Our only option is minority screech.
Pikachu chooses "minority screech": https://i.imgflip.com/5jfpjo.jpg
Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
291–300 of 860 posts
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#292Apple's track record on user protection compared to Google or Samsung has been very good. For example, resisting wide net Federal "because terrorism" warrants as much as they legally can.
There's a reason why Apple 0 day exploits sell for way more on the black market than Android exploits.
Trust is hard to earn, easy to lose and even harder to regain. User trust is such a huge part of Apple's business and success, it's shocking to me they'd damage it so much and so fast.
A system that exists but has "protections" can and will be abused. A system that doesn't exist can't be. It's really that simple.
Here's the big question though: did Apple executives not realize there would be a backlash against this? Or did they just not care? Either is hard to fathom. Apple's board and shareholders should be asking some pretty tough questions of Tim Cook at this point.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#293How would Apple roll this back?
Seems unlikely, but stepping into "what if", what are people's thoughts on what it would like for Apple? Does it mean Cook resigning, firing a team. How do we get from here to there? Is CSAM on iPhone the next AirPower where it just gets cancelled?
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#294Earlier quoted context omitted.
> Apple is engaging in this activity of their own free will for sake of their own commercial gain What's the commercial gain?
This will likely be paired with the rollout of full encryption for iCloud and they will sell the entire thing as a pro-privacy move.
That would appear to have backfired.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#295Earlier quoted context omitted.
>the system is just a few bit flips away from scanning every photo on your device I prefer to think of it as being just one national security letter away from that happening. Which is of course a schroedinger's cat kinda thing. It's already been sent. Or it hasn't. But why would the national security apparatus not take advantage of this obvious opportunity? Anyone giving benefit of the doubt to this kind of stuff now…
How would the agency issuing an NSL be able to generate a hash of a photo they’re looking for? Presumably if they already had a photo to derive the hash they’d already have whatever it is they’re searching for.
It’s fuzzy hashing, so they don’t need the bit-for-bit same image.
Outside the US and other western countries, this could be a government (Russia? Chechnya?) forcing Apple to look for LGBT pride flags.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#296Earlier quoted context omitted.
By the way they already scan photos that aren’t uploaded to iCloud. I’ve never used iCloud and I can go on the photos app and search for food for example
Right, the difference is that now, you can be reported to the authorities for a photo that the CSAM algorithm mistook for child pornography, whereas before the image classifying was purely for your own use.
This is simply a complete falsehood, because photos that are not uploaded are not scanned for CSAM.
Photos for your own use that you do not upload to Apple’s cloud are completely unaffected.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#297Earlier quoted context omitted.
> But with Apple's CSAM proposal is NOT possible to have an iPhone that Apple isn't continuously scanning. As currently implemented, iOS will only scan photos to be uploaded to iCloud Photos. If iCloud Photos is not enabled, then Apple isn't scanning the phone.
That’s wrong. They are also enabling on-device detection for Messages.
Communication safety in Messages is a different feature than CSAM detection in iCloud Photos. The two features are not the same and do not use the same technology. In addition:
Communication safety in Messages is only available for accounts set up as families in iCloud. Parent/guardian accounts must opt in to turn on the feature for their family group. Parental notifications can only be enabled by parents/guardians for child accounts age 12 or younger.
https://www.apple.com/child-safety/pdf/Expanded_Protections_...
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#298Earlier quoted context omitted.
'Communists' instead of 'socialists' actually; the US version is inaccurate due to anti-communist propaganda.
Do you have a source for that?
The original:
Als die Nazis die Kommunisten holten, habe ich geschwiegen;
ich war ja kein Kommunist.
Als sie die Sozialdemokraten einsperrten, habe ich geschwiegen;
ich war ja kein Sozialdemokrat.
Als sie die Gewerkschafter holten, habe ich geschwiegen;
ich war ja kein Gewerkschafter.
Als sie die Juden holten, habe ich geschwiegen;
ich war ja kein Jude.
Als sie mich holten,
gab es keinen mehr, der protestieren konnte.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#299"The ark of the covenant is open and now all your faces are going to melt" - to paraphrase "The Thick of It".
Prior to this when a government tapped Apple on the shoulder asking to scan for what they (the government) deem illicit material, Apple could have feasibly say "we cannot do this, the technology does not exist".
Now the box is open, the technology does exist, publicly and on the record - Now we are but a national security letter, or a court order with an attached super-injunction, away from our computers and phones ratting us out for thought crime, government critique and embarrassing the establishment. At first it's the photos, but what about messages and browsing history or the legion other things that people use their devices for, when do they follow?
CSAM is beyond abhorrent, morally reprehensible and absolutely should be stopped. This is not in question. And I have no reason to doubt that there is sincerity in their goal to reduce and eliminate it from Apple's perspective.
But they have root; this system and it's implementation is a fundamental betrayal of the implicit trust that their users have placed in them (however foolish it was, in hindsight). It just is not possible to regain that trust now that it is gone, when the level of control is so one sided and the systems involved are so opaque.
Re: Apple's child protection features spark concern within its own ranks: sources
#300Earlier quoted context omitted.
Because if (willBeUploaded) { scanPhoto(); } can become if (true) { scanPhoto(); } Obviously, this is stupidly oversimplified, I have no idea how Apple has structured their code. But the fact of the matter is, if the scanning routine is already on the phone, and the photos are on the phone, all anyone has to do is change which photos get scanned by the routine...
By the way they already scan photos that aren’t uploaded to iCloud. I’ve never used iCloud and I can go on the photos app and search for food for example
Exactly. They already analysed photos on your phone for search. They don’t in fact do CSAM detection on the photos on your phone.
But why are people only objecting now when they were already doing on-device analysis?
CSAM detection is a complete red herring. It is less of a general purpose scanning mechanism than the search function that was already there.