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LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

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Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#31
"So, we reverse-engineer the LoRa physical layer using the patents filed by Semtech [27, 57], which is the key LoRa chipset manufacturer. We also use the Semtech 1276 starter kit [10] that provides an interface to transmit LoRa packets with various bitrates and an arbitrary payload. Finally, we analyze the transmissions from the LoRa chipsets on a USRP."

This is some impressive work.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#32
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Modern microcontrollers can be had in the sub-$5 range that support hardware implemented encrypting algorithms. Mostly it's a worthless feature but we aren't far out from it being more or less standard even in the $0.20 guys. The bigger issue is that the entire point of this system is to remove cost of deployment and maintenance for cheap highly distributed lo-fi systems. The cost of keying all those devices for encr…

> Also, why do you even want to encrypt it in the first place? I want to encrypt and authenticate any and all wireless gadget data because I've been paying attention to the last 5 years of defcon talks.

I.e. you want to make the world less fun for the type of people who present the DEFCON talks. :(.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#33
post #31

"So, we reverse-engineer the LoRa physical layer using the patents filed by Semtech [27, 57], which is the key LoRa chipset manufacturer. We also use the Semtech 1276 starter kit [10] that provides an interface to transmit LoRa packets with various bitrates and an arbitrary payload. Finally, we analyze the transmissions from the LoRa chipsets on a USRP." This is some impressive work.

There has been some prior work on this:

- Decoding LoRa: Realizing a Modern LPWAN with SDR [1]

- Presentation on this work from GRCon16 [2]

- Slides from the above presentation [3]

[1] https://pubs.gnuradio.org/index.php/grcon/article/download/8...

[2] https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-YNMRZC6v1s

[3] https://static1.squarespace.com/static/54cecce7e4b054df1848b...

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#34
post #22

I worry about encryption of sensitive data. I don't doubt it can be done, but can their "twenty-cent" chip handle it without messing up its lightweight low-power nature?

Since backscatter systems depend on on an RF source, I wonder if work has been done on encrypting the source signal (pseudorandom bit pattern for example), then modulating the random stream at the device and decoding the backscattered signal at the receiver - essentially a streaming XOR cypher.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#35

It says regarding CSS "That makes even faint LoRa signals easy to distinguish from background noise, which fluctuates randomly". Is CSS better than FSK than in this respect or..? Edit: http://www.akermann.bg/files/Semnrs/H2016/Module3.4_100km%20... Says "Spreading codes does not improve sensitivity over FSK systems, for usable datarates you get similar sensitivity using standard FSK modulation"

>background noise, which fluctuates randomly

From years of experience selling, supporting, and installing 900MHz ISM radios, I can tell you this is not the case in many, many places (it describes a greenfield application more or less correctly, though). 900MHz is heavily used in the US and describing the noise as "background" or "random" is disingenuous at best. I'd like to see someone install a LoRa hub on a tower with several other 900MHz radios (common) and see how well it works.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#36
post #35

It says regarding CSS "That makes even faint LoRa signals easy to distinguish from background noise, which fluctuates randomly". Is CSS better than FSK than in this respect or..? Edit: http://www.akermann.bg/files/Semnrs/H2016/Module3.4_100km%20... Says "Spreading codes does not improve sensitivity over FSK systems, for usable datarates you get similar sensitivity using standard FSK modulation"

>background noise, which fluctuates randomly From years of experience selling, supporting, and installing 900MHz ISM radios, I can tell you this is not the case in many, many places (it describes a greenfield application more or less correctly, though). 900MHz is heavily used in the US and describing the noise as "background" or "random" is disingenuous at best. I'd like to see someone install a LoRa hub on a tower w…

That's very interesting cheers. Just to clarify that quote was from the article this post originally linked to, rather than the paper it now links to.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#37
post #27

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Modern microcontrollers can be had in the sub-$5 range that support hardware implemented encrypting algorithms. Mostly it's a worthless feature but we aren't far out from it being more or less standard even in the $0.20 guys. The bigger issue is that the entire point of this system is to remove cost of deployment and maintenance for cheap highly distributed lo-fi systems. The cost of keying all those devices for encr…

> Also, why do you even want to encrypt it in the first place? I want to encrypt and authenticate any and all wireless gadget data because I've been paying attention to the last 5 years of defcon talks.

HN ate my reply, apparently I was posting too fast, but as a TLDR you can avoid the overhead of encryption and authentication by revisiting the trust framework in the design of your network and simply assuming that you don't trust your sensors. This moves the overhead from the sensors and the network which are heavily constrained to the processing of the central authority where you have a lot more lee-way and moore's law to help. If you are interested in learning more about this sort of system, it is a topic of research in control theory often lumped under robust systems.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#38
post #22

I worry about encryption of sensitive data. I don't doubt it can be done, but can their "twenty-cent" chip handle it without messing up its lightweight low-power nature?

Since backscatter systems depend on on an RF source, I wonder if work has been done on encrypting the source signal (pseudorandom bit pattern for example), then modulating the random stream at the device and decoding the backscattered signal at the receiver - essentially a streaming XOR cypher.

In this system the RF source you are sending is effectively the IF component for the sensor's Tx chain. Because it is so high power and such a clean pilot tone, the sensor can eliminate it's IF generating oscillator and output amplifier by just mixing the data onto the receive pilot tone and retransmitting it. This is how the sensor is made so cheap and low power. If the pilot tone was cyphered, it wouldn't mean the data was. That is, you could recover the unencrypted data if you recorded a copy of the pilot by mixing. There is also the issue that, because the pilot tone provides the power to the sensor's carrier, any spreading of it's spectrum, which is what random xor encoding does, makes it harder to recover and use as the IF component for the sensor's radio chain. The last issue here is that the CSS standard does not allow this sort of non-linear modulation.

All that said, it's not a fundamentally bad idea. Pseudo-random xor encoding of signals is a technique used all the time to increase orthoganality between signals for a variety of encoding schemes.

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Since backscatter systems depend on on an RF source, I wonder if work has been done on encrypting the source signal (pseudorandom bit pattern for example), then modulating the random stream at the device and decoding the backscattered signal at the receiver - essentially a streaming XOR cypher.

In this system the RF source you are sending is effectively the IF component for the sensor's Tx chain. Because it is so high power and such a clean pilot tone, the sensor can eliminate it's IF generating oscillator and output amplifier by just mixing the data onto the receive pilot tone and retransmitting it. This is how the sensor is made so cheap and low power. If the pilot tone was cyphered, it wouldn't mean the…

>>> That is, you could recover the unencrypted data if you recorded a copy of the pilot by mixing.

Yes, thanks for the response!

Re: LoRa Backscatter [pdf]

#40
This paper to be presented in ACM SenSys in November actually demonstrates ability to backscatter to distances as high as 3.4 kilometers at 70 microwatts using narrow band FSK transmissions.

http://www.ambuj.se/LoRea-CR.pdf

LoRa while achieves impressive sensitivity levels, this is for very low bitrates of tens of bps. For any practical data rate the sensitivity levels are similar to FSK.

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