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Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

solokeys.com

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Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#31
post #24

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Thank you, I’ll fix it later tonight. Can you confirm your resolution? I mostly tested it on small screens, I wasn’t expecting the front page.

Overlaps on widths >1500px. (My recommendation would be to not make this a background image, but simply an image in the markup after the headline.)

It should be fixed, thanks again for catching it.

(followed the recommendation -- only for large screens though, it's late and I don't want to make mistakes ehehe)

Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#32
I wonder where are they going to manufacture it, and what control and visibility will they have into their supply chains, both upstream and downstream?

Absent some very serious issue with the crypto implementation, that would be my greatest concern -- how easy would it be for a state-level actor to introduce some sort of backdoor or other vulnerability (even a subtle one, e.g. modification to EM radiation pattern) to either all or just a select subset of devices, either into components "upstream" in the supply chain, in manufacturing itself, or downstream in transit to the retailer/customer.

Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#34
post #32

I wonder where are they going to manufacture it, and what control and visibility will they have into their supply chains, both upstream and downstream? Absent some very serious issue with the crypto implementation, that would be my greatest concern -- how easy would it be for a state-level actor to introduce some sort of backdoor or other vulnerability (even a subtle one, e.g. modification to EM radiation pattern) to…

It's worse than that, I think. Part of the security is that each key has to be unique, as I understand it. So to compromise security, all they have to do is make duplicate keys...

Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#37

Earlier quoted context omitted.

As cool as that would be its probably not doable because gpg doesn't support curve 25519, which is what signal uses for its authentication keys. So either needs gpg decides to support the curve or hardware keys need to explicitly support either signal or the 25519.

GnuPG supports Curve 25519: https://gist.github.com/jmgrosen/5e646d6a6624c0d0e45f241be21... However, perhaps you're referring to the OpenPGP Smart Card spec, which does indeed lack support for Curve 25519 and EdDSA.

Even though Gnuk supports them: https://debconf17.debconf.org/talks/162/

I wish the spec would be updated to include them...

Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#38
post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

First version will be fido2 only, thought the firmware is open, so easy to extend. We'll just have to verify which features are copiable vs proprietary for yubikeys. To be honest I don't know at this point, I mostly use my keys for auth, rarely otp, but no gpg/ssh/etc. Do you have any primary use case that you're interested in?

I use mine everyday for signing Git commits and tags. Also as my SSH keys. If it did that then it would potentially replace my YubiKey(s).

There is also open source firmware used on old Yubikeys that could be reused: https://github.com/Yubico/ykneo-openpgp

Re: Solo – Open-source FIDO2 security key

#39
post #9
post #3

Earlier quoted context omitted.

First version will be fido2 only, thought the firmware is open, so easy to extend. We'll just have to verify which features are copiable vs proprietary for yubikeys. To be honest I don't know at this point, I mostly use my keys for auth, rarely otp, but no gpg/ssh/etc. Do you have any primary use case that you're interested in?

Secure storage of GPG/SSH keys preferably 4096bit, so I can have offline "cold signing"/emergency keys that are valid for a long time.

I'm using Yubikey for that too and would also be interested in open source solution, especially if it included ed25519 and secure, tamper proof element. (Gnuk has the former but not latter).
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