I'm getting HTTPS errors on two platforms (and two internet connections) for this website. It seems fairly ironic, but I guess it's just me. Am I doing something wrong? IIDRN says it's up: http://www.isitdownrightnow.com/torproject.org.html
Tor at the Heart: Firefox
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Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#32I'm getting HTTPS errors on two platforms (and two internet connections) for this website. It seems fairly ironic, but I guess it's just me. Am I doing something wrong? IIDRN says it's up: http://www.isitdownrightnow.com/torproject.org.html
I hate to be that guy but considering the subject of the site.. perhaps tampering? Might be worth collecting some info to understand the problem.
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#33Why use firefox at all? why not something based on libcurl that absolutely does not talk back to the server after reciving the document unless the user clicks on a link or submits a form?
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#34Why use firefox at all? why not something based on libcurl that absolutely does not talk back to the server after reciving the document unless the user clicks on a link or submits a form?
Writing a web browser is non-trivial.
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#35Earlier quoted context omitted.
I think this is an over-estimation of the amount of entropy. If canvas hardware acceleration is disabled, the only things that can really have an impact on the output of the panopticlick canvas fingerprint are OS version, user-agent and available cpu vectorization instructions.
Interesting. I wonder to what extent one could trap vectorization instructions in e.g. KVM. Presumably they are unprivileged instructions on x86?
> Presumably they are unprivileged instructions on x86?
They're all unprivileged; having to go to the kernel would defeat the purpose most of the time.
Also, trapping them wouldn't make a difference. Fixing the CPUID fields on the other hand (so that these code paths are not taken in the first place)...
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#36Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#37Earlier quoted context omitted.
"uplift" in this context seemed to mean to me that they were not upstreaming the patches verbatim but neutering them for Firefox.
It's a mix. Some patches are just getting rebased and landed. For others, the Firefox and Tor Browser teams are working together to re-implement the feature in a way that makes more sense in the broader Firefox architecture. For example, for First Party Isolation, we took the "origin attributes" feature that we built to support containers (user-specified tracking limitations) and reused it for isolation. In the conta…
Regarding your last sentence, does that mean that in the future I could open a link in a 'tor browser' container? That's awesome if so.
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#38Why use firefox at all? why not something based on libcurl that absolutely does not talk back to the server after reciving the document unless the user clicks on a link or submits a form?
I wish you good luck doing online banking that way :')
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#39Why use firefox at all? why not something based on libcurl that absolutely does not talk back to the server after reciving the document unless the user clicks on a link or submits a form?
that's the Richard Stallman approach: https://stallman.org/stallman-computing.html
he has a script that he can poke to download the content and email it to himself. then he reads it with emacs or maybe lynx with no networking enabled.
Re: Tor at the Heart: Firefox
#40Why use firefox at all? why not something based on libcurl that absolutely does not talk back to the server after reciving the document unless the user clicks on a link or submits a form?
Writing a web browser is non-trivial.
There is a middle ground, using electron + per-site customization. HN user megous got a bit of attention when he teased a bit more detail two weeks ago: