A DNS hijacking wave is targeting companies at an almost unprecedented scale

Depending on the registrar, updating glue records can be a separate process that requires additional authentication. Not long ago my registrar required me to contact them directly to update glue records.

Offline signing is a very useful feature precisely because it makes it easier to differentiate security domains. For example, I could use offline signing for foo.com (along with a registrar lock) but delegate the subdomain dyn.foo.com to a separate SOA that uses real-time signing (or none at all) for use by internal services.

The problem with the modern web PKI is that, as a practical matter, everybody is forced to put their private keys not only online, but unprotected (because HSM and PKCS#11 support isn't that great, yet).[1] Key rotation and certificate expiration doesn't really solve the problem; in fact, rotation exacerbates the problem by 1) forcing you to keep the CA keys online, and 2) incentivizing increasingly loose authorization policies.

Offline signing makes it easier to manage risk in a more robust manner. It's a tool, not a panacea; a tool conspicuously missing from TLS infrastructure. Some newer projects like Wireguard have effectively turned asymmetric key authentication systems into something that walks and quacks exactly like shared passwords. They do it because key management is a hard problem. But I'm not ready to throw in the towel, and the option (both officially and as a practical choice) of offline key signing in DNSSEC is under appreciated. From a security perspective, allowing people to enumerate my subdomains is a small price to pay for permitting me to keep my private keys offline. I don't expect everybody to make that calculation, but it bothers me that people fail to see the value at all.

[1] People faithfully recite the mantra "encrypt at rest" as if that means something. Data at rest is useless. If your data is worth anything then you're going to actually be, you know, using it, and if it's not protected in use then it's all just security theater. This is most clear with the private keys (e.g. stored "encrypted at rest" in KMS) used by cloud services for acquiring access tokens. It's 2019 and industry is still basically using shared passwords--tons of them, a complex web of passwords dutifully pushed around the network by layers of complex software. As if any of it matters to someone who has figured out how to penetrate your network; as if 5 minute or even 5 second password rotation matters to the guy who already figured out how to automate penetration onto your systems.

Being widely phased-out due to being too risky and error-prone. Attacks like this get a lot of media attention, but are pretty rare overall. It's much more common for someone to handle certificates and servers badly somehow, ending up in locking all of your visitors out of your own site, or you never bother with it, but the attacker who takes over your domain does, once again basically hijacking your domain name indefinitely.

I never set it up for any of my sites for the same reason, just too many ways for it to go wrong.

This is the problem with quickie SSL cert issuance from "Let's Encrypt". If it took 10 days of consistent domain resolution to get an SSL cert, this wouldn't be happening.

Yeah, yeah.

So many on HN has this mindset. Criminals just whip up credit cards like it's nothing. They don't. It's noisy to use some grandma's credit card to buy a cert for buttsnstuff.ca when she donates to her local church five times a month. Almost all criminals are fucking dumb or even if they're smart they fuck up before they're good and land themselves in jail. Like at least 98% of them.

HTTPS is a tire fire. Root certs by hostiles. Near-trivial PDAs. Termination at network edge. OS installed certs. Even when it "works" 95% of the packets are on shitty, broken ciphers with no forward secrecy. And that last 5% is built on PKI which we know quantum is breaking pretty fucking soon. Almost nobody rotates access tokens. Almost nobody layers encryption. Almost nobody safeguards certs by locking down permissions. Almost nobody pins them. Almost nobody uses HSTS.

Everything is shabby and shitty and breakable. Let's Encrypt is the wrong solution. It helps irrelevant hobby websites and increases risk for medium sized companies that tried to do the right thing.

Much better than (CA0 || CA1 || ... ). All it takes is one CA out of 10s of independent CAs to misbehave to insecure whole tls.

In DNSSEC/DANE, world only has to watch one entity rather than 10s of entities.