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Password Managers

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291–300 of 342 posts

Re: Password Managers

#291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

They'd need root access to do half of those things. The other half are bad but not life-shattering.

This obviously depends on your OS and setup, but on Linux + Xorg at least I don't need root access to do any of the things I listed.

Sorry, I must have been very tired last night. This morning, I can't remember (or figure out) which actions I was thinking of when I wrote that.

The only one that still jumps out to me is browser extensions—I'm pretty sure none of the major browsers allow that without user approval within the browser. You'd have to do something nasty which would require root.

Re: Password Managers

#292
post #137

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Last I checked I couldn’t export Chrome passwords (aka offline backup), couldn’t add non site passwords, and couldn’t manage non site based passwords/secrets with chrome password manager. And that was a month ago?

You can import chrome passwords from other browsers so I think you can also export them for backup. I agree that I don't think you can add custom secrets.

Sure enough, looks like I was wrong re: export. Thanks! Unfortunately other things are still an issue - https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/95606

Re: Password Managers

#293

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This makes me wonder about something else: why not just hash the passwords client side and send the hashed value to the server? Better yet, why not make the hashes salted with something like a timestamp (similarly to how TOTP works), so that those hashes couldn't be reused later? What's inside of the private key is a long secret (albeit not a shared one), a password also feels like it should be a secret that's not sh…

shandor explained why the trivial approach you thought of doesn't work. But you can actually have what you're asking for. It's called an Asymmetric Password Authenticated Key Exchange or aPAKE. The IRTF is in the process of recommending OPAQUE for this purpose: https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-irtf-cfrg-opaque... However, given that we're still putting the finishing touches on the OPAQUE recommendation in…

Thanks for the link, it seems like an interesting approach!

Re: Password Managers

#294

Earlier quoted context omitted.

Isn't it encrypted using the Google Account credential, if you don't specifically set a password?

It is locally, but server side it is less obvious. They don't really say explicitly but this page strongly suggests that they are encrypted server-side too: https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/10311524

That page is referring to their password breach detection feature though, not password sync. The sync pages have language which indicates that the encryption is only end-to-end if you use a passphrase. See:

https://support.google.com/chrome/answer/165139?hl=en&co=GEN...

> With a passphrase, you can use Google's cloud to store and sync your Chrome data without letting Google read it. ... Passphrases are optional. Your synced data is always protected by encryption when it's in transit.

Re: Password Managers

#295

I would NOT recommend the chrome password manager. If you sync your passwords, they will not be stored encrypted at the google side. You need to specifically set password encryption in the settings. I've also spend a lot of time with understanding password managers in my master thesis. What I can recommend is: https://pfp.works/ The creator was auditing password managers like LastPass, found a lot of issues, and used…

The instructions on PFP website for how to do various things, they often begin with the following steps: > Click PfP icon on any website > Enter your master password Can't a website just fake a PFP icon to induce you to reveal your master password, and now the website owner has access to all of your generated passwords? Isn't this exactly the type of attack that caused taviso to write OP?

Pfp puts the icon in the browser bar, to counter such action. So the pop-up can only be opened this way and the pop up is in a different context than the website itself.

Yes the pop-up could be faked, but not the button.

Actually Tavis Ormandy found a lot of security breaches in password managers that loaded GUI elements into the website. Not only that you can fake it, but also they are susceptible to clickjacking.

Re: Password Managers

#296
post #252

I would NOT recommend the chrome password manager. If you sync your passwords, they will not be stored encrypted at the google side. You need to specifically set password encryption in the settings. I've also spend a lot of time with understanding password managers in my master thesis. What I can recommend is: https://pfp.works/ The creator was auditing password managers like LastPass, found a lot of issues, and used…

Could you share a link to your thesis?

It's still in the works and unfortunately I've written it in German. If you're still interested I'll share a link as soon as it's released. Should be sometime this summer.

Re: Password Managers

#298
post #243
post #95

> I would recommend using the one already built into your browser. They provide the same functionality, and can sidestep these fundamental problems with extensions. I haven't used the browsers built-in password manager for years, so I don't know what features they have, but I find it hard to believe that they can provide the same functionality as a dedicated password manager. Some of the top features of dedicated pas…

The built-in password manager in Chrome does all of those things, except maybe sharing but it's possible that it supports that as well.

I must be missing something because when I go to the Chrome password manager all I see is this:

https://i.imgur.com/h7ZAGZw.png

When I choose to edit an entry, it only gives me the option to have a username and password. I don't see where to put security questions or backup codes, etc. and searching around for a TOTP generator feature also yielded no results.

https://i.imgur.com/yN5GaDf.png

Re: Password Managers

#299

Earlier quoted context omitted.

This makes me wonder about something else: why not just hash the passwords client side and send the hashed value to the server? Better yet, why not make the hashes salted with something like a timestamp (similarly to how TOTP works), so that those hashes couldn't be reused later? What's inside of the private key is a long secret (albeit not a shared one), a password also feels like it should be a secret that's not sh…

Everything you described is still a shared secret. Hashing your password client side is just a way to create a random, shared password. Yes, an attacker has a much harder time getting to your password, but they don't need to if it's the hash that's the one the server knows and checks against. Asymmetric cryptography with its Math Magic IS the solution industry came up with.

But if the valid hash changes as a function of time (e.g. a time based salt value), does it still matter as much, then? If a stale hash is stolen, then it doesn't allow to log in since it's no longer valid, nor does it allow figuring out the original password.

I find it interesting to reason about all of the interesting ways this could still break, as long as the words of Eoin Woods [1] are followed: "Never invent security tech.", to only reason about these things outside of production environments, and use tested solutions there. In that regard, asymemetric cryptography and the frameworks surrounding it seem to be the one way to go.

Of course, that brings up a further question: why aren't certificates the default way to sign up for sites for end users? Instead of coming up with a password, or using API keys or whatever, why not create a certificate through some sort of a browser/external mechanism instead? It feels like no attempts have been made to make something like that easier, so that it'd replace the concept of passwords.

Thanks for your input, but i guess i shouldn't take up too much of your time.

  [1] https://speakerdeck.com/eoinwoods/secure-by-design-security-design-principles-for-the-working-architect?slide=31 (or in video form: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4qN3JBGd1g8 )

Re: Password Managers

#300

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But if that salted pw gets exposed, can a hacker just guess your pws for other sites? E.g. myBank@thepwialwaysuse

Yes, but you're not important enough for someone to try your password on other sites by hand, and bots are hopefully not smart enough to do this automatically. You should still use a password manager. Or at least a paper notebook.

Do bots need to do this automatically? What if a programmer gets that database and does a quick search for those naive salts? Then he can do some pattern matching and try the same pattern in some sites like PayPal, Apple, Gmail, etc. Generalize it a bit and you can even create a tool to do this for you for every new database leaked.
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