trust.html That's all assuming the voting machine is actually running the software/hardware they tell you - how would a voter check? The article briefly mentions "That receipt does not permit you to prove…
> That's all assuming the voting machine is actually running the software/hardware they tell you - how would a voter check? Have dedicated hardware compute a hash from the content of program ROM on demand with a button press and present it on an auxilliary 7-segment display. Compare against the hash of the vetted image. No software need be involved. At some point in the process, machines will be used for tabulation.…
If the compiler was compromised, how do you know the vetted image is correct? If the hardware was compromised, then the software will still hash to the correct value. And once the attacker knows where you're getting the dedicated hardware for the hash, he can compromise that as well.
And the entire system relies on the people implementing it to not have been compromised. Because if they were, if the government itself compromised the machines, the voters could never tell. How good is a voting system that only works if your government is honest?
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#35Software is perfectible, skinware is not. As long as corruptible human beings are in charge, there will be room for fraud.
Software is perfectible, skinware is not. As long as corruptible human beings are in charge, there will be room for fraud.
Skinware writes the software.
(Is "skinware" the new "wetware?")
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#36Could this be a useful application of blockchain?
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#37>The systems Galois designs won’t be available for sale. But the prototypes it creates will be available for existing voting machine vendors or others to freely adopt and customize without costly licensing fees or the millions of dollars it would take to research and develop a secure system from scratch. I guess the devil is always in the details. "freely adopt and customize" to me says that the code will not be veri…
When the military is building voting systems you should be a little leery.
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#38Earlier quoted context omitted.
I love voting by mail, but I don't understand how that's legal since you could just coerce someone that way? Force them to vote by mail, watch them fill out the ballot (or fill it out for them), and mail it in.
Voting by mail is indeed vulnerable to fraud, as we saw in North Carolina last election.
When thinking about voting by mail I wouldn't consider North Carolina's system as exemplar, since it is still primarily a polling-place election. Instead, look towards Washington, Oregon, and Colorado which are states where elections are entirely by mail. Evidence of coercion or fraud is low, and engagement is high.
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#39Good news. An Agora voting system's fork powered by SGX/TrustZone and verified by Cryptol?
Re: DARPA Is Building a $10M, Open-Source, Secure Voting System
#40> Kiniy said Galois will design two basic voting machine types. The first will be a ballot-marking device that uses a touch-screen for voters to make their selections. That system won’t tabulate votes. Instead it will print out a paper ballot marked with the voter’s choices, so voters can review them before depositing them into an optical-scan machine that tabulates the votes. Galois will bring this system to Def Con…
The paper trail is not so wonderful. What we saw in 2016 was that even if a candidate were to contest a result, none of the election committees were willing to commit to a full hand recount; instead, the only options were to retabulate through the very same tabulation processes and machines that had produced the questionable results in the first place. Without low barrier to recount by hand, the electronic systems pr…
> none of the election committees were willing to commit to a full hand recount
I don't see how any system can work if nobody is willing to double-check it.