The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf] • Hacker News Board

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#31

Post by starbeast » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 2:44 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

>I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will.

Causal chains are required for free will to make sense, but causal chains do not require robust pre-determination. We regularly simulate causal chains that make a narrative sense and are predictive, but only within complexity limited bounds, without the infinite precision needed for robust pre-determination.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#32

Post by shellac » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 2:45 PM UTC

jatsign wrote: post #3

Can anyone dumb this down for me?

Suppose you're told that somebody has halved an apple and put the two pieces in separate boxes. You are given a box, and the other is sent to a friend on the other side of the planet, who phones you when it arrives.

You both open the boxes and describe what you see. "Oh my half has the stalk", "oh, mine doesn't". "I see 5 pips", "so do I". There are a bunch correlated (and anti-correlated) observations about the two halves.

Nothing surprising about this.

The quantum equivalent seems to work the same way at first glance. However on closer inspection there are some weird correlations that suggest that:

* The apple wasn't cut in advance, but the two halves were created and put in the box just before they were opened.

* Or maybe the apple was cut in advance, but somehow the person cutting knew what observations I would make ('I have the stalk').

* Or maybe the boxes were never separated but remained paired in 5-d space and only on opening did the apple split.

* Or maybe I messaged the apple-cutter back-in-time to say what I would do.

* Or something else.

My box is so remote from the other relativity (and practicality) surely means I'm causally independent of the other box. And I got to chose my observations freely, nothing influenced me. And yet we know one - or both - of these can't be true.

The mention of free-will in the paper is a bit cheeky, really.

IIRC in the literature 'parameter-independence' and 'outcome-independence'have been to used to name the sort of factors that feel bad to violate (did I have a free choice about what to observe?) verses supposedly more innocuous quantum magic.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#33

Post by [deleted] » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:00 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

[deleted]

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#34

Post by ifdefdebug » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:05 PM UTC

esotericn wrote: post #22

Free will is not well defined. What does it mean for "will" to be "free"? If you could rewind time around one of your decisions, and replay it, you'd make the same decision every time, unless there was a random element involved, because the state would be the same every time. And if there's a random element involved, it's not really your will, is it?

Your decision is between black and red while looking at the spinning roulette wheel. The random element is the outcome of your bet, which can not possibly be inferred from the current state at the time of making the decision. So if I could rewind and replay, and actually make a different decision each time, it would really be my will, I think.

Most, if not all, real-world decisions take a non-zero uncertainty about the outcome into account.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#35

Post by colanderman » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:06 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Following that train of thought, could free will simply be the capacity to predict one's own (deterministic) actions, based on one's current state, and ascribing that to some internal volition? Similarly, the "inner monologue" simply the capacity to observe one's own (deterministic) thought process?

Conversely, is the judgement that another entity is free-willed no more than an admission that one is unable to predict that other's actions, though that other can predict its own?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#36

Post by esotericn » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:09 PM UTC

ifdefdebug wrote: post #34

esotericn wrote: post #22

Free will is not well defined. What does it mean for "will" to be "free"? If you could rewind time around one of your decisions, and replay it, you'd make the same decision every time, unless there was a random element involved, because the state would be the same every time. And if there's a random element involved, it's not really your will, is it?

Your decision is between black and red while looking at the spinning roulette wheel. The random element is the outcome of your bet, which can not possibly be inferred from the current state at the time of making the decision. So if I could rewind and replay, and actually make a different decision each time, it would really be my will, I think. Most, if not all, real-world decisions take a non-zero uncertainty about t…

In that case, you didn't "will" the different decision, it was a result of your internal RNG.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#37

Post by simonh » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:11 PM UTC

sooheon wrote: post #26

naasking wrote: post #12

Earlier quoted context omitted.

You're better off thinking about the logical properties that entail moral responsibility. Consider that it makes no sense to hold a car engine morally responsible for malfunctioning and killing its passengers, but it does make sense to hold a driver responsible (and it might make sense to do the same for a general AI in the future). Why? What distinguishes how we deal with one deterministic system over another? That'…

I love your framing of the question, but am frustrated with the Compatibilist conclusion. "Moral responsibility" is a heuristic for our monkey brains, tapping into evolved ideas of justice, accounting for imperfect prediction of future events, attempting to control human behavior one way or the other. The reason we don't lecture engines about morality is because it is perfectly clear that they obey only one kingdom o…

I like your "God of the Gaps" analogy. That's exactly the problem I have with dualism. We don't understand the physical causes, therefore mysticism.

As cars become more than just human-controlled engines (self-driving) they are likely to be called on to make arguably moral judgements. They are being given rules to follow. For now these systems are still largely deterministic in a comprehensible way, but with deep learning neural networks playing an increasing role we might begin to lose the ability to fully and deterministically anticipate how they will behave. Not because it isn't possible in principle, but because it will become too complex to do in practice. Then what do we do?

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#38

Post by all2 » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:15 PM UTC

sooheon wrote: post #24

all2 wrote: post #9

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> The definition of 'me' is my prior state. I don't think this is true. We know that thought and memory are constrained (accessed) at a physical level - at least to some extent. That is, damage to your physical brain can result in diminished or eliminated access to those things. Indeed, thought as we know it seems to be a physically mediated process (perhaps not completely defined by our physical bodies, but at least…

> You are, at your basest existence, the ability to choose. A choice engine with a physical layer; a physical memory, physical emotion, the ability to think. But at your foundation, you choose. I don't see how this is at odds with the prior state view. You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment. The physi…

> You are a state machine. As time moves, you have no choice but to choose, and this is entirely dependent on your previous state and your current environment.

This makes sense. There's no choice unless there's a dimension (some state variable) that can we can move in. We have stuff that can be state (matter and energy) and dimension (time) to move in.

In terms of state, my argument is that choice is a core piece of 'me' and 'you'. I don't know how to make an effective argument for the separateness of choice and state, but I think it makes sense to consider them as separate things. We possess state like we possess the space we exist in, in time. You could say that your choices are like driving a car. Navigating streets (or offroad!) is like choosing from possible states.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#39

Post by jymbo » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:16 PM UTC

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Which is why this paper proves the Copenhagen interpretation of QM is wrong.

Re: The Strong Free Will Theorem (2009) [pdf]

#40

Post by jymbo » Wed, Nov 07, 2018, 3:18 PM UTC

colanderman wrote: post #35

simonh wrote: post #7

I really think this, along with much philosophical musing about free will, is entirely missing the point. Pre-determination is essential to free will. You literally cannot have free will without it. Random choice, or even non-predetermined correlated outcomes of entangled objects don't lead to free will, they lead to uncertain decisions and those are not the same thing. If my decisions are not a product of my prior s…

Following that train of thought, could free will simply be the capacity to predict one's own (deterministic) actions, based on one's current state, and ascribing that to some internal volition? Similarly, the "inner monologue" simply the capacity to observe one's own (deterministic) thought process? Conversely, is the judgement that another entity is free-willed no more than an admission that one is unable to predict…

How free-willed or "alive" an object is, from one subject's perspective, will have a lot to do with how _unpredictable_ the possible futures of the object seem, relative to that subject.