31–40 of 78 posts
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
HN title should have a "- For Now" at the end.
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
We've agreed as a country that the ability to get a warrant in the case of probable cause is a good thing. How is this not just maintaining that? I find it hilarious how often privacy advocates manage to forget that we've had this conversation before, and while the government can and has overstepped in many ways, lets not throw out the ability to investigate at all along the way.
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
> Partial Victory: Obama Encryption Policy Rejects Laws Mandating Backdoors, But Leaves the Door Open for Informal Deals
Compared to:
> Obama Encryption Policy Rejects Laws Mandating Backdoors
It also doesn't sound like a full on rejection, as new information might cause him to change his stance:
> “will not —for now—call for legislation requiring companies to decode messages for law enforcement.”
Earlier quoted context omitted.
On the other hand, as long as backdoors remain out of legislation, those companies are still free to say "no".
Many won't say no, because the advantage of having a government willing to look out for their bottom line is far too large to ignore for the sake of a few users.
The point here is that where we have device and service providers like Apple and Google and whoever-just-bought-LastPass where we do trust them to encrypt our info, the government won't be making rules that compel them to undo that work.
If you didn't trust Google and Apple to begin with, the government compulsion would be meaningless anyway.
If you are one of these companies that are informally cooperating with the government on this, please state so publicly, in the signup process and by message to current users, so that we can avoid using your services now, or at least when it's discovered later if you weren't honest about it up front.
* The FBI-NSA-etc. axis already tried to ban nonescrowed crypto. This was in 1997, when far fewer products relied on it, far fewer people used the Internet, and far fewer groups mobilized to oppose it. If even that effort failed, this one was likely to fail as well.
* Excerpt from that 1997 proposal, which was actually approved(!) by a House of Representatives committee: "It shall be unlawful for any person to manufacture for distribution, distribute, or import encryption products intended for sale or use in the United States, unless that product..." http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/cpquery/T?&report=hr108p4&dbna...
* I disclosed in 2012 that the FBI had drafted a proposed law to require backdoors; that legislation was never introduced, even as a placeholder. My 2012 article: http://www.cnet.com/news/fbi-we-need-wiretap-ready-web-sites... Of course the FBI's bill could be kept in reserve to become Patriot Act 2.0, just like the FBI-NSA-etc. axis had EPPSCA in reserve, which morphed into Patriot Act 1.0 a month after the 9/11 attacks, as I wrote about here: http://www.cnet.com/news/how-bin-laden-and-911-attacks-shape...
* If the legislative approach is now off the table, as the WashPost piece indicates, look for the FBI-NSA-etc. axis to try more creative approaches. "Oh, you want that $2 billion government contract? You want your new device to be FIPS 140-2 certified? How about that merger or FTC antitrust review? Environmental reviews? Trade? Taxes? It sure would be a shame if things didn't go your way. Maybe you can help us and we'll help you..."
This is why it's worth supporting groups like EFF (I donated last year and need to again before the end of this year). They provide a moral argument that counters that of the Washington establishment--and also provides guidance for tech firms when they're faced with challenges like those above.
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
We've agreed as a country that the ability to get a warrant in the case of probable cause is a good thing. How is this not just maintaining that? I find it hilarious how often privacy advocates manage to forget that we've had this conversation before, and while the government can and has overstepped in many ways, lets not throw out the ability to investigate at all along the way.
Traditional policework goes a very, very long way, and it's time to admit that the terrorism angle is too overblown and intentionally abused to take seriously anymore.
Ultra-narrowly targeted, ultra limited duration, warrant-required wiretaps which are disclosed as evidence in full during court trial are what is acceptable when exhaustion of traditional methods hasn't closed the case. That is the standard we should work from.
How can we know that NSL's aren't being used right now to "persuade" or coerce companies to cooperate? Who needs legislation when you effectively don't have to reveal anything?
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
The article title doesn't seem as deceptive as this post title: > Partial Victory: Obama Encryption Policy Rejects Laws Mandating Backdoors, But Leaves the Door Open for Informal Deals Compared to: > Obama Encryption Policy Rejects Laws Mandating Backdoors It also doesn't sound like a full on rejection, as new information might cause him to change his stance: > “will not —for now—call for legislation requiring compan…
Really the only reason to pass policy against policy in this case is to score political points with the Hacker News interest group, which is a pretty niche constituency...
Deceptive title, unintentionally. FTA: "Instead, the Post reports, the “administration will continue trying to persuade companies that have moved to encrypt their customers’ data to create a way for the government to still peer into people’s data when needed for criminal or terrorism investigations.” While eschewing attempts to legislatively mandate that tech companies build backdoors into their services, the preside…
This is about what's cryptographically possible and what isn't. I don't frankly care if anyone respects my privacy, what I want is the ability to shut adversaries out, period, using math.
This decision means companies can say 'no'. That's a win, because it lets the math be possible in the first place.