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A Message to Our Customers

apple.com

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Re: A Message to Our Customers

#291

Earlier quoted context omitted.

But this request was made specifically for the phone in the San Bernardino case. In which the owner is dead and the phone is locked. This implies it is possible for Apple themselves to apply an iOS update to a locked phone in order to disable the erase-on-repeated-failure feature.

It implies that the FBI wants Apple to do that. Tim Cook doesn't offer an opinion about how possible that might be. As a matter of principle, he doesn't believe that Apple should be forced to make the attempt. That doesn't stop anyone else from doing so, however. And I suppose that the FBI could seek discovery on all requisite information, take depositions, etc, etc. However, I vaguely recall that discovery can't com…

That's a good point. I guess I figured if they simply can't do it why not say "it's impossible by design," rather than argue the principle?

It seems like their stand would be better saved for when a compromise is requested that is actually possible for them implement.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#292

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Apple 5C is an older phone not even manufactured by Apple anymore, and, for the longest time, Apple had capabilities that allowed them to brute force iPhones under direction of a court order. Apple has some concern, clearly, about it's customer's security, but doesn't care as much about this particular iPhone Model's security, as it does about the general principle that, without explicit legislation such as [1]CA…

I don't understand — if the iPhone 5C is so simple to brute force, why aren't Apple simply doing this for the FBI in this particular case? Why request an entire iOS modification when Apple could do what it has done for previous court orders and just brute force the phone.

My understanding is that the iPhone 5C is not _simple_ to brute force as sold from the store. The FBI is asking Apple to weaken the software in this particular one enough for them to be able to brute-force by creating custom software that would allow them to try millions of passcode combinations rapidly.

In the past law enforcement could use their own tools and Apple didn't have any legal way to say "it is beyond our ability to break it so we can't help you" anyway. After their name showed up on that slide in the Prism leak without their cooperation (meaning they had been stepped around by the FBI. Some of the earlier companies had willingly volunteered data), they stepped up their game and deployed end-to-end encryption and secure enclave to have the ability to say 'we can't help' when forced to.

This technique wouldn't be possible on the iPhone 6 due to the encryption keys being in the hardware secure enclave but they are putting their foot down now so that a legal precedent isn't established forcing them to weaken other models too. That's my understanding of it right now.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#293
post #163
post #2

Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…

I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments). If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially? And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to bu…

> If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists

Schroedinger's Backdoor? ;)

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#294
If they provide to the government what the government wants now, next year the government will come back with even more ridiculous request. Mr.Cook is right - it'd be great if we can avoid creating a precedent.

Oh wait they already did by providing their clients' data. Trying to stop the government now is like trying to stop a high-speed train. Still, good luck to them! Good to know they are not just pushed around without any resistance.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#295

  While we believe the FBI’s intentions are good, it would
  be wrong for the government to force us to build a 
  backdoor into our products. And ultimately, we fear that 
  this demand would undermine the very freedoms and liberty 
  our government is meant to protect.

  Tim Cook
Kudos to this guy for standing up to an idea.

Now on practical notes, this is about security, providing a digitally secure platform to both users and providers, prevent tampering, keeping data secure.

Microsoft could take a cue.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#297
post #2

Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…

Let's get behind Google, Facebook and Amazon to protect our privacy?

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#298
post #163
post #2

Huge props to Apple - here's hoping against hope that Google, Facebook, and Amazon get behind this. One thing I was wondering is how Apple is even able to create a backdoor. It is explained toward the end: "The government would have us remove security features and add new capabilities to the operating system, allowing a passcode to be input electronically. This would make it easier to unlock an iPhone by “brute force…

I don't see how this "reassuring"; to me it's rather very confusing (as mentioned in many other comments). If Apple could in fact write a software backdoor, doesn't it mean that the backdoor exists, at least potentially? And how can one be sure that Apple is the only company able to build that door? At the very least, couldn't the right Apple engineer be either bribed or forced (by terrorists or the government) to bu…

Only Apple has the ability to sign updates to software (barring jailbreak).

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#299

Earlier quoted context omitted.

The Apple 5C is an older phone not even manufactured by Apple anymore, and, for the longest time, Apple had capabilities that allowed them to brute force iPhones under direction of a court order. Apple has some concern, clearly, about it's customer's security, but doesn't care as much about this particular iPhone Model's security, as it does about the general principle that, without explicit legislation such as [1]CA…

I don't understand — if the iPhone 5C is so simple to brute force, why aren't Apple simply doing this for the FBI in this particular case? Why request an entire iOS modification when Apple could do what it has done for previous court orders and just brute force the phone.

Because it sets an awful future legal precedent. If Apple did it once and didn't challenge it, you can be sure that all future government cases involving decryption will cite this case as the new standard of law.

Re: A Message to Our Customers

#300
So the FBI is asking Apple to build a tool that will unlock security measures of an existing iPhone, like the one in the San Bernadino shooting, and allow it to be read.

The problem with this is that no such tool should be possible to build. It should not be a matter of yes or no; it should be simply impossible for Apple to build such a tool without the private key of the user, which Apple does not have.

If it is possible to write a piece of software which can circumvent the protections of the iPhone without the user's private key, then Apple wrote its security software incorrectly. Either they wrote it with an appalling lack of security understanding; or they left in important backdoors, either knowingly or through ignorance. But if they wrote the software correctly and did not create backdoors of which they're aware, then the government's request is actually impossible -- cannot be done.

So which is it, Apple? Is the point moot because you did this right? Or have you already placed backdoors in the product which the FBI is now asking you to exploit for their benefit?

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