Hacker News Board Hacker News, browsed like a classic message board
Live data from Hacker News

Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

features.propublica.org

Post reply on HN
Print view View original

31–40 of 108 posts

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#31

Post by scott00 »

genkimind wrote: post #10
smacktoward wrote: post #2

A dozen or so [maintenance issues] were considered more serious. They included problems with the ship’s primary navigation system. It was the oldest such system among destroyers based in Japan. It was running on Windows 2000, even though other ships had been upgraded. It could not display information from the AIS. The broken email system had a “major impact” on the ship’s day-to-day operations. Microsoft Outlook did…

I spent 5+ years on a ship in 7th fleet and am all too familiar with what was described above. I would attribute it to a few things. Mostly the over-extension of resources and people. The operational tempo in 7th fleet is absolutely ridiculous, so everything that isn't "mission accomplishment" gets pushed to the wayside. Training, making sure equipment is properly fixed.. our days were so jam packed full of bullshit…

How common are scenarios where there are multiple ships within visual distance? From reading the account of the collision, it seems like everybody relied primarily on one radar to make navigation decisions, and that radar was either broken, or its operators didn't know how to use it. It's hard for me to understand how they didn't realize they weren't getting useful data from that radar and switch their primary navigation driver to the other radars, lookouts, the commercial position broadcasting system, or the infrared camera, all of which seemingly worked. Unless of course actually navigating around other ships is pretty uncommon.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#32

Post by danso »

Good god this story is a gripping read, even at ~18,000 words. I had the pleasure of being colleagues with one of its authors, T., years ago, and was always amazed at how throughly nerdy in detail he was in investigating the document trail, while still being able to so elqouently describe impact and drama at the individual human level. It's not that the two skills are diametrically opposite, it's just that T may have been the best at both, especially when reporting on complex bureaucratic tragedies.

This American Life had a good segment in late 2017 about the Navy accidents here: https://www.thisamericanlife.org/634/human-error-in-volatile...

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#33

Post by pdonis »

jessaustin wrote: post #28

Regardless of other problems, TFA makes it clear that LTJG Coppock failed really hard between 0120 and 0130. Although her subordinates probably should have detected the Crystal sooner, she had ten minutes to save the lives of her crew, and she should have done so. Navigating out of danger might not have been possible, but an emergency stop like that executed by LTJG Breau a month earlier would have worked. The really…

> It's difficult to say from the outside whether that should go up the chain

Based on one single incident, that's a fair comment. But it wasn't one single incident. There was one other collision, plus, as the article notes, a number of near misses that should have been critically analyzed but weren't. That's a pattern for which leaders up the chain are responsible.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#34

Post by darkpuma »

setr wrote: post #24
arminiusreturns wrote: post #18

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I like to remind people that Hanlons razor is a logical fallacy, and really shouldn't be used nearly as much as it is, especially the way it is (in an isolated context)

>Hanlons razor is a logical fallacy I'm not see'ing it, and a quick google search isn't finding any support for that idea; it seems to me quite reasonable: Given 2 common possible explanations, prefer one. Perhaps the "Never" is at issue, but I doubt anyone ever actually interprets never as never.

Logical fallacies are not a finite set. Those you find listed on places like wikipedia are merely the most popular.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#35

Post by nradov »

smacktoward wrote: post #2

A dozen or so [maintenance issues] were considered more serious. They included problems with the ship’s primary navigation system. It was the oldest such system among destroyers based in Japan. It was running on Windows 2000, even though other ships had been upgraded. It could not display information from the AIS. The broken email system had a “major impact” on the ship’s day-to-day operations. Microsoft Outlook did…

Budget sequestration was a factor. Ships require increasing maintenance as they age, but the military budget was flat or declining.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#36

Post by nerdponx »

dragonwriter wrote: post #7
smacktoward wrote: post #2

A dozen or so [maintenance issues] were considered more serious. They included problems with the ship’s primary navigation system. It was the oldest such system among destroyers based in Japan. It was running on Windows 2000, even though other ships had been upgraded. It could not display information from the AIS. The broken email system had a “major impact” on the ship’s day-to-day operations. Microsoft Outlook did…

> How the hell does a first-line warship of the United States Navy get into a state like this? Command negligence at very high levels, a high optempo without adequate attention to readiness and discipline. > Based on the article it sounds like the excuse they've settled on is just blaming everything on the crew Unless you are including the chain of command above the ship's commander up through and including the 7th F…

This is all infuriating to read as a civilian. This is what we get for all the billions we pour into the military?

