As many others have pointed out - this doesn't keep the email encrypted from the providers at either end.
We're already basically there for what this is suggesting - opportunistic TLS between providers is so high that the only sites that aren't doing it are the ones who aren't going to be deploying any new solution either.
And it still requires secure DNS to avoid being MITM degraded. Once you assume secure DNS is reliably deployed, lots of things become easier - but you still don't need encrypt partial payloads, because there's no "middleman" unless you're using a forwarding service.
And if you're using a forwarding service, who's publishing the DNS keys? This solution didn't address that at all, the forwarding service would have to decrypt the email with the key for the alias name, then re-encrypt it to the final destination. Either that or proxy the key request, which is trivially MITMable.
Upshot - this adds complexity and theater but doesn't protect against any credible attack vector.
As for the "coffee shop reads your email". Please. Basically every server who cares about security (the audience for ideas like this) already disables non-encrypted SMTP/IMAP/POP. At FastMail we only open the ports for SSL, because STARTTLS is nice, but it's MITM removable, and even if we reject login with the plaintext password, it's already been over the wire.
https://www.fastmail.com/help/technical/ssltlsstarttls.html
I'm too lazy to find one of those checklist things to paste about why this won't work, but I'm not jumping to implement it.