291–300 of 987 posts
https://phrack.org/issues/72/7_md#article
You delete your data, trash your gear, and hop on a bus, to start over in some other city, in a different line of work.
That said, people do make bad calls, and this would be an epically bad one, if they really don't have any form of backup.
[1] These days creating such a facility for archiving an exabyte of essentially write mostly data are quite feasible. See this paper from nearly 20 years ago: https://research.ibm.com/publications/ibm-intelligent-bricks...
I would love to know how a fire of this magnitude could happen in a modern data center.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
From the perspective of securing your data, what's the practical difference between a second country and an enemy country? None. Even if it's encrypted data, all encryption can be broken, and so we must assume it will be broken. Sensitive data shouldn't touch outside systems, period, no matter what encryption.
Any even remotely proper symmetric encryption scheme "can be broken" but only if you have a theoretical adversary with nearly infinite power and time, which is in practice absolutely utterly impossible. I'm sure cryptographers would love to know what makes it possible for you to assume that say AES-256 or AES-512 can be broken in practice for you to include it in your risk assessment.
Exfiltrating terabytes of data is difficult, exfiltrating 32 bytes is much less so.
Earlier quoted context omitted.
A country can become an adversary faster than a government can migrate away from it.
Hence a backup country. I already covered that. But while countries go from unfriendly to attacking you overnight, they don't generally go from friendly to attacking you overnight.
If the US wants its state-puppet corporations to be used for integral infrastructure by foreign governments, it's going to need to provide some better legal assurances than 'trust me bro'.
(Some laws on the books, and a congress and a SCOTUS that has demonstrated a willingness to enforce those laws against a rogue executive would be a good start.)
Earlier quoted context omitted.
> the should not have kept that data on foreign cloud storage regardless. It's not like there are only two choices here Doesn't have to be an American provider (Though anyone else probably increases Seoul's security cross section. America is already its security guarantor, with tens of thousands of troops stationed in Korea.) And doesn't have to be permanent. Ship encrypted copies to S3 while you get your hardenede-b…
I'm aware of a big cloud services provider (I won't name any names but it was IBM) that lost a fairly large amount of data. Permanently. So that too isn't a guarantee. They simply should have made local and off-line backups, that's the gold standard, and to ensure that those backups are complete and can be used to restore from scratch to a complete working service.
Using a commercial provider is not a guarantee.
The government official who insisted that commercial AWS/GCP/Azure couldn't possibly be trusted with keeping the information will be keeping their head low for a few days then... "The Interior Ministry explained that while most systems at the Daejeon data center are backed up daily to separate equipment within the same center and to a physically remote backup facility, the G-Drive’s structure did not allow for extern…
Earlier quoted context omitted.
Any even remotely proper symmetric encryption scheme "can be broken" but only if you have a theoretical adversary with nearly infinite power and time, which is in practice absolutely utterly impossible. I'm sure cryptographers would love to know what makes it possible for you to assume that say AES-256 or AES-512 can be broken in practice for you to include it in your risk assessment.
The risk that the key leaks through an implementation bug or a human intelligence source. Exfiltrating terabytes of data is difficult, exfiltrating 32 bytes is much less so.
The government official who insisted that commercial AWS/GCP/Azure couldn't possibly be trusted with keeping the information will be keeping their head low for a few days then... "The Interior Ministry explained that while most systems at the Daejeon data center are backed up daily to separate equipment within the same center and to a physically remote backup facility, the G-Drive’s structure did not allow for extern…
The issue here is not refusing to use a foreign third party. That makes sense. The issue is mandating the use of remote storage and not backing it up. That’s insane. It’s like the most basic amount of preparation you do. It’s recommended to even the smallest of companies specifically because a fire is a risk. That’s gross mismanagement.