At least some heads rolled for it. But based on what I'm reading here, the problem is systemic.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#37

Post by pdonis »

jessaustin wrote: post #28

Regardless of other problems, TFA makes it clear that LTJG Coppock failed really hard between 0120 and 0130. Although her subordinates probably should have detected the Crystal sooner, she had ten minutes to save the lives of her crew, and she should have done so. Navigating out of danger might not have been possible, but an emergency stop like that executed by LTJG Breau a month earlier would have worked. The really…

> Although her subordinates probably should have detected the Crystal sooner

One thing that jumped out at me was not having a lookout on both bridge wings. Yes, I know the ship was shorthanded, but that's the last place that should take a hit, particularly when navigating through a crowded shipping channel at night. Take someone from somewhere else.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#38

Post by genkimind »

scott00 wrote: post #31
genkimind wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I spent 5+ years on a ship in 7th fleet and am all too familiar with what was described above. I would attribute it to a few things. Mostly the over-extension of resources and people. The operational tempo in 7th fleet is absolutely ridiculous, so everything that isn't "mission accomplishment" gets pushed to the wayside. Training, making sure equipment is properly fixed.. our days were so jam packed full of bullshit…

How common are scenarios where there are multiple ships within visual distance? From reading the account of the collision, it seems like everybody relied primarily on one radar to make navigation decisions, and that radar was either broken, or its operators didn't know how to use it. It's hard for me to understand how they didn't realize they weren't getting useful data from that radar and switch their primary naviga…

Navigating with other ships in close proximity is pretty common -- mostly when transiting into port, out of port, and through shipping lanes.

It is pretty silly that they didn't seem to realize that the radar wasn't tuned correctly. I wasn't a surface watchstander so I can't comment on the radar aspect in more detail. Normally inputs are taken from a variety of sensors, not just one busted radar.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#39

Post by pdonis »

scott00 wrote: post #31
genkimind wrote: post #10

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I spent 5+ years on a ship in 7th fleet and am all too familiar with what was described above. I would attribute it to a few things. Mostly the over-extension of resources and people. The operational tempo in 7th fleet is absolutely ridiculous, so everything that isn't "mission accomplishment" gets pushed to the wayside. Training, making sure equipment is properly fixed.. our days were so jam packed full of bullshit…

How common are scenarios where there are multiple ships within visual distance? From reading the account of the collision, it seems like everybody relied primarily on one radar to make navigation decisions, and that radar was either broken, or its operators didn't know how to use it. It's hard for me to understand how they didn't realize they weren't getting useful data from that radar and switch their primary naviga…

> How common are scenarios where there are multiple ships within visual distance?

In a main shipping channel near a busy port? Very common.

> It's hard for me to understand how they didn't realize they weren't getting useful data from that radar and switch their primary navigation driver to the other radars, lookouts, the commercial position broadcasting system, or the infrared camera, all of which seemingly worked.

Or the old standby, the Mark One eyeball. As I commented elsewhere upthread, the thing that jumped out at me was not having a lookout on both bridge wings (port and starboard). Even with a ship that's shorthanded, that's the last place you should give up personnel, especially when navigating in a crowded shipping channel at night. They should have made up the shortfall from somewhere else.

Re: Death and Valor on an American Warship Doomed by Its Own Navy

#40

Post by CydeWeys »

genkimind wrote: post #10
smacktoward wrote: post #2

A dozen or so [maintenance issues] were considered more serious. They included problems with the ship’s primary navigation system. It was the oldest such system among destroyers based in Japan. It was running on Windows 2000, even though other ships had been upgraded. It could not display information from the AIS. The broken email system had a “major impact” on the ship’s day-to-day operations. Microsoft Outlook did…

I spent 5+ years on a ship in 7th fleet and am all too familiar with what was described above. I would attribute it to a few things. Mostly the over-extension of resources and people. The operational tempo in 7th fleet is absolutely ridiculous, so everything that isn't "mission accomplishment" gets pushed to the wayside. Training, making sure equipment is properly fixed.. our days were so jam packed full of bullshit…

Were you doing such essential tasks the other 19 hours of the day that it made sense to only get 5 hours of sleep, or was much of that 19 hours wasted on bullshit?

Personally, I'd say that if there's so much work to do that between work and eating everyone is up for 19 hours, then you're undercrewed.

Post reply on HN