Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…
1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
291–300 of 437 posts
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#292https://medium.com/intigriti/how-i-hacked-hundreds-of-compan...
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#293Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#294Slightly off topic, but why does it always seem to be teenagers who are the most talented at finding exploits?
No responsibilities and all the time in the world to learn with the right circumstances, they can go far.
Older devs who are experts in this area are already busy making money and working on their employer's security.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#295Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…
Presumably one of the PMs you’re referring to has posted this article for additional information. Feels like they’re doubling down on their initial position. https://support.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/8187090244506-...
THEN the researcher eventually goes public.
Later, Zendesk announces the bug and the fix and says there will be no bug bounty because the researcher went public.
Is that how it went? I mean if so, that's one way to save on bug bounties.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#296Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#297Earlier quoted context omitted.
Presumably one of the PMs you’re referring to has posted this article for additional information. Feels like they’re doubling down on their initial position. https://support.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/8187090244506-...
So when the researcher said it was a bug, they said, "No, it's fine. No bug bounty, sorry." THEN the researcher eventually goes public. Later, Zendesk announces the bug and the fix and says there will be no bug bounty because the researcher went public. Is that how it went? I mean if so, that's one way to save on bug bounties.
He should have said since its not going to be fixed, he will just inform the individual companies.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#298Reported this exact bug to Zendesk, Apple, and Slack in June 2024, both through HackerOne and by escalating directly to engs or PMs at each company. I doubt we were the first. That is presumably the reason they failed to pay out. The real issue is that non-directory SSO options like Sign in with Apple (SIWA) have been incorrectly implemented almost everywhere, including by Slack and other large companies we alerted i…
Out of curiosity, do you know of open source projects or any resources that someone less familiar with SSO can use/read to properly implement SSO?
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#299Wait... it looks like Zendesk only fixed the issue of Apple account verification emails being added to tickets, not actually the underlying issue? >In addition to this, we also implemented filters to automatically suspend the following classes of emails: User verification emails sent by Apple based on the Reply-To and Message-Id header values Non-transactional emails from from googleworkspace-noreply@google.com Over…
Only the customer domain owners can fix the underlying issue, which is a missing SPF/DMARC configuration.
Re: 1 bug, $50k in bounties, a Zendesk backdoor
#300Wait - how is that workflow possible and supported?
In my head, authorization under @company.com would be delegated to a central directory, instead of relying on Apple ID. It is effectively an authentication bypass.