Earlier quoted context omitted.
That's not the only defition of probability - and it's a very limiting one. Statistical mechanics is based on the probability of the physical state now and not on the frequency of physical states over time. Sometimes we can assume an hypothetical infinite time evolution and use averages over that but a) it's just a way of arriving at the averages over ensembles that are really the object of interest, b) the theoretic…
>Don't be offended, but "Nobody looks at a future event that he already knows is going to occur and says that the probability of that future event is 100%" is a very strange thing to say. Not offended by your words but I am offended by the way you think. Maybe rather then assuming I'm wrong and your superior, why don't you just ask questions and dig deeper into what I'm talking about. Probability is a mathematical co…
You may be content with an interpretation restricted to talking about frequencies. I prefer a more general interpretation which can also - but not exclusively - refer to frequencies.
Even from a frequentist point of view I find perplexing your suggestion that nobody says that the probability of something is 100% when they are able to predict the outcome with certainty.
Probability may be a mathematical concept separate from reality but when it's applied to say things about the real world not all probability statements are equally good - just like the "moon made of cheese" model is not as good as any other even if it's mathematically flawless. This has nothing to do with Bayesian vs frequentist, by the way, empirical frequencies are not mathematical concepts separated from reality.
It's a perfectly frequentist thing to do to compare a sequence of probabilistic predictions to the realised outcomes to see how well-calibrated they are.
The astronomer that predicts P(total solar eclipse in 2023)=0%, P(t.s.e. 2024)=100%, P(t.s.e. 2025)=0%, P(t.s.e. 2026)=100%, etc. will score better than one who predicts P(t.s.e. 2023)=P(t.s.e. 2024)=P(t.s.e. 2025)=P(t.s.e. 2026)=2/3 or whatever is the long run frequency.
A weather forecaster that looks at satellite images will score better than one that predicts every day the average global rainfall. Being a frequentist doesn't prevent you from trying to do as well as you can.
I did already agree that you _can_ keep your model where the millenary-change ball may be either white or black and make calculations from it. (It just doesn't seem to me a good or useful description of that system once the precise state is known. You _can_ also change the model when you have more information and the updated model is objectively better. I think we will agree that from frequentist point of view predicting a white ball with 100% probability and getting it right every time is more accurate than a series of 50%/50% predictions. And the refined model can calculate the loooooong-term frequency of colours just as well.)