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One Bad Apple

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Re: One Bad Apple

#291
post #64

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> They want to move to e2e for photos so they don't have to keep those keys. That's my suspicion too, but has it actually been confirmed?

Well why else would they bother? This is WAY more complicated than just scanning on their servers.

We have no information to make a decision there. It could be (as you say) because they want to implement E2E cloud, but it could just as well be because they want to start scanning offline content for folks that opted out of iCloud storage (and even if that is not their immediate intent, you can't argue implementing this system doesn't take them 95% of the way to making that possible)

Re: One Bad Apple

#292
post #192
post #148

Earlier quoted context omitted.

>Is it intangible? 18% of the world lives in China alone. That's more people than the "1/10 who are victims of child abuse*", and I'm sure that 18% will only grow as other authoritarian countries get more technologically advanced. You didn't mention any tangible results here. How would this system by Apple make my life worse? Can you answer that without a slippery slope argument? >I think "Think of the kids" applies…

> How would this system by Apple make my life worse? Can you answer that without a slippery slope argument? “With the first link, the chain is forged. The first speech censured, the first thought forbidden, the first freedom denied, chains us all irrevocably. The first time any man's freedom is trodden on we're all damaged...."

This is melodramatic high school Hamlet-ism. It’s also silly - there has obviously been a case where the first speech was censured. It happened before civilizations. Are we all still damaged and bondaged by that?

Look, speech is important. So is protecting the public good. But if one believes in absolutes, rather than takeoffs, they are IMO getting too high on their own supply.

Let’s talk about the trade offs that we have already made.

Re: One Bad Apple

#293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

> I'm surprised, and honestly disappointed, that the author seems to still play nice, instead of releasing the whitepaper. I'm the author. I've worked with different parts of NCMEC for years. (I built the initial FotoForensics service in a few days. Before I wrote the first line of code, I was in phone calls with NCMEC about my reporting requirements.) Over time, this relationship grew. Some years, I was in face-to-f…

I have no idea whether this statistic is true or not, but "nearly 1 in 10 children in the US will be sexually abused" is an incredibly high number. I have no doubt that some cases of sexually abused children must have also existed in the environment where I have grown up as a child, in Europe, but I am quite certain that such cases could not have been significantly more than 1 per thousand children. If the numbers wo…

What makes you quite certain about your 1-1000 number? It’s really easy to mistake our experience for something generalizable.

Re: One Bad Apple

#294

NCMEC has essentially shows that they have zero regard for privacy and called all privacy activists "screeching voices of the minority". At the same time, they're at the center point of a highly opaque, entrenched (often legally mandated) censorhip infrastructure that can and will get accounts shut down irrecoverably and possibly people's homes raided, on questionable data: In one of the previous discussions, I've se…

> I'm surprised, and honestly disappointed, that the author seems to still play nice, instead of releasing the whitepaper. I'm the author. I've worked with different parts of NCMEC for years. (I built the initial FotoForensics service in a few days. Before I wrote the first line of code, I was in phone calls with NCMEC about my reporting requirements.) Over time, this relationship grew. Some years, I was in face-to-f…

> Why haven't I made my whitepaper about PhotoDNA public? In my view, who would it help? It would help bad guys avoid detection and it will help malcontents manufacture false-positives. The paper won't help NCMEC, ICACs, or related law enforcement. It won't help victims.

Making it public would allow the public to scrutinize it, attack it, if you will, so that we can get to the bottom of how bad this technology is. Ultimately my sincere guess is that we’d end up with better technology to do this not some crap system that essentially matches on blurry images. Our government is supposed to be open source, there’s really no reason we can’t as a society figure this out better than some anti CP cabal with outdated crufty image tech.

Re: One Bad Apple

#295

NCMEC has essentially shows that they have zero regard for privacy and called all privacy activists "screeching voices of the minority". At the same time, they're at the center point of a highly opaque, entrenched (often legally mandated) censorhip infrastructure that can and will get accounts shut down irrecoverably and possibly people's homes raided, on questionable data: In one of the previous discussions, I've se…

> I'm surprised, and honestly disappointed, that the author seems to still play nice, instead of releasing the whitepaper. I'm the author. I've worked with different parts of NCMEC for years. (I built the initial FotoForensics service in a few days. Before I wrote the first line of code, I was in phone calls with NCMEC about my reporting requirements.) Over time, this relationship grew. Some years, I was in face-to-f…

> someone usually mocks "it's always about the kids, think about the kids."

Yes, let's think about the kids, please.

I certainly don't want my children to grow up in an authoritarian surveillance state...

Re: One Bad Apple

#296

This made me think of a good point regarding apples error rate of “one in a trillion”. If they are so confident that there won’t be false positive’s why bother sending it to apple for manual review? Clearly they think the error rate will be high enough that a human has to double check everything. But that is not what they are saying.

Apple doesn’t have access to the original CSAM images — only the hashes generated by the agency that produced them, so there could be hashes that don’t match anything illegal that trigger a false positive.

Re: One Bad Apple

#299

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Post your passwords.

That's too short a thought, it detracts from the point. It is bad to post passwords, not just because you lose privacy, but because you'd lose control of important accounts. Asking people to post their passwords is not reasonable. I think you might have a point you're trying to make, but please spell it out fully.

No actually I kind of like it. It boils down the essence of the problem to it's core point-- trust.

Re: One Bad Apple

#300
post #142

Earlier quoted context omitted.

It's a lossy hash match though. If it wasn't, then subtly re-encoding the image would hide it. So they're definitely going to be mistakingly matching images.

And any mistakes would be caught by the manual review.

Which will have its own rate of false positives. Manual review is not a panacea, especially if the original net is cast widely.
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