Over the past two or three decades it has become increasingly common for large and institutional investors to regularly hold meetings with the senior leadership (and investor relations) teams of the companies with which they have (or are looking to have) significant holdings.
After all, the investor needs to understand the business strategy, the operating conditions, and the particular risks and opportunities available to that business. The company and (particularly) it's management have an interest in increasing demand for the stock, so they normally oblige.
The conversation is not one-way. Stock options mean that the personal financial interests of the senior leadership team are normally well-aligned with that of the investors, so all the parties to these discussions have a mutual interest in the performance of the stock.
Investors have a mandate to maximise return and minimise risk. They have a limited ability to predict the future; an ability which drops precipitously the longer into the future they look. Investing client funds based on unreliable long-term predictions would be an irresponsible dereliction of duty on the part of the fund manager. In addition, measuring the performance of fund managers is also notoriously difficult, so there is a very human need to get as much feedback on performance as possible as quickly as possible. All of these factors combine to exert incredible pressure on the institutional investor to focus on gains in price over shorter time-spans (months rather than years).
This interest and short-term focus will naturally come across in discussions between the investor (=owner) and the senior management in the company. It takes an unusually self-aware, self-confident and self-assured management team to recognize (let alone resist) this inexorable pressure.