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DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

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Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#291
post #280

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Yes, the idea you are presenting is that the human being must manually check for mistakes. Not at all? The password manager handles that automatically, have you never used a password manager before? > Passkeys will automate and enforce the check What happens to the passkey when the origin changes, is it automatically recognising it as the new domain without any manual input? Curious to see what magic is responsible…

> Not at all? Yes: '...you double-check the domain.' That's manually checking for mistakes. > What happens to the passkey when the origin changes, The passkey won't work at all. You will just have to create a new one.

> Yes: '...you double-check the domain.' That's manually checking for mistakes.

Yes, but that's only when the origin changed compared to when you added it to the password manager. Same thing for Passkeys, won't work if the origin is different, so you double-check that the domain in your browser address bar is the correct one.

Obviously normally you don't do anything except click on the account that shows up, since the domain matches.

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#292
post #291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Not at all? Yes: '...you double-check the domain.' That's manually checking for mistakes. > What happens to the passkey when the origin changes, The passkey won't work at all. You will just have to create a new one.

> Yes: '...you double-check the domain.' That's manually checking for mistakes. Yes, but that's only when the origin changed compared to when you added it to the password manager. Same thing for Passkeys, won't work if the origin is different, so you double-check that the domain in your browser address bar is the correct one. Obviously normally you don't do anything except click on the account that shows up, since th…

With passkeys there is nothing to check manually. If it works, you know it's the domain you registered on. If it doesn't work, you log in with a non-phishable auth method like emailed magic link, then register a new passkey.

You could claim that a phishing site could set up their own passkey registration system–but that still wouldn't give them access to the target's real account.

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#293
post #291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> Yes: '...you double-check the domain.' That's manually checking for mistakes. Yes, but that's only when the origin changed compared to when you added it to the password manager. Same thing for Passkeys, won't work if the origin is different, so you double-check that the domain in your browser address bar is the correct one. Obviously normally you don't do anything except click on the account that shows up, since th…

With passkeys there is nothing to check manually. If it works, you know it's the domain you registered on. If it doesn't work, you log in with a non-phishable auth method like emailed magic link, then register a new passkey. You could claim that a phishing site could set up their own passkey registration system–but that still wouldn't give them access to the target's real account.

> With passkeys there is nothing to check manually. If it works, you know it's the domain you registered on. If it doesn't work,

So exactly the same as password managers, there is no functional difference if you were using a password manager...

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#294
post #39

Earlier quoted context omitted.

yubikeys locks up my firefox on both windows and mac, no thanks

Mine works flawlessly in Chrome on MacOS. Maybe you got defective one, or try factory resetting it.

a defective one that works fine in all other browsers?

Re: DuckDB NPM packages 1.3.3 and 1.29.2 compromised with malware

#295
post #254

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Use WebAuthn as the second factor. Passkeys are a single factor authentication, and a downgrade from password+WebAuthn.

Depends on where you store them. If they're in TPM (like WHFB) it's two-factor (because you need the TPM itself, something you have, and PIN or biometric to unlock it, something you know/are). But if you're just loading keys into a software password manager, yes, it's single factor.

At this point, we have passkey support integrated in both major desktop OSes (Windows, macOS) and both major mobile OSes (Android, iOS). All of them require both the physical device and either PIN or biometric unlock.
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