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Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

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31–40 of 53 posts

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#31
post #20

I understand that the info to answer my question may not be public yet. I would greatly appreciate an an answer by someone who can explain when it is. If an attacker had recorded encrypted WiFi traffic in the past and then performed one of these attacks could they see the traffic? (I know TLS is used for a lot of traffic, but in time that will be broken too.) It seems to me that a patient attacker could gain a lot of…

I expect they could, yes; WPA2 doesn't offer forward secrecy. But WPA2 never offered much anyway. If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else, because the client keys are derivable from the shared passphrase (which presumably everyone at the mall has been told) and overhearing the four-way handshake when someone joins. And! You can even fake a disconnect message that forces the f…

> * If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else*

Without contradicting your observation, I want to mention that virtually anything important you do on the Internet these days--from online banking to Google searches to reading Hacker News--is protected by a second independent layer of encryption: HTTPS. I'm not excusing the WPA2 flaws, but I do think that your bank info, web searches, and Hacker News comments are secure even at the mall.

If someone can offer a credible explanation of why online banking or other HTTPS activity is insecure on public wifi, I'd like to hear it please.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#32

"We initialize the random number generator with the system uptime, then use it to make crypto keys" - really?!? "We also publish the system uptime in an unencrypted broadcast message to save you the effort of even bruteforcing it". Does nobody do security reviews on this stuff, or are these weaknesses there deliberately? The line between incompetence and malice really is thin here...

And on a device equipped with a radio, it's not very hard to generate entropy.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#33
post #2

WPA2 is toast. Ref to the CVEs that will make a lot of network admins hate Monday: https://twitter.com/nick_lowe/status/919527451570638848 And some background: https://eprint.iacr.org/2016/475.pdf

WPA2 in general, or just WPA2-TKIP?

WPA2 in general. The 4-way handshake is vulnerable. Might be patchable, but there is a ton of embedded stuff out there that will never get updated...

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#34
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

WPA2 in general, or just WPA2-TKIP?

WPA2 in general. The 4-way handshake is vulnerable. Might be patchable, but there is a ton of embedded stuff out there that will never get updated...

I guess the question is whether only the AP needs to be patched or the client as well.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#35

Earlier quoted context omitted.

I expect they could, yes; WPA2 doesn't offer forward secrecy. But WPA2 never offered much anyway. If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else, because the client keys are derivable from the shared passphrase (which presumably everyone at the mall has been told) and overhearing the four-way handshake when someone joins. And! You can even fake a disconnect message that forces the f…

> * If you're on mall wifi, you can already see unencrypted traffic for everyone else* Without contradicting your observation, I want to mention that virtually anything important you do on the Internet these days--from online banking to Google searches to reading Hacker News--is protected by a second independent layer of encryption: HTTPS. I'm not excusing the WPA2 flaws, but I do think that your bank info, web searc…

If you don't have extensions that force HTTPS on all content, you could, for example, get served a malicious image file.

from the article:

> they won’t be able to pretend to be a secure site like your bank on the wifi, but they can definitely pretend to be non-secure resources

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#36
post #33

Earlier quoted context omitted.

WPA2 in general, or just WPA2-TKIP?

WPA2 in general. The 4-way handshake is vulnerable. Might be patchable, but there is a ton of embedded stuff out there that will never get updated...

It has already been patched by some vendors, but you're right, if the IoT has given us anything, it's tonnes of unpatchable consumer gear.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#37
post #32

"We initialize the random number generator with the system uptime, then use it to make crypto keys" - really?!? "We also publish the system uptime in an unencrypted broadcast message to save you the effort of even bruteforcing it". Does nobody do security reviews on this stuff, or are these weaknesses there deliberately? The line between incompetence and malice really is thin here...

And on a device equipped with a radio, it's not very hard to generate entropy.

The radio might not be exposed to the OS. If it's a Fullmac device, you usually don't have access to the radio stuff. Even with Softmac, there's not a guarantee.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#38
post #19
post #17

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The only reason TLS works is because of CAs. What could be the CAs for APs?

WPA2 Enterprise use a central RADIUS server for authentication, with separate credentials for each user, and a (separately-distributed) certificate for the server. It's just not practical for consumer and small-business setups.

Somewhat true. Setting up a Freeradius is not hard. Problem is that you need another device that is running 24/7.

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#39
post #38
post #19

Earlier quoted context omitted.

WPA2 Enterprise use a central RADIUS server for authentication, with separate credentials for each user, and a (separately-distributed) certificate for the server. It's just not practical for consumer and small-business setups.

Somewhat true. Setting up a Freeradius is not hard. Problem is that you need another device that is running 24/7.

The bit that's less practical for consumer setup is more the cert distribution and setup of separate credentials for each user. (The RADIUS server could even be built into the router in a consumer product.)

Re: Predicting, Decrypting, and Abusing WPA2/802.11 Group Keys [pdf]

#40

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> What's the historical reason we aren't all using TLS to connect to our APs? Because it’s insanely impractical for home use? Hey, here’s your new WiFi router. Just install this new root CA on all your devices, create a device cert for each machine and install that very as well, and don’t forget you need to re-do this every year...

Trust keys on first use. Like SSH. https://www.tedunangst.com/flak/post/moving-to-https "So how does one verify that the downloaded cert is the original? The same way the CAs do. Perform a DNS lookup, make a web request, trust the result. The addition of HPKP would indicate that people find the CA model untrustworthy, solving the problem with trust on first use key continuity. Why not cut out the middle man? Protesti…

The router isn’t the issue here the clients are.
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